Woollin, R v.

The House of Lords held that where a defendant does not desire death or really serious bodily harm, a jury may only infer intention to cause such harm if they are sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty as a result of the defendant's actions and that the defendant appreciated that fact. The court reaffirmed and endorsed the Nedrick guidance (the "virtual certainty" test) and held that a trial judge's direction in terms of appreciation of a "substantial risk" was a material misdirection which blurred the distinction between intention and recklessness and between murder and manslaughter. The court also considered s.8(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and held that Nedrick is consistent with that provision.

This is a criminal appeal against a murder conviction following the death of the appellant's three-month-old son after the appellant threw him on to a hard surface. The Crown did not allege a desire to kill or to cause serious injury; the issue was whether the appellant nonetheless intended to cause really serious bodily harm.

The appellant was convicted of murder after the trial judge gave, at one point, a correct Nedrick direction but later used a direction framed in terms of the defendant appreciating a "substantial risk" of causing serious injury. On appeal to the Court of Appeal the conviction was upheld and two questions were certified about the application and scope of the Nedrick direction. The appeal then came to the House of Lords.

(i) Nature of the application: Criminal appeal against a murder conviction; the appellant sought to quash the murder conviction on the ground of misdirection and to have it substituted with manslaughter.

(ii) Issues framed by the court: whether the Nedrick formulation (foresight of virtual certainty plus appreciation) is the correct legal test for inferring intent where death or serious harm was not desired; whether that direction applies only when the evidence of intent is limited to the defendant's admitted acts and their consequences; and whether a judge's direction in terms of "substantial risk" improperly widened the mens rea for murder.

(iii) Reasoning: the House analysed prior authorities (including Smith, Hyam, Moloney and Hancock) and concluded that Nedrick, founded on Moloney, correctly articulates the threshold for inferring intention in murder cases where the defendant lacked a purpose to kill or to cause serious harm. The court rejected the Court of Appeal's restriction that the Nedrick direction be confined to cases where the only evidence of intent is the defendant's actions and their consequences. The trial judge's use of "substantial risk" was held to be a material misdirection that could not be cured by an earlier correct direction; accordingly the murder conviction was unsafe. The Lords quashed the murder conviction, substituted a verdict of manslaughter and remitted sentencing to the Court of Appeal. The court also observed that Nedrick is compatible with s.8(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and emphasised clarity and brevity in jury directions.

Appeal allowed. The House held that the Nedrick "virtual certainty" direction correctly states the law for inferring intention to cause death or really serious bodily harm where the defendant did not desire that result; a direction in terms of appreciation of a "substantial risk" was a material misdirection enlarging the mental element for murder. The murder conviction was therefore quashed, a conviction of manslaughter substituted and the case remitted to the Court of Appeal for sentence.

Convicted at trial (Recorder of Leeds). Appeal to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed [1997] 1 Crim.App.R. 97 (R. v. Woollin). Appeal to the House of Lords allowed [1998] UKHL 28; conviction for murder quashed and substituted with manslaughter; matter remitted to the Court of Appeal to pass sentence.