W 1-6 v. Essex County Council and Another

The House of Lords held that the parents' negligence claim against the county council and a social worker, alleging psychiatric injury resulting from the placement of a known sexual abuser in their home, was not so clearly untenable that it should be struck out. The court applied established principles governing psychiatric injury claims, including the primary/secondary victim distinction and the Alcock criteria, and emphasised that strike out under R.S.C. Ord. 18 r.19 should be used cautiously where novel or fact-sensitive issues arise.

The key legal principles were that pleadings are to be taken as true for strike-out purposes, that the development of liability in respect of psychiatric injury must be incremental and fact-based (Caparo, McLoughlin, Page), and that factual investigation is required to determine whether the parents might fall within recognisable categories of primary or secondary victims under Alcock and subsequent authorities.

This was an appeal by parents (W.1 and W.2) against orders striking out their negligence claims arising from the placement by Essex County Council of a 15-year-old boy who had admitted indecent assault and was under investigation for alleged rape. The parents had previously told the council they would not accept any child known or suspected of being a sexual abuser. After placement, serious sexual abuse of the parents' children allegedly occurred and the parents claimed psychiatric injury, including reactive depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.

Nature of the claim and relief sought:

• The parents sought damages for personal injury (psychiatric) and other heads; the immediate procedural relief sought was to set aside strike-out orders so their negligence claim could proceed to trial.

Procedural history to the House of Lords:

• Hooper J. struck out the parents' claims on 7 July 1997 but allowed the children's claims to proceed ([1997] 2 F.L.R. 535).
• The Court of Appeal, on 2 April 1998, unanimously upheld the striking out of the parents' negligence claim ([1999] Fam. 90).
• The parents appealed to the House of Lords; by the time of the hearing the defendants accepted the childrens' claims should proceed and the sole issue was the parents' claim.

Issues framed by the court:

• Whether the parents' statement of claim disclosed a cause of action in negligence or was an abuse of process such that it should be struck out under R.S.C., Ord. 18, r. 19(1)(a) and (d).
• Whether a duty of care was owed by the council/social worker to the parents in placing a known sexual abuser in their home.
• Whether the parents' psychiatric harm fell within recognised categories of recoverable psychiatric injury—specifically whether they could be regarded as primary or secondary victims under Alcock and related authorities—and whether their injury resulted from qualifying shock or from a non-compensatable cumulative reaction.

Court's reasoning:

• The court restated the proper test on strike out: assume factual averments to be true and only strike out where the claim is clearly bound to fail or is an abuse of process, particularly where the law is developing (X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire; Barrett v. Enfield; Caparo).
• The pleaded facts showed the parents made their objection to placement known and that the council and social worker knew of the boy's history; whether this gave rise to an actionable duty and breach depended on a full factual inquiry into the decision-making and surrounding circumstances.
• On psychiatric injury the House reviewed authorities (Alcock; McLoughlin; Page; Frost etc.) and concluded that it was not possible at strike-out stage to say the parents' psychiatric illness was outside the range of compensatable psychiatric injury. The parents’ claimed disorders went beyond ordinary grief and a person of reasonable fortitude might not be bound to tolerate learning of sexual abuse of their children in these circumstances.
• The primary/secondary victim distinction was not closed to further development; it was arguable that the parents might be regarded as primary victims or otherwise fall within recognised categories once the full facts were investigated.

Conclusion: The House allowed the appeal and remitted the parents' negligence claim to proceed to trial so that the factual questions bearing on duty, breach and causation could be explored.

Appeal allowed. The House held that the parents' negligence claim could not be declared legally untenable on a strike-out application: the pleadings, taken as true, raised arguable issues as to duty, breach and compensatable psychiatric injury under the primary/secondary victim framework (Alcock and subsequent authorities) and thus required full factual investigation at trial.

Hooper J. struck out the parents' claims on 7 July 1997 ([1997] 2 F.L.R. 535). The Court of Appeal on 2 April 1998 upheld the strike-out of the parents' negligence claim ([1999] Fam. 90). The House of Lords allowed the parents' appeal ([2000] UKHL 17).