Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk (Barnet London Borough Council v Smith)

A contractual periodic tenancy granted to joint tenants may, unless its express terms provide otherwise, be determined by an appropriate notice to quit from any one joint tenant. The concurrence of the others is unnecessary.

Continuation into a further period depends upon the continuing assent of every party. A tenant who gives notice withholds that assent rather than disposing of an existing fixed-term interest. The rule therefore differs from the rules governing surrender, exercise of a break clause or other positive dealings with jointly held rights.

The statutory trust affecting jointly owned legal estates under the Law of Property Act 1925 does not alter the efficacy of the notice as between landlord and tenants. Nor does the possible loss of statutory security change the common-law rule.

Mr Monk and Mrs Powell were joint tenants of a council flat under a weekly tenancy terminable by four weeks’ notice. After leaving the flat, Mrs Powell gave the council notice to quit without Mr Monk’s knowledge or consent. The council then sought possession.

The West London County Court dismissed the claim, holding that the notice had not determined the tenancy. The Court of Appeal, in Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk (1990) 61 P. & C.R. 414, allowed the council’s appeal and ordered possession.

The issue before the House was whether one joint tenant could determine a contractual periodic tenancy by notice to quit without the concurrence of the other joint tenant.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s possession order. Lord Bridge of Harwich delivered the leading speech. Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Ackner and Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle expressly agreed with his reasons. Lord Browne-Wilkinson also dismissed the appeal and added reasons addressing joint ownership and the statutory trust.
2. Common-law rule. Per Lord Bridge, a periodic tenancy continues beyond the currently committed period only while every party assents to its continuation. Each joint tenant has agreed to be bound for no longer than the period already entered upon. Unless the clearest contractual language provides otherwise, one joint tenant may therefore give effective notice without the concurrence of the others. The possible loss of statutory security following termination is irrelevant to that common-law question.
3. Authorities. Lord Bridge applied the principle in Doe d. Aslin v Summersett (1830) 1 B. & Ad. 135: a periodic tenant holds the whole only while all relevant parties please. The reasoning in Leek and Moorlands Building Society v Clark [1952] 2 Q.B. 788, Greenwich London Borough Council v McGrady (1982) 46 P. & C.R. 223 and Smith v Grayton Estates Ltd. 1960 S.C. 249 supported the same conclusion. The contrary dictum in Howson v Buxton (1928) 97 L.J.K.B. 749 was given no weight because it was unsupported by reasoning.
4. Nature of the notice. Although giving notice is positive in form, its substance is the withholding of assent to continuation for another period. It is therefore distinguishable from surrendering a fixed term, exercising a break clause or otherwise disposing of jointly held rights. The retrospective treatment of a yearly tenancy as one continuous term, discussed in Candy v Jubber (1865) 9 B. & S. 15, did not alter its prospective dependence upon continuing assent.
5. Statutory trust and contractual terms. Per Lord Bridge, the trust arising under the Law of Property Act 1925 did not extend the tenancy beyond the period for which the parties had assented. Lord Browne-Wilkinson added that even if unilateral notice could amount to a breach of trust between the joint tenants, it remained effective against the landlord unless the landlord participated in the breach. The particular tenancy agreement did not require notice from both tenants.

1. House of Lords: In Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478, the House unanimously dismissed the tenant’s appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s possession order.
2. Court of Appeal: In (1990) 61 P. & C.R. 414, Slade, Nicholls and Bingham L.JJ. allowed the council’s appeal and ordered possession.
3. West London County Court: Judge Roger Cooke held the unilateral notice ineffective and dismissed the council’s possession claim.