R v Kingston

Involuntary intoxication supplies no defence where the prosecution proves the act and the mental element required by the offence. It may nevertheless be relevant evidence when deciding whether that mental element existed.

Mere disinhibition, loss of restraint or inability to resist an existing desire does not negative an intention which was actually formed. Mens rea concerns the legally required state of mind, rather than moral blameworthiness. The absence of moral fault may affect sentence but does not itself prevent criminal liability.

The respondent was convicted of indecent assault after participating in sexual acts involving an unconscious 15-year-old boy. He contended that a co-accused had secretly drugged him, lowering his inhibitions and releasing desires which he would ordinarily have controlled.

The trial judge directed the jury that intoxication had to be considered when deciding whether the respondent possessed the required intent, but that an intent formed while drugged remained an intent. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) quashed the conviction in [1994] QB 81. It held that involuntary intoxication could render an otherwise proved intention non-criminal where the drug removed the accused's self-control.

The certified question was whether involuntary intoxication constituted a defence after the prosecution had proved the necessary act and intention.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Mustill delivered the leading speech. Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Slynn of Hadley agreed with his reasons.

2. Per Lord Mustill, mens rea identifies the state of mind required by the legal definition of the offence. It does not require moral guilt independently of that mental element. The absence of blame for the circumstances which produced an intention therefore does not convert a proved intention into a non-criminal intention.

3. Per Lord Mustill, involuntary intoxication remains relevant to whether the prosecution has proved the required mental element. Where intoxication prevents the accused from forming the necessary intention, the offence is not proved. The policy rules governing voluntary intoxication in Reg v Majewski [1977] AC 443 do not prevent an accused from relying on an incapacity which was not deliberately induced.

4. Per Lord Mustill, there is no additional defence where the accused formed the required intention but a secretly administered drug removed inhibitions or weakened self-control. Mere disinhibition differs from automatism, insanity and an incapacity to form intent. A drugged intent remains an intent.

5. Per Lord Mustill, neither Pearson's case (1835) 2 Lew CC 144 nor the other authorities established a wider defence. The Scottish decisions showed that involuntary intoxication may excuse a total alienation of reason, but not an accused who knows what he is doing and intends it while lacking the ability to refrain.

6. Per Lord Mustill, the House should not create a new common-law excuse for drug-induced disinhibition. Such a defence would be theoretically uncertain, difficult to control and vulnerable to spurious claims. The accused's reduced culpability could ordinarily be reflected through sentence. Any broader reform was more appropriately considered by the Law Commission and Parliament.

7. The first certified question was answered in the negative. The Court of Appeal's order was set aside. The case was remitted to that court to determine the outstanding grounds of appeal, any appeal against sentence, and whether the conviction should ultimately be upheld or quashed.

1. House of Lords: The prosecutor's appeal was allowed unanimously. The order quashing the conviction was set aside, and the case was remitted for determination of the outstanding grounds and, if appropriate, sentence.

2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The respondent's appeal was allowed and his conviction quashed in [1994] QB 81. The court held that secretly induced intoxication could negative criminal intent despite proof that the accused intentionally committed the act.

3. Lewes Crown Court: The respondent was convicted by a majority verdict of indecent assault and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.