Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jackson; Stanley v. Director of Public Prosecutions

The appeals concerned the procedure the police must follow when requiring a driver to provide a specimen of blood or urine under section 7(3) and section 8(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The House concluded that the procedural guidance given in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Warren is broadly to be treated as guidance rather than as a set of mandatory textual requirements, subject to three specific mandatory requirements derived from the statute: (i) the warning required by section 7(7) that failure to provide a specimen may render the driver liable to prosecution; (ii) in a section 7(3) case, a statement of the reason why breath specimens cannot be taken or used; and (iii) in a section 8(2) case, the statement that the lower breath specimen does not exceed 50 microgrammes per 100 millilitres. The remaining elements of the Warren formula are matters which a police officer should, for fairness, explain so the driver appreciates the role of the medical practitioner, but failure to state them is not necessarily fatal unless the omission caused prejudice to the driver.

On the facts the House held that a remark such as "I don't like needles" or "I don't want no needle" is a question of fact whether it raises a potential medical objection; the courts below were entitled to find on the facts that no medical objection was raised. Applying those principles, the House allowed the Director of Public Prosecutions' appeal in Jackson (setting aside the Divisional Court's decision) and dismissed the defendant's appeal in Stanley.

The appeals arose from two separate prosecutions concerning police procedure when seeking specimens for laboratory analysis under the Road Traffic Act 1988. Both cases raised whether police officers must recite the full procedural formula suggested in the House's earlier decision in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Warren and whether certain omissions require acquittal.

• Nature of the proceedings: appeals to the House of Lords from the Divisional Court concerning convictions (Jackson: conviction for failure to provide a specimen of blood contrary to section 7(6); Stanley: conviction for driving above the prescribed breath alcohol limit under section 5(1)(a), the breath specimen falling within the section 8(2) window).
• Facts: Jackson was arrested after erratic driving and exhibited signs consistent with drug use; at the station he repeatedly refused to give blood or urine and said "I don't like needles." The Divisional Court allowed his appeal on the ground that the officer's question was insufficiently wide in scope as compared with the Warren formula. In Stanley the driver provided two breath samples, the lower containing 47 microgrammes of alcohol, was told about the section 8(2) option, replied "No, I don't want no needle," and was convicted; the Crown Court and Divisional Court upheld the conviction on the facts.
• Issues framed: (i) whether the Warren formula is mandatory in its entirety or whether its statements should be treated as guidance; (ii) whether police must ask about non-medical reasons for refusing blood; (iii) whether a defendant’s brief remark about needles raises a medical issue requiring further enquiry; and (iv) the consequences of non-compliance with the Warren guidance.
• Court’s reasoning and disposition: the House reviewed statutory text (notably sections 7, 8 and 11 of the Road Traffic Act 1988), prior authorities (including Johnson and Warren) and considered the respective functions of police officers and medical practitioners. It held that three specific items are mandatory under the statute (the section 7(7) warning, the statement of reason in section 7(3) cases and the section 8(2) statement about the 50 microgrammes threshold). Other elements of the Warren formula are desirable and promote fairness — especially ensuring that the driver appreciates the role of the doctor — but are not automatically fatal if omitted; the proper test is whether the omission caused prejudice by depriving the driver of the opportunity to make an informed choice. Whether a passing remark about needles raises a medical issue is a factual matter for the trial court. Applied to the facts, the House allowed the DPP's appeal in Jackson (setting aside the Divisional Court’s order) and dismissed Stanley’s appeal, because there was no established prejudice and the factual findings that no medical reason had been raised were open to the courts below.

As this was an appeal to the House of Lords the court allowed the appeal in Jackson and dismissed the appeal in Stanley. The House held that the Warren formula should be treated largely as guidance rather than as mandatory, subject to three statutory requirements (the section 7(7) warning; in a section 7(3) case a statement of the reason why breath cannot be used; and in a section 8(2) case the statement that the lower breath specimen does not exceed 50 microgrammes). Other elements of the Warren guidance should be given for fairness so the driver understands the role of the medical practitioner, but omissions are only fatal if they prejudiced the driver. On the facts, remarks such as "I don't like needles" or "I don't want no needle" were matters of fact for the lower courts and did not require acquittal in these appeals.

Appeals from the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division (case stated appeals). The House of Lords gave final determination in consolidated appeals (DPP v Jackson; Stanley v DPP) [1998] UKHL 31.