London Borough of Harrow v. Johnstone

The House of Lords held that a notice to quit given by one joint tenant is, in general, effective to determine a periodic joint tenancy in accordance with the principle established in Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v. Monk. The court found nothing in the injunction made under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 that, on its face, prohibited the wife from serving such a notice or that was intended to preserve the tenancy pending future matrimonial proceedings. The Council, which had acted under its housing policy to enable re-housing of the wife, did not knowingly or intentionally frustrate the administration of justice and therefore was not guilty of contempt or an abuse of process.

Legislative provisions considered included the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 (section 1), the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (sections 24 and 37) and the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 (sections 1, 7 and 9 and Schedule 1). The decisive legal principles were (i) the Monk principle that a periodic joint tenancy is terminable by notice from one joint tenant, and (ii) that an injunction preventing exclusion from occupation does not, absent clear language or procedural context, convert into a mandatory obligation to keep the tenancy in being.

The appellant local authority sought possession of a house occupied under a secure joint tenancy following a notice to quit served by one joint tenant (the wife). The respondents were the husband (remaining in occupation) and the wife. The wife had earlier been subject to an ex parte injunction made under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 forbidding her to exclude the husband from the property. The council, following its rehousing policy, assisted the wife to serve a notice to quit which purported to terminate the joint tenancy. The council thereafter sought possession from the husband in the county court.

Procedural history: Willesden County Court (Judge Hunter) dismissed the council's possession claim on grounds that the notice and the council's conduct amounted to contempt/abuse of process. On appeal to the Court of Appeal the judges were divided. The council then appealed to the House of Lords.

Nature of relief sought: an order for possession of the dwelling by the housing authority.

Issues framed by the court:

• whether a unilateral notice to quit by one joint tenant validly terminates a contractual periodic joint tenancy (the Monk principle);
• whether the wife's notice to quit breached the ex parte injunction and whether the council's involvement made the notice or subsequent possession proceedings contempt of court or an abuse of process;
• whether the injunction should be interpreted as a mandatory order preserving the tenancy pending matrimonial or other proceedings; and
• whether acts of the wife and council frustrated any proprietary remedies which might later be sought by the husband (comparison with principles in the Spycatcher line of authority).

Reasoning and decision: The House of Lords applied the Monk principle and held that, absent clear language to the contrary, a periodic joint tenancy is terminable by one joint tenant's notice. The injunction was interpreted as an order aimed at preventing molestation and exclusion in the sense of preventing an immediate wrongful eviction, not as an order intended to maintain the proprietary form of the tenancy pending future matrimonial remedies. There was no evidence that the council knowingly intended to frustrate the administration of justice or to procure a result that would make existing or future proceedings nugatory; therefore there was no contempt or abuse of process. The Lords allowed the council's appeal and granted possession. The court also considered, but did not decide finally, ancillary questions about the scope of section 37 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the classification of notice as a "disposition".

Appeal allowed. Applying the principle in Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v. Monk, the House held that a unilateral notice to quit by one joint tenant validly terminated the periodic joint tenancy. The ex parte injunction under the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1976 was interpreted as protecting against exclusion and molestation in the immediate sense and did not, on the evidence, amount to a mandatory order preserving the tenancy or render the notice ineffectual. There was no proven intention by the council to frustrate the administration of justice and no contempt or abuse of process was established.