R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex p Evans (No 2)

False imprisonment is a tort of strict liability. Detention must be justified by lawful authority. Good faith, reasonable care and reliance on a judicial interpretation later shown to be wrong do not justify imprisonment beyond the date authorised by statute.

A sentencing order stating the length of imprisonment does not authorise detention beyond the correctly calculated release date where legislation places that calculation upon the prison governor. A declaration of the correct statutory construction ordinarily states what the provision has always meant. Prospective limitation could not deprive the successful claimant of compensation in this case.

The respondent received concurrent sentences, the longest being two years. Under section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, periods spent in custody before sentence reduced the period to be served. The prison governor calculated her release date as 18 November 1996 by following an established line of Divisional Court decisions.

In R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex p Evans [1997] QB 443, the Divisional Court held that the earlier construction was wrong and declared that the respondent had been entitled to release on 17 September 1996. She was released immediately, after 59 additional days in custody. Collins J dismissed her claim for false imprisonment but assessed damages contingently at £2,000.

The Court of Appeal, by a majority, allowed her appeal and increased damages to £5,000: [1999] QB 1043. The governor appealed on liability and quantum. The central questions were whether reliance upon the previously accepted law justified the unlawful detention and whether the increased damages award should stand.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously dismissed the governor’s appeal and upheld the award of £5,000. Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Steyn, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough gave reasons supporting liability. Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed with the reasons of Lord Steyn and Lord Hope, subject to reservations about prospective overruling and legislation subsequently declared ultra vires.

2. Strict liability and lawful justification. Per Lord Slynn, Lord Steyn, Lord Hope and Lord Hobhouse, false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability. The claimant need not prove fault or bad faith. Once the respondent’s entitlement to release on 17 September had been established, her later detention was unlawful. The governor’s good faith, reasonable care and reliance on the law as previously understood supplied no lawful justification.

3. Scope of the sentencing order. Per Lord Hope and Lord Hobhouse, the Crown Court’s order stated only the length of the sentence. It authorised the respondent’s initial reception into custody but did not specify her conditional release date. Section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 placed responsibility for calculating that date upon the governor. The cases protecting a gaoler who acts within a facially valid warrant were therefore distinguishable. The extended detention had to be justified by the statute, and the statute gave no authority to detain the respondent beyond the correctly calculated date.

4. Earlier judicial error. The previous Divisional Court decisions had never given the statutory provision the meaning for which the governor contended. A judicial decision is evidence and exposition of the law; an erroneous interpretation does not itself create legal authority to detain. In substance, the State was required to compensate the respondent for the executive’s interference with her liberty.

5. Retrospective effect and Convention rights. The declaration in R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex p Evans [1997] QB 443 stated the respondent’s rights as at 17 September and operated retrospectively. Lords Slynn, Steyn and Hope considered that any power of prospective overruling could not properly be used against this respondent. The broader existence and scope of such a power were left unresolved. Lord Steyn, Lord Hope and Lord Hobhouse also regarded the result as supported by article 5 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, although the common law was sufficient to decide liability.

6. Damages. Per Lord Steyn and Lord Hope, the 59-day period was substantial. The Court of Appeal legitimately provided guidance in an area where authority on damages was scarce, and its substituted award of £5,000 disclosed no basis for interference.

1. House of Lords: In R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex p Evans (No 2) [2000] UKHL 48, the House unanimously dismissed the governor’s appeal and upheld liability and the £5,000 damages award.
2. Court of Appeal: By a majority, the court allowed the respondent’s appeal on liability and increased the contingent damages assessment from £2,000 to £5,000: [1999] QB 1043.
3. High Court: Collins J dismissed the claim for false imprisonment but assessed damages at £2,000 in case that conclusion was wrong.
4. Divisional Court: In R v Governor of Brockhill Prison, Ex p Evans [1997] QB 443, the court declared that the respondent had been entitled to release on 17 September 1996 and ordered her immediate release. The damages issue was adjourned.