Steed v Home Office

The House of Lords held that the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997 compensation scheme created a substantive entitlement to compensation once the scheme conditions were satisfied and that the scheme carried implied obligations to decide claims and to make payments within a reasonable time. The court treated the scheme's terms (including the treatment of Options A, B and C and the Scheme provisions governing documentary evidence and valuation) as giving rise to enforceable rights to payment when the stated conditions are met. It held that a claimant deprived of property and awaiting compensation may, in appropriate circumstances, pursue those rights by ordinary action rather than being confined to judicial review; the general rule in O'Reilly v Mackman is subject to exceptions where the proceedings do not amount to an abuse of process. The appeal against refusal to strike out the claimant's summons was dismissed.

Background and parties:

The respondent, Mr Steed, surrendered firearms and ammunition under the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997 and submitted claims under the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1997 Compensation Scheme (Options A, B and C). The Home Office administered the Scheme. Mr Steed alleged delay in processing and payment and commenced civil proceedings for the value of the surrendered items and interest.

Procedural history:

• District Judge Madge refused the Home Office's application to strike out the County Court summons.
• His Honour Judge Cowell dismissed the Home Office's appeal from that refusal.
• The Court of Appeal dismissed the Home Office's further appeal on 1 May 1998 (neutral citation not stated in the judgment).
• The Home Office appealed to the House of Lords, which delivered judgment on 18 May 2000.

Nature of the claim and relief sought:

Mr Steed sought payment under the compensation Scheme for surrendered firearms and ammunition and damages in the form of interest for the period of delay. The particular issues included whether the Scheme conferred a right to prompt payment, whether an implied term required claims to be decided within a reasonable time (with differing expectations for Options A/B and Option C), and whether the claimant was limited to judicial review rather than an ordinary action.

Issues framed by the court:

• whether the Scheme created an enforceable entitlement to payment once its conditions were met,
• whether there was an implied obligation to determine claims and make payment within a reasonable time,
• whether the claimant could pursue an ordinary action rather than being confined to judicial review, in light of O'Reilly v Mackman and related authority, and
• whether the summons constituted an abuse of process.

Reasoning and conclusion:

The Lords concluded that the Scheme did create an entitlement to payment once the Scheme's conditions were satisfied (Options A and B giving rise to automatic entitlement where the conditions are met; Option C requiring documentary evidence or, if unsatisfactory, an independent valuation). The court accepted that the Scheme impliedly required decisions and payments within a reasonable time, recognising that the appropriate length of that period may vary between Options A/B and Option C. On procedure, the court held that the general rule in O'Reilly v Mackman does not preclude civil proceedings in every case; exceptions apply where the claim concerns a private right to money and the proceedings do not amount to an abuse of process and where the practical choice of procedure does not prejudice the parties or the court. Applying those principles, it was not an abuse of process for Mr Steed to proceed by summons and the refusal to strike out was upheld.

Appeal dismissed. The House of Lords held that the compensation Scheme created enforceable rights to payment once its conditions were met and carried an implied obligation to decide claims and make payments within a reasonable time; where a claim is essentially for money due under the Scheme an ordinary action is not necessarily an abuse of process and judicial review is not the only remedy. The judge was entitled to refuse to strike out the summons.