Attorney-General v Associated Newspapers Ltd

Section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 prohibits disclosure of particulars of jury deliberations by anyone, not merely disclosure by a juror. “Disclosure” bears its ordinary, comprehensive meaning and includes newspaper publication of information that has not already become public knowledge.

The rule favouring a defendant where penal legislation is ambiguous applies only if full consideration leaves the court in real doubt about Parliament’s intended meaning. It does not apply merely because statutory language is linguistically capable of more than one meaning.

The House may alter a punishment imposed for contempt where it is wrong in principle or manifestly disproportionate, but that jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly.

The publisher, editor and City editor of the Mail on Sunday published an article recounting statements, opinions, arguments and votes from the jury’s deliberations in the Blue Arrow fraud trial. The material had been obtained indirectly through purported American researchers who interviewed jurors.

The Attorney-General brought contempt proceedings under section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. The Divisional Court held that newspaper publication amounted to disclosure, found all three appellants in contempt and imposed fines of £30,000, £20,000 and £10,000 respectively: [1993] 3 WLR 74; [1993] 2 All ER 535.

The appellants appealed on the construction of “disclose” and the amount of the fines. The central question was whether section 8(1) applied only to disclosure by a juror or also to subsequent newspaper publication.

1. The appeals were dismissed unanimously. Lord Lowry delivered the leading speech. Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Lloyd of Berwick agreed with his reasons.

2. Per Lord Lowry, “disclose” in section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 bears its plain and ordinary meaning. It covers both a juror’s revelation of deliberations and a newspaper’s subsequent publication of those deliberations. Publication is one manifestation of disclosure. The fact that the information reached the newspaper indirectly did not prevent publication from being a disclosure.

3. Per Lord Lowry, the provision does not ordinarily capture mere repetition of facts that have already become public knowledge. Whether publication reveals previously unknown information, and therefore amounts to disclosure, is a question of fact.

4. Per Lord Lowry, the language, statutory context and legislative mischief all supported the comprehensive construction. The concluding words of section 8(2) pointed away from restricting section 8(1) to disclosures made by jurors. The pre-enactment materials demonstrated longstanding concern that publication of jury-room deliberations would inhibit frank discussion, undermine public confidence and harm the administration of justice.

5. Per Lord Lowry, the word was not ambiguous merely because it could describe disclosure by a juror and disclosure through publication. It comprehensively included both. The principle that ambiguity in penal legislation should be resolved in favour of the defendant applies only where full inquiry and consideration leave the court in real doubt about Parliament’s intended meaning.

6. Per Lord Lowry, the appellants’ reliance on parliamentary history and article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights could not alter the construction because the enactment was clear. He nevertheless observed that a prohibition on potentially harmful publication was compatible in principle with the protection of jury secrecy and the authority and impartiality of the judicial system.

7. Per Lord Lowry, the House had jurisdiction to revoke or amend contempt punishments that were wrong in principle or manifestly disproportionate to the offence or to one another. That jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly. There was no ground for interfering with any of the fines.

1. House of Lords: The appeals against the findings of contempt and the fines were dismissed unanimously: [1994] 2 AC 238.
2. Divisional Court: The court held that publication of the jury’s deliberations infringed section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. It fined the publisher £30,000, the editor £20,000 and the journalist £10,000: [1993] 3 WLR 74; [1993] 2 All ER 535.