Regina v Kingston

This appeal concerned the legal effect of involuntary intoxication on criminal liability and whether a defence of involuntary intoxication exists where the prosecution proves the requisite mens rea. The House rejected the creation of a general common-law exculpatory defence that would operate when a defendant, although having formed the necessary intent, did so because an involuntary intoxicant disinhibited him. The law remains that where involuntary intoxication results in a lack of the required mens rea (for example because the defendant could not form intent) the defendant may rely on that absence; but where the prosecution proves the necessary intent, involuntary intoxication does not operate as a separate excuse. The decision emphasised the distinction between negating mens rea (which can exculpate) and inventing a new excusatory doctrine that would acquit despite proven intent. The House therefore allowed the Crown's appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal's order and remitted remaining grounds (including any sentence issues) to the Court of Appeal.

Background and facts:

• The respondent, Barry Kingston, was tried at Lewes Crown Court and convicted of indecent assault on a 15-year-old. A co-defendant, Penn, was convicted of administering a stupefying drug to the youth. The prosecution's case was that Penn secretly drugged the boy and that Kingston and Penn then performed indecent acts on the unconscious boy.
• At trial Kingston advanced the defence that Penn had also secretly given him drugs which disinhibited him; he contended that any such involuntary intoxication either negated the mens rea or, alternatively, should afford an excuse. The judge ruled that even if Kingston had been drugged he could not rely on that to avoid liability where the necessary intent was proved, and directed the jury accordingly. The jury convicted; the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, holding that involuntary intoxication could be a defence even where the requisite intent was proved and that the judge had misdirected the jury.

Procedural posture and issues:

• The Director of Public Prosecutions obtained a certificate that a point of law of general public importance arose and appealed to the House of Lords.
• The principal issues were (i) whether a defendant may invoke a defence of involuntary intoxication where the prosecution proves the necessary intent at the time of the offending, and (ii) on whom the burden of proof lies for any such defence.

Reasoning and conclusion:

• The House analysed the distinction between (a) involuntary intoxication that prevents the defendant forming the necessary mens rea (in which event absence of mens rea is a proper issue for the jury and can lead to acquittal), and (b) a putative new defence that would exonerate a defendant who in fact formed the requisite intent but did so because of a disinhibiting drug administered by another.
• The court rejected the existence of a general common-law excusatory defence of involuntary intoxication that applies where intent is proved. The House reviewed authority (including Majewski and the M'Naghten principle), overseas decisions (including Scottish authorities such as Ross and Cardle), and policy and practical considerations (risk of abuse, evidential and forensic difficulties) and concluded that the common law should not be extended to create such a defence. It reiterated that voluntary intoxication is not generally an excuse and that where involuntary intoxication negates mens rea the defendant may be acquitted because the prosecution has failed to prove the mental element.
• The House allowed the Crown's appeal, answered the certified question (first part) in the negative, set aside the order of the Court of Appeal and remitted outstanding grounds, including any appeal against sentence, to the Court of Appeal for further disposition consistent with the House's views.

Appeal allowed. The House held that there is no general common-law defence of involuntary intoxication which exculpates a defendant who has in fact formed the requisite intent; involuntary intoxication can only excuse if it negates the mens rea (i.e. if the defendant lacked the necessary intent). The House therefore set aside the Court of Appeal's decision and remitted remaining issues to that court.

Conviction at Lewes Crown Court (16 March 1992). Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) allowed the respondent's appeal and quashed the conviction [1994] Q.B. 81 (judgment delivered 5 October 1993). Crown obtained certificate of general public importance and appealed to the House of Lords; House allowed the Crown's appeal on 21 July 1994 and remitted remaining grounds (including any sentence appeal) to the Court of Appeal.