X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council

This House considered the circumstances in which public authorities and their servants may be liable in private law for damage arising from the performance or non‑performance of statutory functions. The court distinguished three relevant categories: (A) claims for breach of statutory duty simpliciter; (B) claims based solely on careless performance of statutory duties where no freestanding common‑law duty exists; and (C) claims founded on a common‑law duty of care (including vicarious liability for servants' professional negligence).

The court held that, as a general rule, regulatory and social‑welfare statutes (including the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, Child Care Act 1980 and the Children Act 1989) do not give rise to a private cause of action for damages unless Parliament plainly intended to create such a right. The careless exercise of statutory powers does not of itself create a private claim unless a common‑law duty of care existed or arose from the relationship between the parties (applying the Caparo three‑part test).

Applying those principles the court dismissed the child abuse appeals: statutory duties did not confer private rights of action and public‑policy and systemic considerations precluded imposing a common‑law duty of care on social‑services authorities in this field; witness immunity protected a psychiatrist’s investigatory evidence. In the education appeals the court held that local education authorities do not owe a common‑law duty in the exercise of statutory discretions under the Education Acts, but may owe ordinary professional or operational duties (for example in running a psychology service or for negligent advice or where individual teachers/advisors assume professional duties) which can support vicarious liability.

The House of Lords heard conjoined appeals arising from alleged failures by local authorities in two areas: child protection (Bedfordshire and Newham) and provision for children with special educational needs (Dorset, Hampshire and Bromley). The defendants applied to strike out the statements of claim. The Lords analysed whether plaintiffs could recover in private law for (i) breach of statutory duty simpliciter, (ii) negligent performance of statutory functions absent any common‑law duty, or (iii) breach of an independent common‑law duty of care (including vicarious liability and misfeasance issues).

Procedural posture: These were appeals from striking‑out orders and from decisions of the Court of Appeal ([1994] 2 W.L.R. 554; [1994] 3 W.L.R. 853), decided on the assumed truth of pleaded facts. The court proceeded by statutory construction and established tort principles, emphasising that novel negligence duties should be imposed only incrementally and by analogy with established categories (Caparo test).

Nature of relief sought: damages for personal injury/loss said to flow from local authorities' alleged negligence or statutory breaches; in some claims vicarious liability of authorities for negligence of professionals and an argument that investigatory evidence was protected by witness immunity.

Issues framed: (i) whether the challenged statutes created private causes of action; (ii) whether careless performance of statutory duties gives rise to a private action absent a common‑law duty; (iii) whether a common‑law duty of care arose (directly or via servants) and, if so, whether public‑law, policy or justiciability considerations precluded it; (iv) whether witness immunity protected investigatory evidence; and (v) where appropriate, whether vicarious liability attached for professional negligence.

Court’s reasoning (concise):

• Category (A): statutory duties must be construed to ascertain whether Parliament intended a private right; general regulatory/welfare schemes are ordinarily for the public at large and do not ordinarily imply private damages remedies. The particular language of the 1969, 1980 and 1989 children statutes was inconsistent with a private right of action.
• Category (B): Geddis and related authority show that statutory authority can be a defence to an otherwise actionable common‑law wrong only if the statutory power was exercised with due care; however, mere carelessness in performing a statutory function does not by itself create a new private cause of action.
• Category (C): a common‑law duty of care can arise where the relationship and proximity and the Caparo factors support it, but such a duty will not be imposed where it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme, involve non‑justiciable policy choices, or risk unacceptable interference with statutory multi‑agency procedures.
• Witness immunity: a professional instructed to investigate possible criminal/child‑protection matters and whose findings are effectively evidence in likely protective proceedings is immune from subsequent civil suit based on those investigatory statements.

Application to the appeals: The child‑abuse claims were struck out — no private statutory cause of action and public‑policy and systemic considerations (including multi‑agency procedures and risk of defensive practice) precluded a common‑law duty; witness immunity protected the psychiatrist’s investigatory role. In the education cases the court declined to impose a common‑law duty in respect of the exercise of statutory discretions under the Education Acts but allowed that operational and professional duties (for example educational psychologists, advisory teachers or a psychology service run by the authority) could give rise to a duty and support vicarious liability; some claims were struck out accordingly and others permitted to proceed (the House varied the Court of Appeal orders as to Dorset and Bromley).

Appeals were dismissed or varied as appropriate. The House held that (1) breach of broad regulatory or welfare statutory duties does not ordinarily give rise to a private right of action for damages unless Parliament clearly intended this; (2) careless exercise of statutory powers does not of itself create a new private cause of action — liability requires a freestanding common‑law duty of care; (3) public‑policy, justiciability and the statutory multi‑agency framework preclude imposing a common‑law duty of care on local social‑services authorities in the child‑protection context; (4) witness immunity protects investigators whose reports and opinions are or will be used in protective proceedings; and (5) education authorities do not owe a common‑law duty in the exercise of statutory discretions under the Education Acts but may incur liability for operational/professional negligence (including vicarious liability for educational psychologists or teachers who assume professional duties). The House therefore dismissed the child abuse appeals and in the education appeals struck out claims seeking to impose duties in the exercise of statutory discretions while permitting claims based on operational/professional negligence to proceed in appropriate cases.

The appeals reached the House of Lords from decisions below including the Court of Appeal ([1994] 2 W.L.R. 554 and [1994] 3 W.L.R. 853). Underlying striking‑out decisions were made at first instance (Turner J.; Master Topley; Master Murray; Otton J. and others). The House reviewed those strike‑out orders and the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and made final orders on 29 June 1995.