Turkington and Others v. Times Newspapers Limited (Northern Ireland)

The House of Lords held that the press conference organised by the Clegg Committee was a "public meeting" within the meaning of section 7 and paragraph 9 of the Schedule to the Defamation Act (Northern Ireland) 1955, and that a written press release distributed at the conference formed part of the proceedings of that meeting for the purposes of the statutory qualified privilege. The court applied a purposive and contemporary construction of "public meeting", emphasising the role of the press as the eyes and ears of the public and the importance of freedom of expression. Material said one-to-one after the meeting had ended was not part of the meeting. Because fairness and accuracy of the report remained unresolved, the House quashed the lower courts' orders and remitted the case for further directions and hearing on those issues.

Background and procedural history. The respondents, a firm of solicitors who had represented Private Clegg, sued The Times for libel over an article reporting statements made at a Clegg Committee press conference on 23 January 1995. Girvan J directed the jury that the press conference was not a "public meeting" under the Defamation Act (Northern Ireland) 1955 and withdrew the defence of statutory qualified privilege; the Court of Appeal ([1998] N.I. 358) upheld that ruling. The newspaper appealed to the House of Lords.

Nature of the claim and relief sought. The solicitors sought damages for libel; the newspaper relied on the statutory defence of qualified privilege in section 7 read with paragraph 9 of the Schedule to the 1955 Act.

Issues framed by the court.

• Whether the press conference was a "public meeting" within s.7 and para.9 of the Schedule to the Defamation Act (Northern Ireland) 1955.
• Whether a passage of the article, reproducing parts of a written press release not read aloud at the conference, constituted a report of the proceedings of that public meeting.

Court's reasoning and decision. The House adopted a purposive, contemporary interpretation of "public meeting". It held that a meeting is public if organisers open it to the public or, by issuing a general invitation to the press, manifest an intention that proceedings be communicated to the wider public; the statutory language must be read as "always speaking". The press conference, which was organised to obtain publicity, was a public meeting; the written press release distributed to attendees formed part of the proceedings. Remarks made privately, one-to-one after the meeting had ended were not covered. Because the issues of fairness and accuracy (and the statutory requirement to afford explanation or contradiction under Part II of the Schedule) remained unresolved and are for the jury, the House allowed the appeal, quashed the earlier orders and remitted the case to the Queen's Bench Division in Northern Ireland for further directions and hearing limited to those matters.

Additional procedural note: the House declined to decide in this appeal the detailed allocation of judge and jury functions under the statute where that issue was not argued fully. Costs were ordered for the newspaper on the appeal and in the Court of Appeal; trial costs to abide the event of any re-trial.

Appeal allowed. The House held that the press conference was a "public meeting" within section 7 and paragraph 9 of the Schedule to the Defamation Act (Northern Ireland) 1955 because the organisers intended the proceedings to be communicated to the public by inviting the press; the written press release distributed at the conference formed part of the proceedings and so could be reported under the statutory privilege. One-to-one remarks after the meeting were not privileged. Fairness and accuracy were unresolved and remitted to jury/directions in the High Court.

Trial before Girvan J (liability found for respondents after judge ruled no statutory privilege); Court of Appeal upheld Girvan J ([1998] N.I. 358); appeal to House of Lords allowed ([2000] UKHL 57).