Regina v Lyons and Others (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division))

On an appeal against an old conviction, the court determines safety at the time of the appeal but applies the substantive law governing the original trial. A later finding by the European Court of Human Rights, or a prospective statutory amendment, does not retrospectively render unsafe a conviction obtained in accordance with the law then in force.

An unincorporated treaty obligation cannot override clear domestic legislation. Courts should act consistently with international obligations when domestic law permits, but Parliament’s expressed intention prevails. Under the former section 434(5) of the Companies Act 1985, compelled answers were admissible. Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 permitted exclusion for additional unfairness, but not for statutory compulsion alone.

The appellants were convicted in 1990 of dishonesty offences arising from a share-support operation connected with Guinness plc’s takeover of the Distillers Company plc. Inspectors appointed under Part XIV of the Companies Act 1985 had compelled them to answer questions. Section 434(5) then permitted those answers to be used against them, and the prosecution relied materially upon the interview transcripts at trial.

Domestic appeals in 1991 and 1995 substantially failed. The European Court of Human Rights subsequently held, first in Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313 and then in the applications of the other appellants, that use of the compelled answers violated article 6. Following references by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the Court of Appeal again dismissed the appeals: [2001] EWCA Crim 2860; [2002] 2 Cr App R 210.

The central issue was whether the European Court’s rulings, article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights, international comity or subsequent legislative changes required the convictions to be quashed, although the evidence had been admissible under domestic law at the time of trial.

1. Disposition. The House unanimously dismissed the appeals and answered the certified question in the affirmative. Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hutton and Lord Millett each gave reasons for dismissal. Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough agreed entirely with Lord Hoffmann.

2. Safety of the convictions. Lord Bingham, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hutton, Lord Hobhouse and Lord Millett treated section 2(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 as requiring the Court of Appeal to exercise its own judgment at the time of the appeal. It must allow an appeal if the conviction is unsafe and dismiss it otherwise. Safety includes whether the accused was convicted lawfully and through a fair trial. Contemporary standards may govern general procedural fairness, but the substantive law applicable at the trial remains controlling.

3. Compelled answers. The former section 434(5) of the Companies Act 1985 expressly permitted answers compelled by company inspectors to be used against the person answering. The prosecution was free not to adduce them, but the court could not exclude them merely because they had been compelled and were self-incriminatory. Section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 remained available where some additional circumstance made admission unfair. Exclusion on compulsion alone would have contradicted Parliament’s enacted intention.

4. International and domestic law. Per Lord Bingham, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hobhouse and Lord Millett, the obligation under article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights was an international obligation which had not itself been made directly enforceable in domestic law. Domestic courts should interpret and develop English law consistently with international obligations when free to do so. They remained bound, however, to apply clear legislation even where that might place the United Kingdom in breach of a treaty.

5. No retrospective change. The restriction introduced by section 59 and Schedule 3 to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 applied prospectively. The Human Rights Act 1998 was likewise not retrospective. Neither enactment authorised the appellate court to treat the law governing the 1990 trial as though it had already been amended.

6. Comity and prosecutorial conduct. The principle in Dallal v Bank Mellat [1986] QB 441 did not apply. The European Court had decided whether article 6 was violated under international law, whereas the domestic court had to decide whether the convictions were unsafe under English law. The prosecution’s resistance to the appeals was not an abuse of process, and its view could not determine safety. The broader remedial consequences of articles 41 and 46 were left for the European Court or the Committee of Ministers so far as they remained material.

1. House of Lords: In Regina v Lyons and Others [2002] UKHL 44, the House unanimously dismissed the appeals and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision.
2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 2001: Following references by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the court dismissed all four appeals: [2001] EWCA Crim 2860; [2002] 2 Cr App R 210.
3. European Court of Human Rights: The court held in Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) 23 EHRR 313, and in the other appellants’ applications decided in 2000, that use of the compelled answers at trial violated article 6.
4. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 1995: On a reference by the Home Secretary under section 17(1)(a) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the court quashed one count against Mr Lyons but otherwise dismissed the appeals: [1996] 1 Cr App R 463.
5. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 1991: The court quashed one count against Mr Saunders but otherwise dismissed the participating appellants’ appeals. Mr Lyons had abandoned his appeal on health grounds.
6. Central Criminal Court, 1990: A jury convicted each appellant on four or more counts arising from the Guinness takeover operation.