Awua, R (on the application of) v Brent London Borough Council

The House of Lords held that the word "accommodation" in sections 58 and 60 of the Housing Act 1985 should be given its ordinary meaning as a place which can fairly be described as accommodation and, following amendments, which it would be reasonable for the occupier to continue to occupy (see sections 58(2A) and 58(2B)). There is no statutory requirement that the accommodation must be "settled" or permanent before it can be treated as accommodation for the purposes of Part III, nor that the duty under section 65(2) requires provision of permanent housing.

The court rejected the argument that the concept of a "settled residence" should be imported into the basic definition of "accommodation" and confirmed that the causation analysis developed in cases such as Dyson and Din remains applicable to determine intentional homelessness under section 60(1).

Applying those principles, the House of Lords held that Brent was entitled to conclude that the applicant had deliberately caused herself to cease to occupy accommodation at 10b Clarendon Road by refusing the offer at 10 Jellicoe House and therefore could properly decide she was intentionally homeless.

Background and parties:

• The applicant, Miss Awua, had been accepted as homeless and in priority need by Tower Hamlets, which provided her temporary accommodation at 10b Clarendon Road. Tower Hamlets offered her a further flat at 10 Jellicoe House; she refused that offer and was given notice to quit the temporary accommodation.
• She applied to the London Borough of Brent, which concluded she was homeless and in priority need but intentionally homeless, limiting its duty under section 65(3) of the Housing Act 1985. She sought judicial review to quash Brent's decision.

Relief sought: An order quashing Brent's decision that she was intentionally homeless and thereby requiring Brent to accept the full housing duty rather than the limited duty for intentionally homeless persons.

Issues before the court:

• What is the meaning of "accommodation" in sections 58 and 60 of the Housing Act 1985: does it require "settled" or "permanent" residence?
• Whether the occupation of temporary accommodation (10b Clarendon Road) could be treated as accommodation which it would have been reasonable to continue to occupy, so as to permit Brent to find that the applicant became homeless intentionally when she left it after refusing the offered flat.
• The relevance of earlier authorities (notably Puhlhofer, Dyson and Din) and whether they import a settled-residence requirement into Part III.

Court’s reasoning:

• The court construed "accommodation" in Part III in light of Puhlhofer and the 1986 amendments (section 58(2A) and (2B)) and held the word denotes a place that can fairly be described as accommodation and which it would be reasonable, in the local housing context, to continue to occupy; it does not require permanency or settled status.
• The line of authority that uses the "settled residence" concept properly belongs to causation issues (whether a deliberate act which led eventually to homelessness can be disentangled by subsequent settled occupation); that jurisprudence (Dyson/Din) remains good law for causation but should not be imported as a gloss on the meaning of "accommodation" in sections 58 and 60.
• The duty under section 65(2) is to secure that accommodation becomes available; "suitable" (section 69(1)) relates to suitability rather than permanence. A local authority may provide accommodation in stages and may decide the tenure subject to reasonableness and Wednesbury review.
• Applying those principles, Brent was entitled to find that the applicant ceased to occupy accommodation at 10b Clarendon Road as a consequence of her deliberate refusal of the offer of 10 Jellicoe House and that this caused her to be intentionally homeless within section 60(1).

Procedural posture: The Divisional Court quashed Brent's decision; the Court of Appeal reversed on the status of 10b Clarendon Road; the House of Lords dismissed the appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal's approach to that issue.

Appeal dismissed. The House of Lords held that "accommodation" in sections 58 and 60 of the Housing Act 1985 does not require a "settled" or permanent home; the amended sections 58(2A) and 58(2B) require only that it would be reasonable to continue to occupy the accommodation. Applying that interpretation, Brent was entitled to find that the applicant had deliberately ceased to occupy accommodation at 10b Clarendon Road and was therefore intentionally homeless under section 60(1).

Divisional Court (Sir Louis Blom-Cooper Q.C.) quashed Brent's decision on intentional homelessness; Court of Appeal affirmed that the applicant had not ceased to occupy 10 Jellicoe House but held that 10b Clarendon Road could be treated as accommodation for the purposes of intentionality; House of Lords dismissed the appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal's conclusion on 10b Clarendon Road ([1995] UKHL 23).