Lowsley v Forbes (trading as LE Design Services)

Limitation Act 1980 section 24(1) bars only a fresh action upon a judgment. It does not impose a six-year statutory bar on execution of the original judgment. Execution after six years remains subject to the court’s procedural power to grant leave.

Section 24(2) is wider. It prevents recovery, whether by action or execution, of judgment interest which became due more than six years earlier. Section 32(1) cannot postpone that restriction because recovery of interest by executing a judgment is neither an action nor a right of action for that provision.

In Lowsley v Forbes (trading as LE Design Services), the judgment creditors obtained a consent judgment for £70,000 in 1981. More than six years later, a master granted leave to enforce it and made charging and garnishee orders. The debt and accumulated interest were calculated at £184,199.

Tuckey J held that section 24(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 did not bar execution, but section 24(2) restricted recoverable interest to six years. The Court of Appeal agreed that execution remained available but restored interest from the date of judgment. The debtor appealed on enforceability, while the creditors relied alternatively on section 32(1) to postpone the interest restriction. The central issues were whether execution constituted an “action” under section 24(1), whether section 24(2) governed interest recovered by execution, and whether section 32(1) applied.

1. Appeal allowed in part, unanimously. Lord Lloyd of Berwick delivered the leading speech. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Nolan, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope of Craighead agreed with his reasons. The appeal was dismissed on the enforceability question but allowed on interest, and Tuckey J’s judgment was restored.

2. Per Lord Lloyd, “action” in section 24(1) of the Limitation Act 1980, read with section 38(1), means a fresh action upon a judgment. It does not include proceedings which execute the original judgment. Execution after six years is therefore not extinguished by section 24(1), although leave is required under Order 46, rule 2(1)(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

3. The historical reasoning in W.T. Lamb & Sons v Rider [1948] 2 KB 331 was not accepted. Earlier legislation had not treated actions and execution as wholly independent. Nevertheless, Parliament enacted the 1980 amendment against the construction adopted in that case and upon a Law Reform Committee report which treated it as existing law. Applying the principles illustrated by Barras v Aberdeen Sea Trawling and Fishing Co Ltd [1933] AC 402 and Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498, Parliament was taken to have adopted that construction. Parliament’s understanding of the antecedent law controlled even if the earlier judicial reasoning was erroneous.

4. Section 24(2) independently prevents recovery of judgment interest more than six years after it became due. The word “recovered” has a broad meaning and includes recovery by execution. Its application is not confined to interest claimed in a fresh action upon a judgment. The legislative history supported treating section 24(2) as a freestanding restriction applying to all judgments.

5. Section 32(1) did not postpone that restriction. Recovery of interest by executing an existing judgment is not an “action” or a “right of action” within section 32(1)(b). Lord Lloyd also doubted whether concealment of a debtor’s whereabouts or assets constituted concealment of a fact relevant to such a right.

   The debtor was entitled to repayment of £39,777.48, with interest to be assessed if not agreed. The Mareva injunction, charging order and possession order specified in the judgment were discharged or set aside.

1. House of Lords — Unanimously dismissed the debtor’s appeal on whether execution was barred, allowed it on recoverable interest, and restored Tuckey J’s judgment. Repayment of the overpaid amount was ordered and the specified enforcement orders were discharged or set aside.
2. Court of Appeal — Agreed that section 24(1) did not bar execution, but held that interest ran from the original judgment and restored the master’s order.
3. High Court — Tuckey J permitted execution but restricted interest to six years, fixing the enforceable total at £133,000 and making the execution orders absolute in that amount.
4. Master — Granted leave to enforce the judgment after six years and made charging and garnishee orders nisi on the basis of the debt and interest calculated at £184,199.