Rev. F. T. Smith and others; Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd (consolidated)

The occupier of land may be liable for damage caused by a fire or other hazard started on his premises by a third party only where he has negligently caused or permitted a source of danger to exist and it is reasonably foreseeable that trespassers may interfere with it and thereby spark the danger. Foreseeability alone is not enough to impose a general duty to prevent third‑party deliberate wrongdoing. Where the occupier has knowledge or the means of knowledge of the hazard, he must take such reasonable steps as are open to him to abate the risk.

The appeals arose from actions by owners of neighbouring property against Littlewoods, the owners/occupiers of a disused cinema, after vandals started a fire in the cinema which damaged adjacent premises. The Lord Ordinary found Littlewoods negligent but the First Division of the Court of Session recalled those interlocutors. The House of Lords was asked to decide whether Littlewoods owed a duty to take precautions against vandalism and foreseeable fire risk on their vacant premises. The core issue was whether negligence could be founded on failure to prevent independent third‑party wrongdoing in these circumstances.

1. Disposition: The appeals were dismissed and the interlocutors of the First Division affirmed. The House decided unanimously to dismiss the appeals (Lords Mackay, Goff, Brandon, Griffiths and Keith agreeing in result).
2. Leading reasoning (per Lord Mackay of Clashfern): liability may arise where an occupier negligently causes or permits a source of danger on his land and it is reasonably foreseeable that third parties may trespass and spark that danger. The question whether an occupier should have anticipated and guarded against such a risk is factual and for the judges of fact; appellate intervention should be cautious. Where the occupier had no knowledge and no duty to inspect, the Lord Ordinary was wrong to assume knowledge of certain local incidents and to base liability on them.
3. Support and limits (per Lord Goff of Chieveley): there is no general duty to prevent third parties' deliberate wrongdoing. Special heads of liability exist: (a) duties arising from special relationships or contracts; (b) where an occupier creates or permits an unusual source of danger; and (c) where the occupier has knowledge or means of knowledge of trespassers creating a risk and fails to take reasonable steps to abate it. These situations are narrowly confined and likely to be rare.
4. Concurring observations: Lords Brandon and Griffiths emphasised that assessment depends on the particular facts and that only in exceptional circumstances would an occupier be required to take extreme measures (for example a 24‑hour guard). Bolton v. Stone and Goldman v. Hargrave were relied upon for the standard that reasonable effort must be proportionate to the risk and the occupier's means.
5. Practical guidance: courts should assess (i) whether the occupier created or permitted a source of danger; (ii) whether the danger was such that third‑party interference was the very kind of thing to be anticipated; and (iii) whether the occupier had knowledge or means of knowledge and reasonable steps were practicable to abate the danger. Where effective precautions would be disproportionate or unavailable, duty may be limited.
6. Result: having regard to the facts, the House held Littlewoods were not under a duty to take the precautions claimed and the First Division's recall of the Lord Ordinary's interlocutors was affirmed. Costs were awarded to Littlewoods.

• First Division, Court of Session (Inner House): recalled the Lord Ordinary's interlocutors and allowed Littlewoods' reclaiming motions (1986 S.L.T. 272).
• House of Lords: appeals heard and dismissed; interlocutors of the First Division affirmed (judgment 5 February 1987).