R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, Ex parte Hague

A breach of the Prison Rules 1964 does not itself give a prisoner a private right to damages. Whether breach of an enactment creates such a right depends on legislative intention, determined from the provision and its context. Protection of a particular class is relevant but not sufficient.

A sentenced prisoner is lawfully confined under section 12(1) of the Prison Act 1952. As against the governor and authorised officers acting in good faith, an unauthorised change in the place, regime or conditions of confinement substitutes one form of lawful restraint for another. It does not constitute false imprisonment. Intolerable conditions do not make the detention itself unlawful, although negligence, assault, misfeasance in public office or judicial review may provide an appropriate remedy.

These conjoined appeals concerned private-law remedies available to convicted prisoners. In R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, Ex parte Hague, a prisoner was segregated under rule 43 of the Prison Rules 1964. The Court of Appeal, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 1210, declared the procedure unlawful but rejected his claim for damages for false imprisonment. He appealed.

In Weldon v Secretary of State for the Home Department, the prisoner alleged that officers assaulted him and confined him overnight without clothes in a strip cell. The Court of Appeal, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 465, upheld the refusal to strike out his false-imprisonment claim. The Home Office appealed.

The common issues were whether breach of the prison rules sounded in damages and whether unauthorised segregation or intolerable conditions could render an otherwise lawful imprisonment false.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously dismissed Hague's appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeal's order. It unanimously allowed the Home Office's appeal in Weldon and struck out the allegations of false imprisonment.

2. Breach of statutory duty. Lord Bridge of Harwich and Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle held that the existence of a private cause of action depends on legislative intention ascertained from the enactment in context. A provision's protection of a particular class does not, without more, establish an intention to confer damages. The Prison Rules 1964 are regulatory provisions governing prison administration. Rule 43 did not confer an individual right to damages. The reasoning in Arbon v Anderson and Becker v Home Office was approved.

   On an issue unnecessary to the common ground of decision, Lord Bridge considered section 47 of the Prison Act 1952 broad enough in principle to authorise safety rules carrying private rights. Lord Jauncey considered that rules creating such rights would exceed the power conferred by section 47. Both nevertheless concluded that rule 43 created no such right. Lord Ackner, Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Lowry agreed that no claim lay for breach of statutory duty.

3. False imprisonment. Per Lord Bridge and Lord Jauncey, false imprisonment requires restraint within defined bounds without lawful authority. Section 12(1) of the Prison Act 1952 authorises confinement in any prison. Section 13 places the prisoner in the governor's legal custody. A prisoner has no legally protected residual freedom of movement against the governor or an authorised officer acting in good faith. Segregation or confinement in another part of the prison therefore substitutes one form of restraint for another and does not constitute false imprisonment.

4. Conditions of detention. Per Lord Bridge and Lord Jauncey, breach of the rules, however substantial, does not qualify the authority conferred by section 12(1). Nor do intolerable conditions convert lawful detention into unlawful imprisonment. The contrary dictum in Middleweek v Chief Constable of Merseyside, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 481, was disapproved. Lord Ackner expressly accepted that his earlier dictum was erroneous. Lord Goff and Lord Lowry agreed.

5. Other remedies. The House recognised that wrongful treatment may support judicial review or, on appropriate facts, claims in negligence, assault or misfeasance in public office. Lord Bridge also considered that an officer deliberately imposing restraint outside his authority, or a fellow prisoner acting without the governor's authority, might be personally liable for false imprisonment. Those observations were not necessary to the disposition.

1. House of Lords: In R v Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison, Ex parte Hague, [1992] 1 AC 58, Hague's appeal was dismissed and the Court of Appeal's order affirmed. In the conjoined Weldon appeal, the Home Office's appeal was allowed and the false-imprisonment allegations were struck out.

2. Court of Appeal—Hague: The court, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 1210, allowed the judicial-review application in part and declared the rule 43 procedure unlawful. It refused certiorari and held that damages for false imprisonment were unavailable.

3. Divisional Court—Hague: The judicial-review application was dismissed.

4. Court of Appeal—Weldon: The court, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 465, dismissed the Home Office's appeal from the refusal to strike out the false-imprisonment pleading.

5. Leeds County Court—Weldon: The registrar and, on appeal, the assistant recorder refused to strike out the pleading.