McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd

A press conference is a public meeting for statutory qualified privilege where its organisers open it to the public or invite the press so that its proceedings will be communicated to the wider public. Restricted admission does not prevent a meeting from being public.

A written press release forms part of the proceedings where it is communicated to those attending, even if it is not read aloud or expressly incorporated. A subsequent private conversation falls outside the meeting unless it repeats what was communicated during the meeting. Privilege remains subject to the statutory requirements of fairness, accuracy, absence of malice, public concern, public benefit and an adequate right of reply.

The respondents, a Belfast firm of solicitors, obtained a jury verdict in libel against the publisher of The Times. The article reported criticisms made at a press conference organised to promote the release and vindication of a convicted soldier. The trial judge ruled that the conference was not a public meeting and withdrew the newspaper's statutory qualified-privilege defence from the jury.

The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland dismissed the newspaper's appeal: [1998] N.I. 358. It held that the invitation to journalists and the incidental attendance of other persons did not provide the necessary public element. It also inclined to the view that an unspoken passage in the written press release was outside the proceedings.

The questions before the House were whether the press conference was a public meeting under section 7 and paragraph 9 of the Schedule to the Defamation Act (Northern Ireland) 1955, and whether the press release formed part of its proceedings.

Held, unanimously, allowing the appeal, quashing the orders below and remitting the case to the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court in Northern Ireland:

1. Lord Bingham delivered the leading speech. Lord Steyn agreed and gave additional reasons; Lord Hoffmann and Lord Millett agreed with Lord Bingham; and Lord Cooke agreed with Lord Bingham and Lord Steyn.

2. Per Lord Bingham, a meeting is public where its organisers open it to the public or, by issuing a general invitation to the press, manifest an intention that its proceedings should be communicated to a wider public. Journalists may be regarded as members of the public or as the public's eyes and ears. The statutory language did not support the lower courts' test based on the absence of a special nexus between organisers and attendees.

3. The concluding words of paragraph 9, which permit admission to be general or restricted, prevent a meeting from losing its public character merely because admission is not available to every member of the public. Nothing inherent in a press conference places it outside the ordinary contemporary meaning of a public meeting. The conference in question was organised to generate public pressure, was widely advertised to the press, admitted journalists and non-journalists without restriction, and allowed questions and statements.

4. Per Lord Bingham, the privilege was subject to substantial safeguards under the Defamation Act (Northern Ireland) 1955. The report had to be fair and accurate; privilege could be defeated by malice; the publication had to concern a matter of public concern and be for the public benefit; and Part II required an adequate opportunity for explanation or contradiction. Those safeguards supported a contemporary and purposive construction of “public meeting”.

5. A written press release forms part of the proceedings if its contents are communicated at the meeting to those attending. It need not be read aloud or expressly incorporated. The press release had been distributed and treated as read, so the relevant passage was capable of forming part of a privileged report.

6. A private one-to-one statement made after the general conference had broken up would not form part of the meeting unless it repeated the effect of something said during the conference or written in the press release.

7. Lord Steyn additionally reasoned that older statutory language should be treated as always speaking and construed within the contemporary legal system, in which freedom of expression has constitutional importance. Lord Cooke considered that ordinary liberal and purposive construction was sufficient, so direct reliance on the Human Rights Act 1998 was unnecessary.

8. No finding had been made on whether the report was fair and accurate. That issue was remitted for determination by a jury. The House declined to decide the wider allocation of functions between judge and jury because it was not raised by a ground of appeal or fully argued.

1. House of Lords: Unanimously allowed the newspaper's appeal, quashed the orders below and remitted the proceedings to the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court in Northern Ireland.
2. Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland: Dismissed the newspaper's appeal and upheld the ruling that the press conference was not a public meeting: [1998] N.I. 358.
3. High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland, Queen's Bench Division: Girvan J withdrew the statutory qualified-privilege defence from the jury. The solicitors succeeded on liability, and the jury assessed damages.