Reeves v Comr of Police of the Metropolis

A custodial authority which knows that a detainee presents a suicide risk may owe a duty to take reasonable care to prevent deliberate self-harm, whether or not the detainee is of sound mind. Where the duty protects against that very act, the suicide neither breaks the chain of causation nor supports a defence of voluntary assumption of risk.

A deliberate act of self-harm may nevertheless constitute the claimant’s own “fault” under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. Damages may therefore be reduced on a just and equitable assessment of responsibility. That assessment should reflect the purpose of the defendant’s duty, the claimant’s mental capacity and each party’s contribution to the damage.

Martin Lynch, a remand prisoner known to have attempted suicide twice, killed himself in a police cell using defects in its door. His administratrix brought proceedings under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. The Commissioner admitted a duty to take reasonable care to prevent the suicide and admitted breach by leaving the cell-door hatch open.

The trial judge held that the deliberate suicide of a person of sound mind broke the chain of causation. Alternatively, he attributed the death entirely to the deceased under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, allowed the administratrix’s appeal and awarded the full assessed damages: [1999] QB 169.

The Commissioner appealed in Reeves v Comr of Police of the Metropolis. The central questions were whether the deliberate suicide constituted a new intervening act or supported the defence of volenti non fit injuria, and whether it could instead amount to contributory fault reducing the damages.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously allowed the Commissioner’s appeal. By a majority of four, it substituted judgment for £4,345 with interest, representing a 50 per cent reduction in the assessed damages. Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough would instead have entered judgment for the Commissioner.
2. Duty and causation. Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle held that a custodial authority which knows of a prisoner’s suicidal tendency may owe a duty to take reasonable care to prevent deliberate suicide, irrespective of whether the prisoner is of sound mind. Lord Mackay of Clashfern agreed with Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope. The duty arose from the authority’s complete control of the prisoner and the known special danger of suicide in custody. Once that duty and its breach were admitted, the occurrence of the precise act which the duty required the police to prevent could not break the chain of causation. Otherwise the duty would be deprived of practical content.
3. Autonomy and voluntary assumption of risk. The majority held that personal autonomy did not alter the result. The duty required non-invasive control of the prisoner’s environment, not forced medical treatment. The autonomy argument therefore concerned the existence of the admitted duty rather than causation. For the same reason, volenti non fit injuria could not defeat liability: the deceased had done the very thing which reasonable care was required to prevent.
4. Contributory fault. Per Lord Hoffmann, Lord Jauncey and Lord Hope, the definition of “fault” in section 4 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 was sufficiently wide to include a deliberate act of self-harm. The rejection of a break in causation did not mean that the suicide was not also a cause of death. Both the police breach and the deceased’s deliberate act could therefore contribute to the same damage.
5. Apportionment. Under section 1(1), the court apportions responsibility rather than merely degrees of carelessness. Lord Hoffmann and Lord Hope reasoned that the assessment had to recognise the policy of imposing a custodial duty to protect known suicide risks. It also had to reflect the finding that the deceased was of sound mind and deliberately seized the opportunity created by the police. Both contributions were substantial, making equal responsibility just and equitable. Lord Jauncey would personally have assigned two thirds to the deceased, but joined the majority’s equal division.
6. Dissent on causation. Lord Hobhouse considered that a person acting voluntarily, deliberately and with full information must accept responsibility for the consequences of an autonomous choice. On the trial judge’s findings, the deceased’s choice was the sole legal cause of death. Lord Hobhouse nevertheless agreed that, if the police breach remained a legal cause, section 1(1) permitted the majority’s 50 per cent reduction.

1. House of Lords: Allowed the Commissioner’s appeal from [1999] QB 169. By a 4–1 majority on liability and the order, substituted damages of £4,345 with interest after a 50 per cent reduction.
2. Court of Appeal: By a majority, allowed the administratrix’s appeal: [1999] QB 169. It rejected the causation and volenti defences and awarded the full assessed damages of £8,690.
3. Trial: Judge White found an admitted custodial duty and breach but dismissed the claim because the deliberate suicide of a person of sound mind broke the chain of causation. Alternatively, he assessed the deceased’s responsibility at 100 per cent.