Clark and Others v Kato, Smith and General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation Plc; Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Company (conjoined appeals)

This case concerned the construction of the word "road" in section 145(3)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and whether two separate car parks fell within that meaning so as to attract compulsory motor insurance cover (and thus insurers' liability under section 151). The House held that the ordinary and contextual meaning of "road" under section 192 must be applied, focusing on physical character and function (a definable way intended to enable movement to a destination), and that car parks are in general distinct in character and function from roads. The court rejected a purposive construction broad enough to include ordinary car parks, including in light of the relevant European Directives, and emphasised that any extension of cover to typical car-park use is a matter for Parliament rather than judicial construction.

The appeals arose from two separate incidents. In Clarke a pedestrian sitting on a kerb in an open car park was struck by a car; the driver was uninsured and the injured party sued the insurer under provisions implementing compulsory motor insurance. In Cutter a passenger was injured in a stationary car in a marked parking bay in a multi-storey car park when leaked lighter fuel was ignited; the driver's insurance cover was forfeited and the passenger sought to recover from the insurer. In each case the preliminary or trial judges reached differing conclusions and the Court of Appeal held the incidents occurred "on a road" for the purposes of section 145(3)(a).

The central legal question was whether the places where the accidents occurred qualified as a "road" within section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 so as to bring the incidents within the compulsory insurance requirement of section 145(3)(a) and thus the insurer liability provisions (including section 151). The House examined the statutory definition, past authorities on what constitutes a road, the physical character and function of the areas in issue, and the significance of public access. The court also considered whether European Directives on compulsory motor insurance required a broader interpretation.

The House concluded (i) the ordinary meaning and statutory context point to a road being a definable way intended to enable movement between places rather than an area designed for parking; (ii) neither the open car park with a passage in Clarke nor the multi-storey parking bay in Cutter was a "road" for the purposes of section 145(3)(a); (iii) the European Directives did not compel a construction that would include ordinary car parks within "road"; and (iv) extending compulsory insurance to incidents occurring in ordinary car parks would be a policy matter for Parliament. The relief sought by the insurers (to avoid liability under the insurance provisions) succeeded: the appeals were allowed and the relevant lower-court orders were reversed or restored as appropriate.

Appeals allowed. The House held that, applying section 192 and the ordinary meaning and function of a "road", neither of the car parks in the two appeals qualified as a "road" within section 145(3)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988; European Directives did not require a broader construction that would include ordinary car parks; any extension of compulsory insurance to such places is a matter for Parliament.

County Court/Assistant Recorder decisions at first instance (finding in Clarke that the park alone was not a road; in Cutter County Court judge found not a road); Court of Appeal reversed/allowed appeals ([1997] 1 WLR 208 for Clarke; [1997] 1 WLR 1082 for Cutter); appeals to the House of Lords allowed ([1998] UKHL 36).