Director of Public Prosecutions v Jackson (Stephen) (Jackson v Director of Public Prosecutions, Stanley v Director of Public Prosecutions)

Most elements of the procedure identified in Director of Public Prosecutions v Warren for obtaining blood or urine specimens are guidance designed to secure an informed and fair decision, rather than mandatory conditions of a conviction. A departure requires acquittal only if it deprives the driver of an opportunity to exercise the statutory option or materially affects its exercise.

The express warning required by section 7(7), the reason why breath specimens cannot be taken or used under section 7(3), and the statement of the qualifying breath-alcohol reading under section 8(2) remain mandatory. Whether a driver’s words raise a medical objection is a question of fact. The police may determine whether such an issue has arisen, but a doctor must determine its medical validity.

These conjoined appeals concerned police procedures under sections 7 and 8 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

Jackson refused to provide either blood or urine after being arrested on suspicion of driving while unfit. The justices convicted him, but the Divisional Court allowed his appeal because the officer had asked only about medical reasons for objecting to blood, contrary to its understanding of Director of Public Prosecutions v Warren [1993] AC 319. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed.

Stanley declined the statutory option of replacing a qualifying breath specimen with blood or urine, saying that he did not want a needle. His conviction was upheld by the Crown Court and the Divisional Court. He appealed.

The central questions were which parts of the Warren procedure were mandatory, the consequences of non-compliance, and when words concerning needles raise a medical issue requiring further inquiry.

1. The appeal in Jackson was allowed and the appeal in Stanley was dismissed unanimously. Lord Hutton delivered the leading speech. Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Griffiths, Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Steyn agreed with it and with the proposed orders.

2. Per Lord Hutton, most requirements stated in Director of Public Prosecutions v Warren [1993] AC 319 are guidance intended to ensure fairness and an informed decision. They are not mandatory merely because an appellate court formulated them. Treating every departure as fatal would produce acquittals where no unfairness or prejudice occurred.

3. Three requirements are mandatory: the section 7(7) warning about the risk of prosecution; in a section 7(3) case, an explanation of the reason why breath specimens cannot be taken or used; and, under section 8(2), a statement that the lower breath specimen does not exceed 50 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath. Non-compliance with any of those requirements requires an acquittal.

4. For a non-mandatory omission, the fact-finder must ask whether the appropriate Warren information was brought to the driver’s attention. If it was not, the court must decide whether the omission deprived the driver of the opportunity to exercise the option or caused its exercise in a different way. A prejudicial omission requires acquittal; an immaterial omission does not. Although evidence from the driver will ordinarily be required, any reasonable doubt about prejudice must result in acquittal.

5. The police should explain the doctor’s role before the driver decides whether to give blood. The constable chooses between blood and urine, but a doctor takes blood and determines any medical objection. The constable may decide whether a medical issue has been raised at all. That preliminary question is one of fact.

6. In a section 7(3) case the officer need ask only whether there are medical reasons why blood cannot or should not be taken. The officer need not invite non-medical reasons; any non-medical reasonable excuse under section 7(6) is for the court. In a section 8(2) case the officer should also ask expressly about medical reasons, although omission of that question is not automatically fatal.

7. Jackson’s dislike of needles did not require further medical inquiry, particularly because he had unequivocally refused every specimen. He suffered no prejudice. Stanley had been told both that a doctor would take blood and that medical objections would be determined by a medical practitioner. The omitted express question caused no injustice or reasonable possibility of prejudice.

1. House of Lords: Allowed the Director of Public Prosecutions’ appeal in Jackson and set aside the Divisional Court’s order, without remitting the case to the justices. Dismissed Stanley’s appeal and upheld his conviction.
2. Divisional Court — Jackson: Allowed Jackson’s appeal from the justices because it considered itself bound by Director of Public Prosecutions v Warren [1993] AC 319 to require inquiry into medical and non-medical reasons for objecting to blood.
3. Widnes justices: Convicted Jackson of failing without reasonable excuse to provide a specimen of blood.
4. Divisional Court — Stanley: Dismissed Stanley’s appeal, holding that the Crown Court could find that his reference to a needle raised no medical issue and that no further question was required.
5. Crown Court at Aylesbury: Dismissed Stanley’s appeal from his conviction.
6. Wycombe and Beaconsfield Magistrates’ Court: Convicted Stanley of driving with excess alcohol.