R v Brent London Borough Council, Ex parte Awua (Awua, Ex parte)

For the purposes of homelessness and intentional homelessness under Part III of the Housing Act 1985, accommodation need not be settled or permanent. It must be capable of being fairly described as accommodation and be reasonable for the person to continue to occupy.

A housing authority’s duty to secure suitable accommodation for an unintentionally homeless person in priority need does not require permanent accommodation. Temporary accommodation may discharge the duty if it is suitable and the applicant is not likely to become homeless within 28 days. Subject to rationality, the authority may determine the appropriate security and duration.

The settled-residence doctrine concerns whether intervening occupation breaks the causal link between an earlier deliberate departure and subsequent homelessness. It does not define homelessness itself.

A housing authority accepted that the appellant was unintentionally homeless and in priority need. It placed her in temporary accommodation pending an offer of more permanent housing. She refused a suitable offer, whereupon the authority treated its duty as discharged and required her to leave the temporary accommodation.

The respondent authority subsequently decided that she was intentionally homeless. The Divisional Court quashed that decision because the accommodation she had left was not settled. The Court of Appeal restored the respondent’s decision, holding that the temporary accommodation could be regarded as settled because the first authority had accepted the full housing duty.

The central issue before the House was whether “accommodation” under sections 58, 60 and 65 of the Housing Act 1985 had to be settled or permanent.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Hoffmann delivered the leading speech. Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Taylor of Gosforth agreed with his reasons.

2. Per Lord Hoffmann, “accommodation” in sections 58(1) and 60(1) of the Housing Act 1985 means a place which can fairly be described as accommodation and which it would be reasonable for the person to continue to occupy. Reasonableness is assessed in light of the general housing circumstances identified in sections 58(2A) and 58(2B). The statute contains no additional requirement that accommodation be settled or permanent.

3. Temporary tenure does not itself make continued occupation unreasonable. If the person is likely to lose the accommodation within 28 days, section 58(4) treats that person as threatened with homelessness. The physical suitability of accommodation must, however, be assessed against the period already spent there and the anticipated duration of occupation. Conditions tolerable for a short period may eventually become unreasonable.

4. The distinction between settled residence and temporary accommodation retained a separate role in causation. Under Dyson v Kerrier District Council [1980] 1 WLR 1205 and Din v Wandsworth London Borough Council [1983] 1 AC 657, settled residence may break the causal link between a deliberate departure from reasonable accommodation and later homelessness. What persists until that link is broken is the intentionality of the later homelessness, not homelessness throughout the intervening occupation. Lord Hoffmann reserved whether settled residence was the sole means of breaking the link.

5. The duty under section 65(2) is to secure that suitable accommodation becomes available. It is potentially continuing but does not require permanent accommodation or security without limit of time. Provided temporary accommodation is suitable, does not leave the person threatened with homelessness and the authority’s decision is not unreasonable in the public-law sense, its duration and security are matters for the authority. A person later made homeless may apply again, when the authority must make fresh inquiries into priority need and intentional homelessness.

6. The respondent was entitled to conclude that the appellant deliberately ceased to occupy accommodation which it was reasonable for her to occupy until the suitable alternative became available. The hypothetical possibility that she would have left the original accommodation after accepting the alternative did not alter why she actually became homeless. The intentional-homelessness decision therefore stood.

1. House of Lords: Dismissed the appeal unanimously and upheld the respondent authority’s decision that the appellant was intentionally homeless.
2. Court of Appeal: Held that the temporary accommodation could be treated as settled accommodation and restored the respondent authority’s decision. It affirmed the conclusion that the appellant had not ceased to occupy the alternative flat, which she had never occupied.
3. Divisional Court: Quashed the respondent authority’s decision. Sir Louis Blom-Cooper QC held that accommodation under section 60(1) of the Housing Act 1985 had to be settled rather than temporary.