Martin v Watson

The House of Lords considered the tort of malicious prosecution and whether a private complainant who falsely accuses another to the police can be regarded as having "set the law in motion" so as to be the effective prosecutor. The court accepted the conventional four ingredients of malicious prosecution (prosecution by the defendant, determination in favour of the plaintiff, lack of reasonable and probable cause, and malice) and focused on the first element.

The Lords adopted authorities from other common-law jurisdictions and the Restatement test to the effect that a person who gives information to the police is not normally the prosecutor; however where the information is known to be false, or where the complainant is the only possible source of the facts and thus effectively deprives the police of any independent discretion, the complainant may be treated as having procured the prosecution. Applying those principles, and having regard to the trial judge's findings that the defendant had maliciously given false accusations and was determined that the plaintiff should be arrested, the House of Lords held she had in substance set the law in motion and restored the trial judgment for the plaintiff.

Background and facts:

• Neighbours in a long-running acrimonious dispute. The defendant accused the plaintiff of indecent exposure on several occasions. The contested incident relied on occurred on 20 July 1989; the defendant gave a witness statement to Detective Constable Haynes and attended court with him on 27 July where a warrant for the plaintiff's arrest was obtained. The plaintiff was later arrested, bailed to court and discharged when the Crown offered no evidence.
• The plaintiff sued for malicious prosecution in Bromley County Court. Judge Goodman found for the plaintiff and awarded £3,500. The Court of Appeal by majority allowed the defendant's appeal and set aside that judgment; the plaintiff obtained leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

Nature of the claim and issues:

• (i) Claim: action for malicious prosecution seeking damages for the prosecution which ended in the plaintiff's favour.
• (ii) Issues: whether the defendant can be regarded as having "prosecuted" the plaintiff (i.e. set the law in motion) where she supplied information to the police which led to a police-instigated prosecution; whether the circumstances deprived the police of an independent decision; whether public policy considerations should limit liability for such informers.

Court's reasoning:

• The House of Lords reviewed authorities from India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and earlier English decisions and adopted the principle that supplying information to the police which merely leads to an exercise of the police's uncontrolled discretion ordinarily will not render the informer the prosecutor. However, if the informer knowingly supplies false information, deliberately deceives or otherwise so influences or compels the police that they have no independent discretion, the informer may be treated as having procured the prosecution.
• The trial judge had found that the defendant had repeatedly made untruthful accusations, was determined that action be taken, and was the only person who could testify to the alleged exposure; he inferred that her conduct influenced the detective who obtained the warrant. The House of Lords accepted these findings and conclusions, rejected policy arguments that would immunise such informers, and held the defendant liable.

Procedural posture:

• Trial: Bromley County Court, Judge Goodman — judgment for plaintiff, damages £3,500.
• Court of Appeal: [1994] Q.B. 425 — majority allowed defendant's appeal and set aside trial judgment.
• House of Lords: appeal allowed; trial judgment restored. Costs orders in favour of the plaintiff against the legal aid fund were indicated subject to the usual opportunity for objection.

Appeal allowed. The House of Lords held that where a complainant maliciously gives false information to the police, and especially where the complainant is the only source of the material facts so as to deprive the police of any independent discretion, that complainant may be treated as having set the law in motion and thus as the effective prosecutor. Applying this principle to the trial judge's findings, the defendant had procured the prosecution and was liable for malicious prosecution.

Trial: Bromley County Court, Judge Goodman — judgment for plaintiff dated 13 July 1992 (damages £3,500). Court of Appeal: appeal allowed by majority, judgment reported at [1994] Q.B. 425 (Ralph Gibson and Hobhouse L.JJ. majority; McCowan L.J. dissenting). House of Lords: appeal allowed [1995] UKHL 25 (13 July 1995).