R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte A

Under section 67(1A)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, time spent on remand in local authority accommodation reduces a custodial sentence automatically only where the accommodation was provided for the purpose of restricting liberty. This means secure accommodation approved by the Secretary of State.

A curfew or another condition imposed during a remand to ordinary local authority accommodation does not satisfy the provision. The statutory test concerns the nature and designated purpose of the accommodation, rather than the practical degree to which the offender’s movements were restricted. A sentencing court may instead consider a restrictive non-secure remand when determining the appropriate sentence.

The respondent, aged 15, was remanded to a registered children’s home after being charged with handling stolen goods. The Youth Court imposed a nightly curfew and other conditions, but the home was not approved as secure accommodation. After receiving four months’ detention in a young offender institution, he sought an automatic reduction for the period spent at the home under section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.

The governor allowed credit for one night in police detention but refused credit for the stay at the home. On judicial review, Collins J considered himself bound by Reg. v. Collins (1995) 16 Cr. App. R. (S.) 156 and held that the period qualified. He certified the point for a direct appeal to the House of Lords. The issue was whether local authority accommodation could qualify despite not being secure accommodation.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Clyde delivered the reasoned speeches. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Nolan and Lord Steyn agreed with both speeches and the result.

2. Per Lord Hope and Lord Clyde, section 67(1A)(c) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 imposes two cumulative requirements. The offender must have been remanded or committed to local authority accommodation under the specified legislation, and must have been in accommodation provided for the purpose of restricting liberty. The second requirement concerns the nature and designated purpose of the accommodation itself.

3. The statutory phrase identifies secure accommodation approved by the Secretary of State. The legislative history maintained a distinction between an ordinary remand to local authority accommodation, with or without bail-like conditions, and a remand subject to a security requirement. Only the latter is equivalent to custody and attracts the automatic statutory reduction.

4. Conditions such as a curfew do not convert ordinary local authority accommodation into qualifying accommodation. Such conditions may restrict conduct, but the resident remains capable of choosing whether to comply. The respondent’s ability to leave the unlocked home illustrated the distinction between conditional liberty and detention.

5. The construction also supplies a clear administrative rule. The governor need ascertain only whether the accommodation was approved as secure accommodation and the number of days recorded there. Section 67 does not require an administrative assessment of the practical severity of each remand regime.

6. A restrictive non-secure remand is not necessarily irrelevant. Per Lord Clyde, its effect may be evaluated by the sentencing court when fixing sentence. That judicial assessment is distinct from the automatic computation performed under section 67.

7. Reg. v. Collins (1995) 16 Cr. App. R. (S.) 156 was wrongly decided and overruled. In re K, unreported, 6 March 1995, which had followed it, was also overruled. The governor’s refusal to grant automatic credit for the period in the non-secure home was therefore correct.

1. House of Lords: Allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal unanimously and overruled Reg. v. Collins (1995) 16 Cr. App. R. (S.) 156 and In re K, unreported, 6 March 1995.

2. High Court: Collins J allowed the respondent’s application for judicial review because he considered himself bound by Reg. v. Collins. He granted a certificate under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969, enabling a direct appeal to the House of Lords.