R v Lichniak

The House of Lords held that section 1(1) of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, which requires a mandatory life sentence for adult offenders convicted of murder, is not incompatible with Article 3 or Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court treated the life sentence as comprising a punitive "tariff" period for retribution and deterrence and a preventative element concerned with dangerousness assessed after the tariff. Authorities of the European Court were applied (notably V v United Kingdom and Stafford v United Kingdom) to show that an indeterminate sentence with a tariff and post-tariff review does not of itself amount to arbitrary, disproportionate or inhuman punishment. The appellants' complaints about uncertainty as to release, the burden on the prisoner and lifelong liability to recall were not of sufficient gravity to engage Articles 3 or 5.

Background and parties:

• The appeals were brought by Ms Lichniak and Mr Pyrah, each convicted of murder and sentenced pursuant to section 1(1) of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 to imprisonment for life.
• Ms Lichniak fatally stabbed a man during an incident in 1990; the trial judge found chronic anxiety stress and recommended a tariff of 10–12 years. The Home Secretary set a tariff of 11 years and she was later released on licence.
• Mr Pyrah, in 1996, kicked a victim in the head after intervening in an assault; the trial judge recommended a significantly below‑norm tariff (about 10 years), the Lord Chief Justice suggested 8–9 years, and the Home Secretary set a tariff of 8 years.

Procedural posture and nature of the claim:

The appellants appealed to the House of Lords from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). They sought declarations under the Human Rights Act 1998 that section 1(1) of the 1965 Act is incompatible with Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and Article 5 (right to liberty) of the European Convention on Human Rights on the grounds that the mandatory life sentence is arbitrary and/or disproportionate.

Issues framed:

1. Whether the mandatory life sentence for murder (section 1(1) of the 1965 Act) is incompatible with Article 3 because it is arbitrary or disproportionate.
2. Whether it is incompatible with Article 5 on the ground of arbitrariness.

Court's reasoning:

• The House accepted that the life sentence comprises two elements: a determinate tariff reflecting punishment (retribution and deterrence) and an indeterminate preventative element based on dangerousness assessed, after the tariff, by an independent body (the Parole Board) with power of recall. That structure aligns the sentence with the legitimate aims of detention after conviction.
• The court considered relevant Strasbourg authority (V v United Kingdom; Stafford v United Kingdom) and concluded that an indeterminate sentence of the kind imposed for murder is not per se arbitrary or inhuman where there is a tariff and appropriate review procedures.
• The court rejected the appellants' arguments that uncertainty over release, the onus on the prisoner at tariff expiry and lifelong risk of recall rendered the sentence arbitrary or disproportionate in their cases. It afforded a degree of deference to Parliament's settled judgment embodied in section 1(1) and relied on procedural safeguards, the Parole Board role and the possibility to challenge decisions showing excessive caution.
• The Court of Appeal's reasoning was endorsed and the appeals were dismissed.

Wider context: The House distinguished the Court of Appeal's decision in R v Offen (concerning section 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997) and explained why Offen did not assist the appellants. The court also noted the significance of subsequent Strasbourg case law on post‑tariff judicial determination of continued detention.

Appeals dismissed. The House of Lords held that section 1(1) of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 is not incompatible with Article 3 or Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The mandatory life sentence, properly understood as a tariff for punishment plus a preventative mechanism involving post‑tariff review by an independent body and potential recall, is not arbitrary or disproportionate in the appellants' cases; the features complained of did not attain the severity required to engage Articles 3 or 5.

Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division); the decision below is reported (see [2002] QB 296). The appeals reached the House of Lords after consideration in the courts below and were heard together with R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46; an earlier related High Court reference is reported at [2001] EWHC Admin 294.