Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte A, R v.

The House of Lords interpreted section 67(1A)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and held that the automatic deduction of "relevant period" from a custodial sentence applies only to periods spent in accommodation which was provided for the purpose of restricting liberty (ie secure accommodation), not to ordinary local authority accommodation where conditions restricting movement are imposed under section 23(7) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. The court concluded that the statutory words refer to the nature and purpose of the accommodation rather than to any restrictions imposed by conditions on a remand. Consequently time spent in non-secure local authority accommodation on remand is not automatically to be credited under section 67(1); instead a sentencing judge may, in the exercise of judicial discretion, take such periods into account.

This appeal concerned whether a young offender remanded to local authority accommodation that was not approved as secure accommodation was entitled to automatic credit under section 67(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 for time spent on remand. The respondent, aged fifteen when remanded, had been placed in a registered children's home and subjected to conditions (curfew, non-contact with witnesses, prohibition on residing at his home) under section 23(7) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. On conviction he was sentenced to detention in a young offender institution; the governor allowed credit for one day in police custody but refused credit for the remand period in the children's home. The respondent sought judicial review; Collins J. felt bound by Reg. v. Collins (1995) to allow credit and granted a certificate enabling a direct appeal to the House of Lords.

(i) Nature of the claim: Judicial review of the governor's refusal to give automatic credit under section 67(1) for time spent on remand to local authority accommodation.

(ii) Issues framed by the court: Whether the phrase "in accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty" in section 67(1A)(c) should be read to include (a) local authority accommodation where the remand court has imposed restrictive conditions under section 23(7) of the 1969 Act, or (b) only accommodation provided and approved as secure accommodation.

(iii) Reasoning and conclusion: The House of Lords analysed the statutory history of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, subsequent child-care legislation and amendments to section 67 of the 1967 Act. The court found that the language and legislative history focus on the character and purpose of the accommodation (ie accommodation provided for restricting liberty, commonly referred to as secure accommodation) rather than on temporary restrictions arising from conditions of remand. Practical considerations also favoured a clear, administrable rule: whether accommodation is approved as secure can be readily ascertained and records kept under the 1991 Regulations provide an objective basis for any automatic deduction. By contrast, leaving such determinations to prison governors would require difficult factual judgements. The court therefore overruled Reg. v. Collins (1995) and held that time spent in non-secure local authority accommodation is not automatically a "relevant period" under section 67(1A)(c); courts retain the discretion to take such periods into account when sentencing.

Appeal allowed. The House of Lords held that section 67(1A)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 requires that the remand be to accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty (ie secure accommodation); time spent in ordinary local authority accommodation subject to conditions under section 23(7) is not automatically a "relevant period" for deduction under section 67(1). The Court overruled Reg. v. Collins (1995) and reasoned that the wording and legislative history point to the nature and purpose of the accommodation rather than the existence of restrictive conditions on remand; issues of weight and fairness as to non-secure remands are for the sentencing judge, not for an administrative deduction by the governor.

The governor refused credit for time spent on remand in local authority accommodation; Collins J. (High Court) felt bound by the Court of Appeal decision in Reg. v. Collins (1995) 16 Cr. App. R. (S.) 156 to allow credit and granted a certificate under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969 permitting a direct appeal to the House of Lords. The House of Lords allowed the appeal and overruled Reg. v. Collins.