Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire

The House of Lords considered claims for psychiatric injury (commonly described as "nervous shock") by persons not physically injured in the Hillsborough disaster. The court reiterated that liability for such psychiatric injury is more limited than for direct physical injury and that reasonable foreseeability alone does not automatically establish a duty of care.

Three control elements govern recovery: (1) the class of persons whose claims should be recognised (requiring sufficiently close ties of love and affection); (2) proximity in time and space to the event or its immediate aftermath; and (3) the means by which the shock is caused (sight or hearing of the event or its immediate aftermath).

The court held that simultaneous television broadcasts are not generally equivalent to direct sight or hearing of the event and that post-event identification many hours later was outside the immediate aftermath in these appeals. Applying these limits, the appeals were dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to show the necessary proximity or that they fell within the class of persons reasonably foreseeable to be at risk.

This litigation arose from the Hillsborough stadium disaster of 15 April 1989 in which 95 people were killed and hundreds injured. The Chief Constable admitted negligence towards those who were killed or physically injured. Ten claimants, none (or only two) of whom were in the pens where the crush occurred, sued for damages for psychiatric illness allegedly caused by the disaster and sought recovery for "nervous shock."

Procedural posture: The cases were tried before Hidden J, who found for ten of sixteen plaintiffs. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal which allowed the defendant's appeals in respect of nine of the successful plaintiffs and dismissed other appeals. Ten appellants obtained leave and appealed to the House of Lords by way of consolidated appeals.

Nature of claim and relief sought: Damages in negligence for psychiatric illness (nervous shock) said to have been caused by events at Hillsborough or by viewing those events on television or by subsequent identification.

Issues framed: (i) Does reasonable foreseeability of psychiatric injury suffice to found a duty of care to the plaintiffs? (ii) What classes of persons should be recognised as potential claimants (scope of the duty)? (iii) What degree of proximity in time and space is required (including immediate aftermath doctrine)? (iv) By what means must the shock be caused (whether sight or hearing, and whether live television may suffice)? (v) Whether identification in the mortuary many hours later can be part of the immediate aftermath.

Court’s reasoning: The House of Lords reviewed prior authorities (notably McLoughlin v O'Brian and Bourhill v Young) and emphasised that psychiatric injury claims require controls beyond mere foreseeability. The court adopted a tripartite control (class, proximity, means) and treated the proximity requirement as a limit on duty. Close ties of love and affection may give rise to a presumption of foreseeability but must be proved or capable of being presumed. The shock must generally arise from direct sight or hearing of the event or its immediate aftermath; the court declined to equate ordinary television coverage with direct perception in these facts because of editorialing, multiple viewpoints and broadcasting conventions which prevented identifiable sufferers being shown. Mortuary identification many hours after the disaster was also held to be outside the immediate aftermath for these appeals. The court therefore found insufficient proximity or foreseeability in the claims before it.

Wider context: The court noted the incremental development of the law of psychiatric injury, expressed caution about further judicially driven expansions (suggesting that Parliament might be better placed to enact wider remedies) and criticised some recent first-instance decisions which appeared to extend liability.

The appeals were dismissed. The House of Lords held that in claims for psychiatric injury caused by shock reasonable foreseeability alone does not establish a duty of care: recovery is subject to limits defined by (i) the class of persons (requiring sufficiently close ties of love and affection), (ii) proximity in time and space to the event or its immediate aftermath, and (iii) the means by which the shock is caused (generally sight or hearing). Simultaneous television broadcasts and delayed mortuary identification in these cases did not meet the required proximity or means, so the plaintiffs failed.

Trial before Hidden J (judgment 31 July 1990). Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeal which gave judgment on 3 May 1991 allowing the defendant's appeals in respect of nine successful plaintiffs and dismissing others. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted; the appeals were consolidated and dismissed by this House on 28 November 1991. Neutral citation: [1991] UKHL 5.