Regina v Manchester City Council, Ex p Stennett and Two Other Actions

The House of Lords held that section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 imposes a duty on health authorities and local social services authorities to provide after-care services for persons discharged from compulsory detention and that this duty imports the power to provide those services "under this section". Because section 117 itself contains no charging provision, authorities may not lawfully charge for after-care services provided pursuant to section 117. The court rejected arguments that section 117 was merely a gateway to other statutory charging provisions (for example section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948) or was only a duty to co-operate, and emphasised the statutory language, context and policy reasons protecting a particularly vulnerable class of persons.

Background and parties:

• The appeals concerned three mentally ill persons who had been detained under section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983, subsequently discharged and placed in caring residential accommodation provided by local social services authorities that charged for those services.
• The appellants were Manchester City Council and other local authorities; the respondents were the former patients (ex parte Stennett and two others).

Procedural history:

• At first instance Sullivan J ruled that authorities had no right to charge for after-care services: [2000] LGR 318.
• The Court of Appeal (Otton and Buxton LJJ and Hooper J) upheld that decision: [2001] QB 370.
• The authorities appealed to the House of Lords.

Nature of the claim and issues:

• The claims were judicial review challenges to the lawfulness of decisions by local authorities to charge discharged detained patients for after-care services.
• The central issue was whether section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 requires and authorises authorities to provide after-care services directly under that section (in which case no charging power exists because section 117 contains no charging provision), or whether section 117 merely operates as a gateway leaving provision and charging to other statutory schemes (for example section 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948).

Court's reasoning and decision:

• The House of Lords placed weight on the imperative language of section 117(2) which states that authorities "shall . . . provide . . . after-care services . . . until such time as the person concerned is no longer in need of such services", and on explicit references elsewhere in the 1983 Act to "after-care services provided under this section" (for example sections 25A to 25H), concluding that Parliament intended section 117 to be a freestanding duty to provide services under that section.
• The court held the duty necessarily imports the concomitant power to provide the services; accordingly the services are provided under section 117 and not under other charging enactments. The absence of any charging provision in section 117 therefore precludes charging for those services.
• The House rejected alternative constructions advanced by the authorities (that section 117 is only a duty to co-operate or merely a gateway) and refused to rely on Hansard material. Policy considerations concerning the vulnerability of the class protected by section 117 supported the interpretation that services should be provided without charge.

Appeal dismissed. The House held that section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983 imposes a duty on health and local social services authorities to provide after-care services under that section; that duty carries with it the power to provide the services under section 117; and because section 117 contains no charging provision authorities may not lawfully charge patients for after-care services provided under section 117.

High Court (Sullivan J) [2000] LGR 318; Court of Appeal (Otton and Buxton LJJ and Hooper J) [2001] QB 370; appealed to the House of Lords [2002] UKHL 34.