Commissioners of Police for the Metropolis v. Reeves (Joint Administratix of the Estate of Martin Lynch, Deceased)

The House held that the police owed a duty of care to a detainee known to be a suicide risk to take reasonable care to prevent him committing suicide while in custody. The court rejected that the detainee's deliberate act was a novus actus interveniens or that volenti non fit injuria defeated liability where the defendant's duty was directed to preventing that very act. The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 applies and the deliberate act of a person of full capacity can be treated as "fault" within section 4 so that damages may be apportioned under section 1(1). Applying those principles the House allowed the police's appeal to reduce the plaintiff's award by 50 per cent for contributory responsibility.

This was an appeal by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner against an award for damages following the suicide of Martin Lynch in a police cell on 23 March 1990. The deceased, remanded in custody and identified as a suicide risk after two prior attempts that day, hanged himself using a ligature passed through an open spy-hole/wicket hatch in the cell door which had been left open. The plaintiff (his administratrix) sued under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 for negligence. The trial judge found duty and breach but held the suicide severed causation (and alternatively treated it as contributory negligence at 100%); the Court of Appeal (majority) allowed the plaintiff's appeal and awarded full damages.

The House of Lords considered three issues:

• Causation/novus actus interveniens: whether the detainee's deliberate suicide broke the causal chain so that the police breach did not cause death;
• Volenti non fit injuria: whether the deceased's deliberate choice to commit suicide was a voluntary assumption of risk defeating liability;
• Contributory negligence: whether the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 permits apportionment where the claimant deliberately caused his own death.

The House rejected novus actus and volenti in these circumstances because the duty was specifically to prevent the very act that occurred and the suicide was a foreseeable consequence of leaving the cell fittings in a dangerous condition. On contributory negligence the court held that "fault" in section 4 can encompass deliberate acts of someone of full capacity and that section 1(1) permits apportionment of responsibility. Balancing the duty-policy of protecting detainees and the finding that Lynch was of sound mind, the majority apportioned responsibility equally and substituted a reduced award (half the trial figure).

Appeal allowed in part. The House held (1) that where a custodial duty is specifically directed to preventing suicide the deliberate act of the detainee does not break the chain of causation nor is it defeated by volenti non fit injuria; and (2) that under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 deliberate self-harm by a person of full capacity can amount to "fault" so that damages may be apportioned. On the facts the court substituted a judgment reducing damages by 50%.

Trial before Judge White (finding duty and breach but that suicide was sole cause and alternatively 100% contributory negligence). Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's appeal [1999] QB 169 (majority). Appeal to House of Lords allowed in part [1999] UKHL 35.