Jameson v Central Electricity Generating Board

Where concurrent tortfeasors cause the same harm, the injured person may recover the loss only once. A settlement with one tortfeasor extinguishes the claim against the others if, objectively construed against the pleaded claim, it fixes and satisfies the whole unliquidated claim. The court may examine the claim and settlement to identify their scope, but may not revalue the compromise by asking whether the agreed sum represented full compensation.

A settlement may discharge the tort from the date of agreement, subject to an implied condition that the discharge becomes void if the agreed payment cannot be recovered. A claim under section 1(1) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 therefore fails where, at the moment of death, the deceased’s claim against the defendant had already been discharged by such a settlement.

Before his death from malignant mesothelioma, the deceased settled his personal injury action against his employer, Babcock Energy Ltd, for £80,000. The agreement, concluded before his death but performed afterwards, described the payment as being in full and final settlement and satisfaction of all causes of action in his statement of claim.

His executors subsequently claimed dependency damages against the Central Electricity Generating Board under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. The claim proceeded on the assumption that the employer and the Board were concurrent tortfeasors responsible through separate breaches for the same harm.

Sir Haydn Tudor Evans held that the executors could maintain the claim and that the Board could seek contribution from Babcock. The Court of Appeal dismissed both defendants’ appeals: [1998] Q.B. 323. Babcock did not appeal further. The central question for the House was whether the settlement had discharged the deceased’s claim against the Board before his death, notwithstanding that the settlement sum was below the subsequently assessed value of his loss and was paid after death.

1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed by a majority of four to one. Lord Hope of Craighead delivered the leading speech. Lord Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Hoffmann expressly agreed with it. Lord Clyde reached the same result in a separate speech. Lord Lloyd of Berwick dissented.
2. Full satisfaction. Per Lord Hope, the basic rule prevents a claimant from recovering damages exceeding the loss. Separate causes of action exist against concurrent tortfeasors, but full satisfaction by one removes the damage essential to the causes of action against the others. The principle discussed in Tang Man Sit v Capacious Investments Ltd [1996] AC 514 was approved.
3. Effect and construction of a settlement. Per Lord Hope, an unliquidated damages claim becomes liquidated when its amount is fixed by judgment or agreement. A compromise expressed as full and final satisfaction of the whole claim fixes its value in the same manner as a judgment. Once effective, it extinguishes claims for the same harm against other concurrent tortfeasors. The agreement must be construed objectively by comparing its language with the claim made. The decision in Carrigan v Duncan [1971] S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 33 supported that approach.
4. Limits of the later court’s inquiry. The later court may examine the first statement of claim and settlement to identify the subject matter settled and whether any claim was excluded or reserved. It may not reopen the compromise to decide whether the sum represented the full financial value of the injuries. That inquiry would undermine the finality of settlements and permit successive reassessments by different courts.
5. Timing. Per Lord Hope, the settlement discharged the original tort claim when the agreement was made. It was subject to an implied resolutive condition under which the discharge would be void from the outset if the agreed debt was not satisfied. The reasoning in Reg v Turner [1974] A.C. 357 was applied by analogy. Babcock later paid everything due, so the discharge remained effective from the agreement date.
6. Fatal accident claim. Section 1(1) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 tests the deceased’s ability to maintain an action at the moment of death. Because the Board’s liability had already been discharged, that condition was not met. Section 4 required inherited settlement proceeds to be disregarded when assessing dependency damages, but it could not create a cause of action where section 1(1) was unsatisfied.
7. Separate speeches. Lord Clyde considered that accepting the promisor’s contractual undertaking could itself supersede the tort claim. He also considered that an unclear settlement with one concurrent obligant should ordinarily be understood as terminating claims against the others. Lord Lloyd would have held that the settlement barred a later action only if the claimant had actually recovered the whole loss. He would have dismissed the appeal.

1. House of Lords: In Jameson v Central Electricity Generating Board [2000] 1 AC 455, the Board’s appeal was allowed by a four-to-one majority. The executors could not maintain the fatal accident claim because the deceased’s underlying claim had been discharged before death.
2. Court of Appeal: Nourse and Auld L.JJ. and Sir Patrick Russell dismissed the appeals of the Board and Babcock: [1998] Q.B. 323. Babcock did not appeal to the House, so the decision permitting contribution proceedings against it was not before the House.
3. Queen’s Bench Division: On 31 March 1995, Sir Haydn Tudor Evans determined preliminary issues in favour of the executors. He held that the fatal accident claim could be maintained and that the Board could pursue contribution proceedings against Babcock.