White v. White

This House considered the exercise of the broad discretionary powers under Part II of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (notably sections 23, 24 and 25) in a high-value "clean break" ancillary relief case. The court held that equality of division is an important and useful yardstick or check but not a statutory presumption; departure from equality is permissible where good reason exists.

The court rejected the approach that a claimant's "reasonable requirements" or Duxbury-type capitalisation of income should be determinative in big-money cases; available financial resources (section 25(2)(a)), contributions (section 25(2)(f)) and other factors in section 25 must be weighed together. The court also explained that inherited or gifted property is a relevant factor but ordinarily carries little weight where the claimant's needs cannot be met without it.

This was an appeal from the Court of Appeal in ancillary relief proceedings following the dissolution of a 33-year marriage between farmers, Martin and Pamela White. The parties ran a successful dairy farming partnership; principal assets included two farms and related farming assets with an overall net worth, on the judge's figures, of about 4.6 million. The case proceeded on a clean break basis.

The first instance judge (Holman J) assessed Mrs White's "reasonable requirements" (a Duxbury-type capital calculation) and ordered a lump sum payment of 800,000 to meet needs; Mrs White would retain her sole assets and transfer jointly owned assets to Mr White. The Court of Appeal (Butler-Sloss, Thorpe and Mantell LJJ) increased the payment to 1.5 million, giving Mrs White roughly two-fifths of the net pool.

The issues before the House were (i) whether equality should be treated as a starting point or presumption, (ii) the relationship and proper weight to be given to section 25(2)(a) (available resources) and section 25(2)(b) (needs) and the judicial use of the concept of "reasonable requirements", (iii) the proper role of Duxbury-type calculations in big-money cases, and (iv) the treatment of property acquired by gift or succession.

The House held that equality is a valuable general guide or check but not a statutory presumption; courts must take account of all the factors in section 25. The court criticised the approach of treating reasonable requirements as determinative and emphasised that where resources exceed needs the surplus must be considered, and may justify an award greater than a claimant's capitalised needs. The House found no basis to interfere with the Court of Appeal's exercise of discretion and dismissed both appeals, upholding the Court of Appeal's award to Mrs White.

Appeals dismissed. The House held that equality is a useful general guide but not a legal presumption; a claimant's "reasonable requirements" (Duxbury) are only one factor under section 25 and are not determinative; courts must weigh available resources, needs, contributions and other section 25 factors together. Applying those principles, there was no ground to disturb the Court of Appeal's exercise of discretion increasing Mrs White's award.

First instance: Holman J (Family Division) awarded Mrs White 800,000 (plus retention of sole assets) by reference to "reasonable requirements". Court of Appeal (Butler-Sloss, Thorpe and Mantell LJJ) allowed Mrs White's appeal and increased the payment to 1.5 million ([1999] 2 WLR 1213). Appeal to the House of Lords ([2000] UKHL 54) dismissed both Mr and Mrs White's appeals.