In re B

On a sole natural parent’s application for adoption, section 15(3)(b) of the Adoption Act 1976 requires a reason sufficient to justify permanently excluding the other parent. The reason need not resemble death or disappearance. Consent is relevant but is not sufficient by itself, and the adverse consequences of exclusion must be weighed against the child’s welfare.

Such adoptions are likely to be exceptional, but exceptional circumstances are not a separate statutory condition. An appellate court cannot replace a trial judge’s welfare evaluation merely because it prefers another outcome. It must identify a material misdirection or a plainly wrong decision. A properly conducted best-interests assessment also supplies the pressing need and proportionality analysis required by article 8.

The unmarried parents’ relationship ended before their daughter was born. The mother initially arranged for adoption without informing the father. Once located, the father assumed the child’s care and obtained parental responsibility. The child thereafter thrived with him. He applied to adopt her as her sole adoptive parent, principally to secure the placement by extinguishing the mother’s parental responsibility. The mother ultimately gave informed and unconditional consent.

Bracewell J granted the adoption order: [2000] 2 FLR 717. The Court of Appeal reversed her decision, holding that section 15(3)(b) of the Adoption Act 1976 required a reason comparable to the circumstances specified in section 15(3)(a), and that adoption was disproportionate: [2001] 1 FLR 589.

The central issues were the correct construction of section 15(3)(b), whether article 8 required a more restrictive construction, and whether the Court of Appeal was entitled to substitute its own welfare assessment for that of the judge.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously allowed the father’s appeal and restored Bracewell J’s adoption order. Lord Nicholls delivered the leading speech. Lords Mackay, Hoffmann, Millett and Rodger expressly agreed with his reasons.
2. Appellate restraint. Per Lord Nicholls, an appellate court may reconsider a child-welfare evaluation only after identifying a material error of law or evidence, or a decision so plainly wrong that a misdirection must be inferred. A mere preference for another outcome does not permit intervention. The principle applies whether the evidence was oral or written, disputed or agreed. The House applied G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] 1 WLR 647 and approved the explanation of appellate restraint in In re Grayan Building Services Ltd (in liquidation) [1995] Ch 241.
3. Section 15(3). Per Lord Nicholls, section 15(3)(b) of the Adoption Act 1976 is deliberately open-ended. The reason for excluding the other natural parent need not be comparable with death, disappearance or the absence of another parent under section 15(3)(a). It must be sufficient, in the circumstances, to justify exclusion and outweigh the adverse consequences for the child. Consent is a relevant factor whose weight depends on the circumstances, but it is insufficient by itself. The Court of Appeal’s construction was therefore unduly restrictive.
4. Welfare and statutory alternatives. Per Lord Nicholls, adoption by one natural parent extinguishes the other parent’s responsibility and legal relationship with the child. Such orders are therefore likely to be exceptional. Adoption is not intended merely to protect a placement against inappropriate intervention, given the powers available under the Children Act 1989. Nevertheless, Bracewell J was entitled to find that the father’s genuine insecurity, the mother’s settled attitude and consent, and the child’s need for stability justified adoption. Her conclusion was neither legally misdirected nor manifestly wrong.
5. Article 8. Per Lord Nicholls, the mother-child relationship constituted family life, but the mother’s informed consent meant that her article 8 rights were not infringed. For the child, the welfare balancing required by the Adoption Act 1976 was substantively the same as the pressing-social-need and proportionality assessment under article 8(2), as applied in Silver v United Kingdom (1983) 5 EHRR 347. A properly conducted best-interests assessment therefore satisfied article 8. No restrictive reading under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 was required.

1. House of Lords: In In re B [2001] UKHL 70, unanimously allowed the father’s appeal and restored the High Court’s adoption order.
2. Court of Appeal: Reversed Bracewell J, set aside the adoption order, and substituted a residence order and restrictions upon applications by the mother under the Children Act 1989: [2001] 1 FLR 589.
3. High Court: Bracewell J granted the father’s application for an adoption order: [2000] 2 FLR 717.