Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (Hunter v London Docklands Development Corpn)

Private nuisance protects interests in land. A claimant ordinarily requires a proprietary or possessory interest, including de facto exclusive possession. Mere residence or a non-exclusive licence is insufficient.

Damages for interference with amenity compensate the diminished utility of the land. They do not multiply according to the number of residents. Absent an easement, covenant or comparable right, the lawful presence of a building is not an actionable nuisance merely because it obstructs television signals, light, air or a view. Electrical or other emanations affecting reception may present a different question.

Two related actions arose from the redevelopment of London Docklands. Residents alleged that the Canary Wharf Tower obstructed television signals and that construction of the Limehouse Link Road generated excessive dust. Preliminary issues concerned whether television interference caused by a building could constitute private nuisance and whether a claimant required an interest in the affected land.

Judge Havery QC held that exclusive possession was required but that television interference was capable of constituting nuisance. The Court of Appeal, reported at [1996] 2 W.L.R. 348, reversed both conclusions. It held that occupation as a home supplied sufficient standing, while obstruction of television signals by a building was not actionable. The residents appealed on television interference, and the defendants appealed or cross-appealed on standing.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously dismissed the residents’ appeal concerning television reception. By a majority of four to one, it allowed the defendants’ appeal and cross-appeal on standing and restored Judge Havery QC’s order requiring the relevant proprietary or possessory interest.

2. Standing in private nuisance. Lord Goff, Lord Lloyd, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope held that private nuisance is a tort against land. A claimant must ordinarily be a freeholder, tenant, reversioner whose interest is affected, or licensee with exclusive possession. De facto exclusive possession may suffice against a wrongdoer because a defendant cannot rely upon a third party’s better title. A person who merely resides in the property, including a spouse, child or other non-exclusive licensee, has no independent cause of action.

3. Nature and measure of loss. Lord Lloyd, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope reasoned that nuisance affecting comfort or convenience remains an injury to the utility or amenity value of land. It is not a personal claim for each resident’s discomfort. Compensation therefore does not increase merely because more people occupy the property or because proprietary interests have been subdivided. Personal injury ordinarily belongs within negligence.

4. Earlier authority. Lord Goff and Lord Lloyd concluded that Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 must be overruled so far as it permitted a mere licensee to sue in private nuisance. Lord Hoffmann treated that decision as potentially sustainable as a case of intentional harassment, but not as authority extending private nuisance beyond interests in land.

5. Television reception. Lords Goff, Lloyd, Hoffmann and Hope held that, absent an easement, covenant or agreement, an owner is generally free to build on the owner’s land. The mere presence of a building is not actionable because it obstructs something that would otherwise reach neighbouring land. The Tower’s obstruction of television signals therefore did not constitute private nuisance. Electrical interference or another emanation might present a different case.

6. Lord Cooke’s separate opinion. Lord Cooke agreed that the television claim failed, principally because the authorised development was a reasonable use of the land. He considered that malicious construction or breach of applicable planning restrictions might produce a different result. He dissented on standing, preferring occupation as a home as a sufficient link for family members and other substantial residents claiming interference with domestic amenities.

1. House of Lords: In [1997] UKHL 14, dismissed the residents’ television appeal, allowed the defendants’ appeal and cross-appeal on standing, and restored Judge Havery QC’s order on that issue.
2. Court of Appeal: In [1996] 2 W.L.R. 348, held that occupation as a home supplied standing in private nuisance, but that obstruction of television reception by the presence of a building was not actionable.
3. County Court: Judge Havery QC held that a right to exclusive possession was necessary to sue in private nuisance, but that interference with television reception was capable of constituting an actionable nuisance.