Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment (Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Manchester Ship Canal Co, Bolton Metropolitan District Council v Trafford Park Development Corpn)

A planning decision-maker must consider every material consideration but need not mention each one in the decision letter. The reasons must be intelligible and sufficiently detailed to disclose the conclusions reached on the principal important controversial issues. They need not address every subsidiary consideration or peripheral argument.

An omission may justify an inference that a principal issue was overlooked, or that the decision lacked a rational basis, only where the other known facts and circumstances point overwhelmingly towards a different decision. The adequacy and rationality of reasons must be assessed fairly and as a whole, with due respect for the decision-maker’s planning judgment.

A developer sought planning permission for a major shopping centre at Trafford Park. Following two public inquiries, the Secretary of State accepted the inspector’s recommendation and granted permission. Eight local authorities and other opponents challenged the decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

Schiemann J rejected allegations that the Secretary of State had overlooked material considerations, acted perversely or given inadequate reasons: (1993) 67 P & CR 333. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the decision: (1994) 69 P & CR 324.

The central issues before the House were whether the decision letter adequately addressed urban regeneration and the possible reservation of the site for high-technology industry, and whether the Secretary of State’s planning judgment was irrational.

1. The appeal was allowed unanimously and Schiemann J’s order was restored. Lord Lloyd of Berwick delivered the leading speech. Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Mustill, Lord Slynn of Hadley and Lord Steyn agreed with his reasons.

2. Per Lord Lloyd, sections 70(2) and 77(4) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 required the Secretary of State to consider the development plan and every other material consideration. Rule 17(1) of the Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1988 required written notification of the decision and reasons. Those duties did not require the decision letter to mention every material consideration or answer every argument. It had to disclose, intelligibly and adequately, the conclusions reached on the principal important controversial issues.

3. Per Lord Lloyd, the Court of Appeal’s requirement that a decision letter should refer to each material consideration imposed an unjustifiable burden. An inference from an omission is confined to a principal issue and arises only where the other known facts and circumstances point overwhelmingly towards a different decision.

4. Per Lord Lloyd, the Secretary of State had considered the changed national policy, weaker retail conditions, later permissions and evidence concerning the effects of out-of-town centres. The drafting was brief and sometimes poor, but it disclosed the decisive reason: the inspector had attached limited weight to retail-spending projections, and the later material did not justify rejecting his broader assessment or reopening the inquiry. Matters such as the ASDA permission, Shudehill and experience at Sheffield and Dudley were subsidiary elements of the overall urban-regeneration issue and did not require separate treatment.

5. Per Lord Lloyd, the Secretary of State also considered whether the land should be reserved for high-technology industry. The shortage of suitable industrial land was one aspect of that issue, and its omission from the letter did not establish that it had been disregarded.

6. Per Lord Lloyd, the balance between regeneration benefits and harm to existing centres was a matter of planning judgment. Although the objections were powerful and conditions had changed, the known circumstances did not point overwhelmingly towards a different decision. The grant of permission was therefore not perverse. It was unnecessary to decide the alternative arguments concerning substantial prejudice and discretionary relief under section 288.

1. House of Lords: Allowed the appeal unanimously and restored the order of Schiemann J: [1995] UKHL 26.

2. Court of Appeal: Allowed the opponents’ appeal and quashed the Secretary of State’s decision: (1994) 69 P & CR 324.

3. High Court: Schiemann J rejected the challenge under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990: (1993) 67 P & CR 333.