R v Adomako (John Ajare)

Gross negligence manslaughter requires proof that the defendant owed the deceased a duty of care, breached that duty and thereby caused the death. The breach must involve a risk of death and be so serious, in all the circumstances, that the jury considers the conduct criminal.

This test is one of degree and is primarily for the jury. Civil negligence alone is insufficient. A judge need not direct the jury by reference to the technical definition of recklessness. The word may be used in its ordinary meaning when appropriate.

The appellant anaesthetist was responsible for a patient during an eye operation. The patient's endotracheal tube became disconnected, interrupting the oxygen supply. The appellant failed to detect or remedy the disconnection before the patient suffered a fatal cardiac arrest. Although negligence was conceded, the issue at trial was whether the conduct was sufficiently serious to be criminal.

The jury convicted the appellant of manslaughter by a majority of 11 to one. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed his appeal in a decision reported at [1994] QB 302. It certified whether, in manslaughter involving a breach of duty, a jury could be directed by the gross negligence test derived from Rex v Bateman and Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions without using the technical recklessness test from Reg v Lawrence.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Mackay of Clashfern LC delivered the leading speech. Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Woolf agreed with his reasons and proposed answer to the certified question.

2. Per Lord Mackay LC, the ordinary law of negligence first determines whether the defendant owed the deceased a duty of care and breached it. The prosecution must then prove that the breach caused the death. The jury must finally determine whether the breach, viewed in all the circumstances and having regard to the risk of death, was so gross that it amounted to a criminal act or omission.

3. The distinction between civil and criminal negligence is one of degree. A very high degree of negligence is required. Some circularity is inherent in asking whether the conduct was sufficiently bad to be criminal, but greater verbal precision would be spurious. The ultimate assessment is properly entrusted to the jury.

4. The House approved the substance of the gross negligence approach in Rex v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8 and Andrews v Director of Public Prosecutions [1937] AC 576. Andrews remained the most authoritative statement of the applicable law.

5. The rule in Reg v Seymour [1983] 2 AC 493, which required a Lawrence direction in motor manslaughter cases together with a very high risk of death, should no longer apply. Its underlying statutory provisions had been repealed by the Road Traffic Act 1991. A single gross negligence approach should apply without a special motor-manslaughter exception.

6. A trial judge need not give the elaborate definition of recklessness associated with Reg v Lawrence [1982] AC 510. The judge may use “reckless” in its ordinary meaning where that assists the jury. Directions should remain comprehensible and should avoid unnecessary elaboration.

7. Read as a whole, the trial judge's summing-up correctly required a high degree of negligence and applied the standard of a reasonably competent doctor. The challenged passage stated a necessary condition for conviction rather than a sufficient one. The Court of Appeal's order was affirmed, the certified question was answered in favour of the gross negligence test, and no order for costs was made.

1. House of Lords: The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The order of the Court of Appeal was affirmed, and the certified question was answered by confirming the gross negligence test.

2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appellant's appeal against conviction was dismissed in the decision reported at [1994] QB 302. The court certified a point of law of general public importance concerning the relationship between gross negligence and recklessness.

3. Trial: The appellant was convicted of manslaughter by a jury majority of 11 to one.