Republic of India and Others v. India Steamship Company Ltd

The House of Lords held that section 34 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 operates as a bar to proceedings in England and Wales where a judgment on the same cause of action has already been given in favour of the claimant in foreign proceedings between the same parties, and that an Admiralty action in rem, once the Admiralty Court is seized, is to be treated as proceedings against the shipowners for the purposes of section 34. The court applied a historical and purposive analysis of actions in rem (including the procedural theory developed since the Judicature Acts) and concluded that domestic policy behind section 34 favours treating in rem proceedings as involving the same parties. The court also held that the appellants had failed to establish estoppel by convention or estoppel by acquiescence which could have defeated section 34, and that the word "brought" in section 34 encompassed proceedings continued after initiation. The House therefore dismissed the appeal.

The respondents (the Indian Government) shipped munitions on the vessel Indian Grace. After a fire and jettison of part of the cargo, they obtained judgment in a local Indian court (Cochin) for a small shortage claim. Later they issued writs in the English Admiralty Court in rem alleging the larger claim that cargo in No.3 hold was damaged and worthless. The shipowners relied on section 34 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 to strike out the English proceedings on the ground that a judgment had already been given in favour of the plaintiffs in foreign proceedings on the same cause of action.

The issues before the House of Lords were:

• whether an Admiralty action in rem is "between the same parties, or their privies", within the meaning of section 34;
• whether the shipowners were estopped (by convention or by acquiescence) from relying on section 34;
• whether the English proceedings were "brought" within the meaning of section 34 where the foreign judgment was obtained after the English writ had been issued; and
• whether the abuse of process principle in Henderson v Henderson could independently defeat the in rem proceedings.

The House analysed the historical development of actions in rem, rejected the old personification fiction as inconsistent with later authority, and followed a procedural realist line: once the Admiralty Court is properly seized the action in rem is effectively an action against the owners. The court relied on a series of authorities (including sovereign immunity decisions and later appellate authority) and the ECJ decision in Maciej Rataj to support the proposition that an in rem action and an in personam action can involve the same parties and cause of action. On estoppel the House held that the plaintiffs had not shown the required common assumption for estoppel by convention nor any conduct that would give rise to estoppel by acquiescence. On the timing point the court construed "brought" purposively (with support from an analogous decision on the Warsaw Convention) to include continued proceedings. Because section 34 applied and was not defeated by estoppel, the House did not need to decide the Henderson point. The appeal was dismissed.

(Nature of relief sought): the plaintiffs sought to proceed in the English Admiralty Court in rem for damages for loss and damage to cargo and to obtain security; the court denied the claim on the jurisdictional/issue-preclusion ground created by section 34.