Regina v. Burstow; Regina v. Ireland

A recognisable psychiatric illness may constitute “bodily harm” under sections 18, 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. Mere fear, distress or other emotion without an identifiable clinical condition is insufficient.

For section 20, grievous bodily harm may be “inflicted” without an assault, physical violence or direct contact. Conduct causing psychiatric injury may satisfy that requirement.

An assault may be committed through words or silence, including a silent telephone call. The question is whether, in its whole context, the conduct intentionally or recklessly caused the victim to apprehend immediate and unlawful violence. Whether that requirement is met ordinarily depends on the facts.

These conjoined appeals concerned campaigns of harassment which caused recognisable psychiatric illnesses. Ireland pleaded guilty to three offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm under section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, following repeated silent or heavy-breathing telephone calls. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal in [1997] Q.B. 114.

Burstow pleaded guilty to inflicting grievous bodily harm under section 20 after persistently harassing a former partner through telephone calls, surveillance, unwanted appearances, offensive material and a menacing note. His appeal was dismissed in [1997] 1 Cr.App.R. 144.

The House considered whether psychiatric illness could amount to bodily harm; whether section 20 required physical violence or an assault; and whether silent telephone calls could amount to an assault for section 47.

1. Both appeals were dismissed unanimously. Lord Steyn delivered the leading speech. Lord Goff, Lord Slynn, Lord Hope and Lord Hutton agreed that both appeals should be dismissed, although Lord Slynn emphasised that the factual application of immediacy in Ireland did not arise for decision.

2. Per Lord Steyn, recognisable psychiatric illness is capable of constituting “bodily harm” under sections 18, 20 and 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. Modern psychiatry recognises anxiety and depressive neuroses as illnesses affecting the body's central nervous system. Mere fear, distress or panic, without an identifiable clinical condition established where necessary by psychiatric evidence, does not suffice. The reasoning in Reg. v. Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689 was approved.

3. Per Lord Steyn, the 1861 Act is generally an “always speaking” statute. Its ordinary words must be interpreted in the light of contemporary knowledge and conditions. The draftsman's subjective understanding of psychiatric illness in 1861 was immaterial.

4. Per Lord Steyn and Lord Hope, “inflict” in section 20 does not require an assault, physical violence or the direct or indirect application of force to the victim's body. In the context of criminally caused psychiatric injury, “inflict” and “cause” have no material practical difference, although “inflict” conveys detriment. A person may therefore inflict grievous psychiatric harm through a campaign of harassment. The restrictive reasoning in Reg. v. Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 no longer governed this issue.

5. Per Lord Steyn and Lord Hope, assault includes an act which intentionally or recklessly causes another to apprehend immediate and unlawful violence. Words alone can constitute such an assault. Silence may also do so when viewed in its whole context. Repeated silent telephone calls may communicate a menacing message and cause apprehension that personal violence is imminent.

6. Whether a call caused the required apprehension is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Lord Hope and Lord Hutton stressed that immediacy depends on the circumstances. Ireland's deliberate and unequivocal guilty pleas meant that further factual exploration was unnecessary. It was not warranted to entertain an appeal based solely on alleged insufficiency of evidence after those pleas.

1. House of Lords: Both appeals were dismissed unanimously. The House upheld the convictions and affirmed that recognisable psychiatric illness may be bodily harm, that section 20 does not require physical violence, and that silent telephone calls are capable in law of amounting to assault.

2. Court of Appeal—Ireland: In [1997] Q.B. 114, the court dismissed Ireland's appeal following his guilty pleas under section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. It held that psychiatric injury could amount to bodily harm and that menacing repeated telephone calls could cause apprehension of immediate and unlawful violence.

3. Court of Appeal—Burstow: In [1997] 1 Cr.App.R. 144, the court granted leave but dismissed the appeal from Burstow's section 20 conviction. It held that grievous psychiatric injury could be inflicted without physical violence applied directly or indirectly to the victim.