Uratemp Ventures Limited v. Collins (Ap)

The House of Lords construed the phrase "a dwelling-house . . . let as a separate dwelling" in section 1 of the Housing Act 1988. The court held that the ordinary meaning of "dwelling" is a place where a person lives and treats as home and that the presence of cooking facilities is not an essential characteristic of a dwelling for the purposes of section 1. The decisive inquiry is whether, at the date proceedings are brought, the premises of which the occupier has exclusive possession are his home. Where exclusive possession is absent and other rooms are shared, the character and extent of those rights determine whether the part occupied is the occupier's dwelling or only part of it. Observations in earlier authorities (notably an obiter passage in Westminster City Council v Clarke) suggesting that cooking facilities are indispensable were rejected as a rigid gloss incompatible with the language and purpose of the statute.

Background and parties.

The respondent landlords owned the Viscount Hotel; Mr Collins, the appellant, occupied a modest hotel room (Room 403) as his home. The landlords sought possession on the basis that his occupation was a licence rather than an assured tenancy under section 1 of the Housing Act 1988.

Procedural history.

• West London County Court (Judge Cotran): held Mr Collins held an assured tenancy and that the room was a separate dwelling.
• Court of Appeal: a majority held the absence of cooking facilities precluded the room being a "dwelling-house"; Mance LJ dissented.
• House of Lords: allowed the appeal ([2001] UKHL 43).

Issues framed.

1. Whether the room occupied by Mr Collins was a "dwelling-house" within section 1 of the Housing Act 1988, in particular whether cooking facilities are an essential requirement.
2. Whether any question of tenancy as opposed to licence should be remitted to the county court.

Facts relevant to the decision.

• Room 403 was small (about 72 square feet), contained a bed, shower and basin, and had power points but no landlord-provided cooking facilities.
• Mr Collins brought in electrical appliances (pizza warmer, sandwich maker, kettle) and ate take-away food in his room; he was not prohibited from bringing his own appliances, though later hotel rules limited cooking methods.
• At the hearing the landlord withdrew opposition to the appeal, and Mr Collins had vacated the particular room.

Court's reasoning and conclusion.

The House analysed the ordinary meaning of "dwelling" and the statutory purpose of giving security to occupiers of modest rented accommodation. It reviewed historical and leading authorities on "dwelling" and on shared accommodation, distinguishing cases concerned with sharing of living accommodation from the question whether premises lacking cooking facilities can be a home. The court rejected a rigid rule that cooking facilities are essential, noting that earlier passages suggesting such a rule were obiter or misapplied. The correct approach is to identify the subject-matter of the tenancy, determine whether the occupier has exclusive possession and whether, at the date proceedings are brought, the subject-matter is the occupier's home. Where sharing exists, the nature of the shared rights and the character of the shared rooms decide whether the part exclusively occupied is the dwelling or merely part of it. Applying these principles, the House concluded that absence of cooking facilities did not preclude Room 403 from being a dwelling-house and allowed the appeal.

Relief sought: Clarification that the occupier enjoyed protection as an assured tenant; declaration and possession proceedings were in issue. The House allowed the appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal orders and directed costs as stated in the judgment.

Appeal allowed. The House held that the absence of cooking facilities is not, as a matter of law, fatal to classification of premises as a "dwelling-house" under section 1 of the Housing Act 1988. The correct test is whether the part of the house of which the occupier has exclusive possession was, at the date proceedings were brought, his home. Observations suggesting that cooking facilities are indispensable were obiter or wrongly applied and should not be treated as imposing a restrictive rule.

West London County Court (Judge Cotran): found an assured tenancy and that the room was let as a separate dwelling. Court of Appeal: majority held absence of cooking facilities precluded classification as a dwelling; Mance LJ dissented. House of Lords: allowed the appeal ([2001] UKHL 43).