Regina v. Acott

The House of Lords considered whether a trial judge must leave provocation under section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 to the jury where there was no evidence of specific provoking conduct. The court held that section 3 applies only if there is some evidence that the defendant was provoked by things done or said such that he might have lost his self-control; the judge must decide whether there is such evidence before leaving the matter to the jury. Mere speculation, suggestions in cross-examination or inference from the severity of injuries alone do not oblige a judge to leave provocation to the jury. In this case the trial judge rightly excluded provocation because there was no evidence of specific provoking words or acts causing a loss of self-control.

Background and facts:

• The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court on 19 June 1995 of the murder of his 78‑year‑old mother. He had telephoned for an ambulance; the deceased was found with multiple head, face and neck injuries. The appellant consistently denied attacking his mother, saying she fell and that his attempts to resuscitate her caused injuries. Three pathologists gave conflicting views about whether the injuries showed a sustained attack.
• Procedural history: the appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), which dismissed the appeal and certified a point of law as to when a judge must leave provocation to the jury (Reg. v. Acott [1996] 4 All E.R. 443). Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted on that point.

Nature of the appeal and issues:

• The appellant argued that the trial judge should have left provocation to the jury because Crown cross‑examination suggested the appellant had lost self‑control at his mother’s treatment of him, and because the nature of the injuries together with the appellant’s strained dependence on his mother allowed an inference of a specific provoking event.

Court’s reasoning and disposition:

• The Lords analysed section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 and reiterated its three elements: provoking conduct (things done or said), a causatively relevant subjective loss of self‑control, and the objective reasonable‑man test for sufficiency. The judge retains the duty to decide whether there is evidence that the accused was provoked to lose self‑control; absent such evidence there is no triable issue of provocation.
• The court rejected the submission that aggressive lines of cross‑examination alone create an issue of provocation where the evidence, even at its most favourable to the defence, supplies no basis for an inference of specific provoking conduct. The severity of the injuries, and the defendant’s difficult relationship with his mother, were insufficient to permit a rational inference of a concrete provocative act or words; allowing provocation to go to the jury on such speculation would be improper.
• The House of Lords dismissed the appeal, confirming that the trial judge correctly refused to leave provocation to the jury. The court declined to prescribe a precise evidential threshold, emphasising that the matter is one for judges to resolve in context by applying common sense and logic.

Relief sought:

• The appellant sought to overturn his conviction by arguing that the provocation defence should have been left to the jury.

Appeal dismissed. The House of Lords held that under section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 a judge is required to leave provocation to the jury only if there is some evidence of specific provoking conduct (things done or said) causing a loss of self‑control. Where such evidence is absent and the inference of provocation is mere speculation, it is correct for a judge not to leave provocation. The trial judge properly exercised his discretion on the facts of this case.

Conviction at the Central Criminal Court (trial concluded 19 June 1995). Appeal to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed: Reg. v. Acott [1996] 4 All E.R. 443. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords granted; House of Lords dismissed the appeal [1997] UKHL 5.