Hunter and Others v. Canary Wharf Ltd; Hunter and Others v. London Docklands Corporation

The House of Lords decided two preliminary issues about private nuisance. First, interference with television reception caused simply by the presence of a neighbouring building (in this case the Canary Wharf Tower) is not, as a matter of law, an actionable private nuisance. Second, a claimant ordinarily must have an interest in the affected land — normally the right to exclusive possession — to bring an action in private nuisance; the Court declined to extend standing to all persons merely resident in a home. The House treated earlier authorities (notably Malone v. Laskey and Foster v. Warblington U.D.C.) as determinative of the scope of locus standi and considered policy, planning controls and comparative law in reaching its conclusions.

The appeals concern two actions by local residents arising from development on the Isle of Dogs: (1) claims for loss and inconvenience from interference with television reception allegedly caused by the Canary Wharf Tower, and (2) claims for damage and annoyance from excessive dust produced in constructing the Limehouse Link Road. The plaintiffs sought damages in nuisance (negligence claims were abandoned in part).

The court was asked to decide two preliminary legal issues: (i) whether interference with television reception can give rise to an actionable private nuisance, and (ii) whether a claimant must have an interest in the land affected (and if so what interest) to sue in private nuisance.

• Procedural posture: preliminary issues were determined at first instance by Judge Havery Q.C., then considered by the Court of Appeal which reversed on both issues (holding that TV interference was not actionable but that occupation of a home sufficed for standing). The plaintiffs in the television action and the defendants in both actions appealed to the House of Lords.
• Court’s reasoning on television interference: the House accepted the long-standing proposition that, absent an easement or some special emanation from the defendant’s land, an owner is generally free to build on his land even if that building obstructs light, view or other transmissions; to create a cause of action against the mere presence of a building would be to extend negative easements and impose an indeterminate burden on developers. The planning system and other remedies (for example obtaining alternative transmission arrangements) make it inappropriate to develop nuisance law in this way. Accordingly the complaint that the tower merely obstructed television signals did not establish an actionable private nuisance in the circumstances of this case.
• Court’s reasoning on locus standi: nuisance is a tort traditionally directed at rights in land. The House held that the plaintiffs must ordinarily have a proprietary or possessory interest — typically exclusive possession as owner, tenant or a licensee with exclusive possession — to sue. Exceptional cases such as Foster (de facto possession) remain available, but the attempt to broaden standing to all persons “occupying a property as a home” (including mere licensees and some visitors) was rejected as undermining the character of the tort and complicating assessment of damages. The Court therefore overruled to that extent Khorasandjian v. Bush and restored the narrower rule based on possession or title.

The House considered comparative and policy arguments (including planning statutory regimes and international human-rights materials) but concluded that the changes urged by the plaintiffs would be better addressed by statute or planning processes rather than by expanding the scope of private nuisance.

Appeal allowed in part. The House dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal in the television action because interference with television reception caused solely by the presence of a building is not, as a matter of law, an actionable private nuisance in the circumstances of this case. The House allowed the defendants' appeals/cross-appeals on locus standi and held that ordinarily only a person with an interest in the affected land (normally exclusive possession) can sue in private nuisance, save for established narrow exceptions (for example de facto possession as in Foster). The Court therefore declined to adopt the broader test of standing based on mere occupation 'as a home' adopted by the Court of Appeal.

Preliminary issues were decided by His Honour Judge Richard Havery Q.C. (first instance). The Court of Appeal reversed on both issues (reported at [1996] 2 W.L.R. 348), holding that interference with television reception was not actionable and that occupation as a home sufficed for standing. The House of Lords ([1997] UKHL 14; [1997] AC 655) affirmed that interference with television by the mere presence of a building is not actionable and restored the narrower rule on standing, overruling to that extent Khorasandjian v. Bush [1993] QB 727.