R v Gough (Robert)

The House of Lords considered whether the presence on the jury of a neighbour of an alleged co-conspirator required quashing of the appellant's conviction for conspiracy to rob. The central legal principle established is that, in cases of apparent bias whether involving jurors, justices, arbitrators or other tribunals, the correct test is whether there was a real danger of bias (that is, a real possibility that a member of the tribunal might unfairly favour or disfavour a party). The court held that a direct pecuniary or proprietary interest remains a distinct category of automatic disqualification. The court affirmed that section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 gives the Court of Appeal its remedial powers where a real danger of prejudice is found. Applying the real danger test to the facts (a juror who was the next door neighbour of the appellant's alleged co-conspirator, whose affidavit denied recognition or influence), the court concluded there was no real danger of bias and dismissed the appeal.

Background and facts:

• The appellant, Robert Brian Gough, was convicted at Liverpool Crown Court of conspiracy to rob based on a series of robberies. He appealed on the ground that one juror was the next door neighbour of his alleged co-conspirator, David Stephen Gough, and that this created a serious irregularity potentially amounting to bias.
• After sentence, it emerged that a juror (Mrs Smith) lived next door to David Stephen Gough; she later swore an unchallenged affidavit describing limited and confused knowledge of the name 'Gough' and stating that her neighbour did not influence her thinking as a juror.

Procedural posture and relief sought: The appellant sought to have his conviction quashed. The case came to the House of Lords on appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), which had dismissed the challenge to the verdict.

Issues framed by the court:

• Which legal test should be applied when an allegation of apparent bias arises — specifically whether the correct test is a 'reasonable suspicion' test, a 'real likelihood' test, or a 'real danger' test?
• Whether the circumstances in this case (a juror who was a next door neighbour of an alleged co-conspirator) created such a possibility of bias as to require quashing the conviction.

Reasoning and decision:

• The Appellate Committee reviewed conflicting authorities (including Rex v Sussex Justices, Reg v Camborne Justices, Metropolitan Properties v Lannon and Reg v Spencer) and concluded that a single unifying test should apply across jurisdictions: whether there was a real danger (a real possibility) of bias on the part of the tribunal member. The court emphasised that the special category of direct pecuniary or proprietary interest remains automatically disqualifying.
• The court explained that the real danger test reflects the need to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice while avoiding intrusive inquiries into the actual state of mind of decision‑makers. It also explained how the test applies to magistrates' clerks where advice is given to the bench.
• Applying that test to the facts and accepting the appellant's concession that no real danger was shown, the House affirmed the Court of Appeal and dismissed the appeal.

Appeal dismissed. The House affirmed the Court of Appeal and held that the appropriate test for apparent bias in jurors, justices and other tribunals is whether there was a real danger of bias (a real possibility that a tribunal member might unfairly favour or disfavour a party). The court reaffirmed that direct pecuniary or proprietary interest remains a separate ground of automatic disqualification and that section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 governs appellate remedial powers where prejudice is found. On the facts there was no real danger of bias arising from the juror's relationship to the alleged co-conspirator.

Conviction at Liverpool Crown Court (25 April 1991). Appeal to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) which refused the complaint about the juror (order dated 2 June 1992). Appeal to the House of Lords ([1993] UKHL 1) which affirmed the Court of Appeal and dismissed the appeal (20 May 1993).