Martin v Watson

For malicious prosecution, a private complainant may be the prosecutor even though the police formally initiated the proceedings. Liability depends on substance: the complainant must have procured or been actively instrumental in the prosecution. Merely giving honest information and leaving the police to exercise independent discretion is insufficient. Where a complainant knowingly and maliciously supplies a false accusation, offers to give evidence and alone possesses the alleged facts, the police may have no practical opportunity for independent judgment. A resulting prosecution may then be treated as procured by the complainant. The claimant must still prove favourable termination, absence of reasonable and probable cause, and malice.

Martin v Watson arose from prolonged antagonism between neighbours. The defendant repeatedly accused the plaintiff of indecent exposure. After she gave the police a witness statement and expressed her willingness to testify, a detective obtained an arrest warrant. The plaintiff was charged, but the Crown Prosecution Service offered no evidence and he was discharged.

Judge Goodman in Bromley County Court found that the defendant had actively set the law in motion. He entered judgment for the plaintiff in malicious prosecution and awarded £3,500 damages. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, reversed that judgment because the defendant had not signed the charge sheet: [1994] Q.B. 425.

The central issue before the House was whether a private complainant who knowingly made false and malicious allegations could be regarded as having procured a police prosecution despite not being its formal prosecutor.

Held, unanimously allowing the appeal:

1. Disposition. Lord Keith of Kinkel delivered the leading speech. Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead and Lord Steyn expressly agreed with his reasons. The House set aside the order of the Court of Appeal, [1994] Q.B. 425, and restored Judge Goodman’s judgment for the plaintiff.
2. The meaning of prosecutor. Per Lord Keith, the court must examine who was responsible in substance for initiating the criminal proceedings. A person may procure a prosecution without signing the charge sheet or laying the information. Conversely, a person who merely gives information believed to be true, after which the police independently decide to prosecute, is not thereby the prosecutor. The formal conduct of the proceedings by the police does not exclude liability where the complainant was in fact instrumental in putting the law in motion.
3. False information and police discretion. Per Lord Keith, knowingly false information may prevent an intelligent and independent exercise of police discretion. Where a complainant falsely and maliciously accuses a person, declares a willingness to give evidence and is the only possible source of the alleged facts, an intention that the accused should be prosecuted may properly be inferred. If the police prosecute because of that accusation, the complainant has procured the proceedings.
4. Application. The trial judge was entitled to infer procurement. The defendant repeatedly made untruthful allegations, wanted action to be taken, accompanied the detective to the magistrates’ court and was the only person capable of supporting the alleged offence. Her accusation caused the detective to obtain the warrant. She was therefore properly regarded as the prosecutor.
5. Policy and immunity. Lord Keith rejected the suggested chilling effect on genuine complaints. A claimant must prove both malice and want of reasonable and probable cause, so an honest complainant is protected. He further reasoned that witness immunity does not justify denying a remedy for malicious abuse of the court’s process merely because evidence or a statement to the police formed one step in that abuse.

The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s Court of Appeal costs. The plaintiff was entitled to his House of Lords costs from the legal aid fund, subject to the usual opportunity for objection.

1. House of Lords: Unanimously allowed the plaintiff’s appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal’s order and restored Judge Goodman’s judgment.
2. Court of Appeal: By a majority, Ralph Gibson and Hobhouse L.JJ., McCowan L.J. dissenting, allowed the defendant’s appeal and set aside the County Court judgment: [1994] Q.B. 425.
3. Bromley County Court: Judge Goodman held that all four ingredients of malicious prosecution were proved, entered judgment for the plaintiff and awarded £3,500 damages.