Pickford v Imperial Chemical Industries Plc

An appellate court should not displace a trial judge’s findings of fact merely because it would have assessed conflicting evidence differently. The trial judge’s advantages extend to complex expert evidence as well as ordinary factual disputes.

A claimant alleging that work caused an organic medical condition bears the burden of proving that cause. The defendant’s failure to prove a competing psychogenic explanation does not reverse that burden.

An employer’s duty depends on the risk reasonably foreseeable from the employee’s actual work. Natural interruptions, varied duties and the rarity and uncertainty of the condition may establish that special rest arrangements or warnings were unnecessary. Caution is required where a warning about an ill-understood condition might itself cause harm.

The respondent secretary claimed damages from her employer for cramp of the hands, described as Prescribed Disease A4. She alleged that prolonged typing without adequate breaks had caused an organic condition and that the employer had negligently failed to supervise her work, prescribe rest periods or warn her of the risk.

After hearing extensive lay and conflicting medical evidence, the trial judge held that she had not proved an organic cause, work-related causation, reasonable foreseeability or negligence. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, reversed those findings and allowed her appeal: [1997] I.C.R. 566. Swinton Thomas LJ dissented.

The employer appealed to the House of Lords. The central questions were whether the Court of Appeal had been entitled to disturb the trial judge’s factual findings, where the burden of proving causation lay, and whether the employer had breached its duty of care.

1. Appeal allowed by a majority of four to one. Lord Hope of Craighead delivered the leading speech. Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle agreed with his reasons. Lord Slynn of Hadley also concluded that the trial judge’s findings should stand. The Court of Appeal’s order was therefore reversed and the trial judge’s dismissal of the claim restored.

2. Per Lord Hope, the Court of Appeal had no proper basis for substituting its assessment of the evidence for that of the trial judge. The trial judge had heard ten days of lay and expert evidence, including an acute medical dispute about whether the hand cramp was organic or psychogenic. His advantage extended to the manner in which the experts gave their evidence, not merely to conflicts between lay witnesses. His assessment of the respondent’s reliability and the nature, amount and interruption of her typing was supported by the evidence. Lord Slynn agreed that it was not open to the Court of Appeal to reject those findings.

3. Per Lord Hope, the respondent bore the burden of proving that her cramp had an organic cause attributable to repetitive typing. The employer was entitled to advance a psychogenic explanation in rebuttal but did not have to prove it. Failure to establish conversion hysteria was relevant evidence, but it did not compel a finding of organic causation. Because the evidence did not permit a definite conclusion, the burden of proof remained decisive.

4. Per Lord Hope and Lord Slynn, foreseeability and negligence had to be assessed by reference to the work the trial judge found proved. The respondent performed varied secretarial duties which naturally interrupted her typing, could organise her work and was not comparable with accounts-department staff who typed continuously. Although hand cramp from excessive typing was a known possibility, the employer was not negligent in failing to impose special rest periods, supervision or the accounts-department warning system in her circumstances.

5. Per Lord Hope, warnings concerning a rare, poorly understood condition required particular caution. A duty should not be imposed to give a warning which might precipitate the condition it was intended to prevent. Expert advice, industry practice, the content of the proposed warning and the employee’s actual exposure were relevant.

6. Lord Steyn dissented. He considered that the trial judge’s rejection of the respondent’s account had undermined the entire factual assessment. In his view, the evidence established organic disability caused by excessive typing and a negligent failure to warn, supervise and provide rest pauses.

1. House of Lords: By a majority of four to one, allowed the employer’s appeal, reversed the Court of Appeal and restored the trial judge’s dismissal of the claim.

2. Court of Appeal: By a majority, allowed the employee’s appeal and reversed the trial judge’s findings on causation, foreseeability and negligence: [1997] I.C.R. 566. Swinton Thomas LJ dissented.

3. High Court: His Honour Judge Eifion Roberts QC dismissed the damages claim after finding that the employee had not proved organic causation, work-related causation, reasonable foreseeability or negligence.