B (A Minor), Re

This case concerned an application by the natural father for an adoption order in respect of his daughter where the mother consented to the adoption. The primary legal question was the proper construction and application of section 15(3) of the Adoption Act 1976 (the requirement that, for an adoption on the application of one natural parent alone, the court must be satisfied that the other parent is dead, cannot be found, there is no other parent under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, or that there is some other reason justifying exclusion). The House of Lords held that "some other reason" in section 15(3)(b) is open-ended and not to be read down so as to require reasons comparable to death, disappearance or anonymous sperm donation. The court also affirmed that the welfare test and the balancing exercise undertaken under domestic law correspond to the proportionality balancing under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights; there was no need to read down section 15(3)(b) by reference to section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The judge at first instance had not misdirected herself and her conclusion that adoption was in the child’s best interests was open to her on the evidence, so the appeal was allowed and the adoption order restored.

Background and facts:

• The child A was born on 19 October 1998 to an unmarried mother. The mother immediately expressed a wish that the child be adopted and the child was placed with foster carers. The father became involved only after the birth, subsequently obtained parental responsibility by agreement, and from December 1998 cared for A full time. The father applied for an adoption order in April 1999, primarily to secure the child’s future in his sole care because he feared future attempts by the mother to reclaim the child. The mother initially vacillated but ultimately gave unqualified consent to the adoption on 20 June 2000.

Procedural history:

• Bracewell J in the High Court made the adoption order ([2000] 2 FLR 717). The Official Solicitor, acting as guardian, appealed. The Court of Appeal ([2001] 1 FLR 589) set aside the adoption order and substituted a residence order and protective directions. The father appealed to the House of Lords.

Nature of the claim/application:

• The father sought a sole adoption order so that the mother’s legal relationship and parental responsibility would be permanently extinguished, thereby securing the child’s placement with him.

Issues framed by the court:

1) The proper construction and application of section 15(3) of the Adoption Act 1976: what is meant by "some other reason" justifying exclusion of the other natural parent?

2) The relationship between the domestic welfare assessment for adoption and the article 8 Convention right to respect for family life; whether section 15(3)(b) had to be read down to accord with article 8.

3) The standard of appellate review in child welfare cases where the trial judge reached a primary conclusion on the balance of welfare considerations.

Court’s reasoning and outcome:

• The House of Lords held that section 15(3)(b) is intentionally open-ended; the reason justifying exclusion need only be sufficient in the circumstances to justify exclusion, and is not limited to circumstances comparable to death, disappearance or anonymous sperm donation. The judge’s emphasis on the father’s anxiety, the mother’s complete lack of involvement from birth, and her consent were matters properly taken into account; on the evidence Bracewell J's conclusion that adoption would promote and safeguard the child’s welfare was a tenable conclusion and was not manifestly wrong.
• On article 8, the House of Lords held that the domestic welfare balancing exercise corresponds to the article 8 proportionality assessment. There was no need to read down section 15(3)(b) by reference to section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998; a properly conducted domestic welfare inquiry will address the pressing social need and proportionality required by article 8(2).
• The Court of Appeal was not entitled to substitute its own evaluation merely because it might have reached a different view; an appellate court should intervene only if the trial judge had misdirected herself or her conclusion was plainly wrong.

Appeal allowed. The House of Lords restored the adoption order made by Bracewell J. The court held that section 15(3)(b) of the Adoption Act 1976 is open-ended and does not require reasons comparable to death or disappearance; the trial judge did not misdirect herself and her welfare conclusion was tenable. The article 8 Convention did not require reading down section 15(3)(b) because the domestic welfare balancing corresponds to the Convention proportionality test.

First instance: adoption order made by Bracewell J (reported at [2000] 2 FLR 717). Court of Appeal: adoption order set aside and substituted orders made ([2001] 1 FLR 589). Appeal to the House of Lords: [2001] UKHL 70 (this judgment).