R v Lyons
[2002] UKHL 44
Case details
Case summary
The House of Lords held that convictions obtained in 1990 which relied in part on answers compelled under the Companies Act 1985, s.434(5) should not be quashed merely because the European Court of Human Rights subsequently held that the admission of such answers violated Article 6. The Court emphasised that the task on appeal is to decide whether a conviction is unsafe under domestic law, applying the law as it stood at the date of trial and relevant statutory constraints on judicial discretion such as s.434(5) and PACE s.78. The court accepted that judgments of the ECtHR are authoritative and should be taken into account where the domestic courts are free to do so, but they do not displace clear, retrospective effect of an Act of Parliament. The Human Rights Act 1998 and later statutory amendment by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 were not retrospective and did not entitle appellants to relief for trials concluded before those changes.
Case abstract
The appellants were convicted in 1990 after a six month trial in which the prosecution adduced transcripts of answers the appellants had been compelled to give to inspectors appointed under Part XIV of the Companies Act 1985. Section 434(5) expressly permitted answers given to such inspectors to be used in evidence. The appellants later challenged their convictions after the European Court of Human Rights found (in Saunders and later decisions concerning these appellants) that admission of compelled answers in criminal trials breached Article 6 of the Convention.
The appeals to the Court of Appeal and to the House raised three central issues: (i) whether, in view of the ECtHR rulings and the United Kingdom's obligations under Articles 41 and 46 of the Convention, domestic appellate courts should quash convictions obtained by use of compelled answers; (ii) whether domestic statutes (notably Companies Act 1985 s.434(5) and the judge's discretion under PACE s.78) permitted exclusion of those answers at trial or on appeal; and (iii) whether later developments — prosecutorial guidance after the Saunders decision and the amendments effected by the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and the Human Rights Act 1998 — required retrospective reopening of pre‑2000 convictions.
The House analysed the appellate role under Criminal Appeal Act 1968 s.2(1): the Court of Appeal must allow an appeal only if it thinks the conviction is unsafe. The Law Lords held that when assessing safety the court must apply the law as it stood at trial. Because s.434(5) plainly authorised use of compelled answers, a trial judge could not lawfully exclude those answers solely because they had been compelled, and a later ECtHR ruling did not change that retrospective application. The Human Rights Act and the 1999 statutory amendment were not retrospective and therefore did not entitle the appellants to quashing of convictions. The House therefore dismissed the appeals, while recognising the international obligation of the United Kingdom to give effect to ECtHR judgments and noting that questions of restitution and execution of judgments remain matters for the ECtHR and the Committee of Ministers.
Held
Appellate history
Cited cases
- R v Seelig, (1992) 94 Cr App R 17 positive
- Saunders v United Kingdom, (1996) 23 EHRR 313 positive
- Dallal v Bank Mellat, [1986] QB 441 negative
- Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2), [1990] 1 AC 109 neutral
- J. H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade and Industry (International Tin Council), [1990] 2 AC 418 positive
- R v Staines and Morrisey, [1997] 2 Cr App R 426 positive
- R v Bentley (Deceased), [2001] 1 Cr App R 307 neutral
- R v Lambert, [2001] 3 WLR 206 positive
- R v Kansal (No 2), [2002] 2 AC 69 positive
Legislation cited
- Companies Act 1985: Section 434
- Companies Act 1985: Section 436
- Criminal Appeal Act 1968: section 2(1)
- Human Rights Act 1998: Section 3
- Human Rights Act 1998: Section 4
- Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Section 76
- Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984: Section 78
- Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999: Section 59
- Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999: Schedule 3