Oladehinde v Immigration Appeal Tribunal

The House of Lords held that immigration inspectors, as senior Home Office civil servants, may validly be authorised by the Secretary of State under the Carltona principle to take initial decisions to serve notices of intention to deport in cases of breach of limited leave or overstaying. The court concluded that immigration officers are not statutory office-holders independent of the executive and that there is no express statutory prohibition in the Immigration Act 1971 or its rules preventing such authorisation (see section 4 and schedule 2). The House of Lords also held that the restriction on appellate review introduced by the Immigration Act 1988 (section 5) confines adjudicators to enquiring only whether there is in law power to make the deportation order for the reasons stated in the notice; challenges to the propriety of the Secretary of State's or inspectors' exercise of power are matters for judicial review.

Background and facts:

• The appellants, Oladehinde (a Nigerian national admitted as a student with a condition prohibiting employment) and Alexander (a national of St Vincent who had overstayed), were interviewed by immigration officers and, following telephone reports to immigration inspectors, were served with notices of intention to deport on grounds of breach of condition/overstay.
• Each appealed. In Oladehinde the adjudicator allowed the appeal on fairness grounds but the Immigration Appeal Tribunal allowed the Secretary of State's appeal. In Alexander the adjudicator and Tribunal dismissed his appeals.

Procedural posture: The Divisional Court quashed the deportation decisions by certiorari on the ground that the Secretary of State could not validly authorise immigration inspectors to make deportation decisions. The Court of Appeal allowed the Secretary of State's appeals and the appellants obtained leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

Relief sought: The appellants sought quashing of the deportation decisions on the basis that immigration inspectors had no lawful authority to take them.

Issues framed by the House of Lords:

• Whether the Secretary of State can validly authorise immigration inspectors to take decisions to deport on his behalf.
• Whether the decisions in the individual cases were in fact taken by the inspectors rather than merely rubber-stamped.
• Whether procedural challenges to who took the decision fall within the restricted appellate jurisdiction created by section 5 of the Immigration Act 1988 or are matters for judicial review.

Reasoning and conclusions: The court examined the statutory framework (Immigration Act 1971 and relevant immigration rules) and concluded that immigration officers are Home Office civil servants rather than holders of independent statutory office. Applying the Carltona principle, the House of Lords held that the Secretary of State may authorise suitably graded immigration inspectors to take deportation decisions so long as there is no specific statutory limitation; the Act contains express examples where personal exercise by the Secretary of State is required, and none applies here. The sworn evidence established that the inspectors personally received reports and took the decisions in these cases, and there was no proper basis to reject that evidence. Finally, the court agreed with the Court of Appeal in R v SSHD, ex parte Malhi that section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1988 limits adjudicators to enquiring only whether, on the facts, there is in law power to make the deportation order; challenges to the exercise or propriety of administrative procedures lie to judicial review.

Appeals dismissed. The House of Lords held that immigration inspectors (senior Home Office civil servants) may be validly authorised by the Secretary of State under the Carltona principle to take initial decisions to serve notices of intention to deport in section 3(5)(a) cases; the inspectors in these cases had sworn they personally took the decisions and there was no basis to reject that evidence; and challenges to the propriety of the exercise of the Secretary of State's power are for judicial review, not the restricted appeal under section 5(1) of the Immigration Act 1988.

Divisional Court: orders of certiorari quashed the deportation decisions [1990] 2 WLR 1195; Court of Appeal: allowed the Secretary of State's appeals and granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords [1990] 2 WLR 1195; House of Lords: appeals dismissed [1990] UKHL 11.