Williamson v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police

The Court of Appeal held that, as a matter of domestic law, the word "offence" in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) does not extend to cover a breach of the peace, and therefore many provisions of PACE (including the bail provisions in Part IV) do not apply to detention for breach of the peace. The court analysed key PACE provisions (notably sections 17, 25, 34, 37, 39 and 47) and the Bail Act 1976 and concluded that Parliament had preserved the common law power to arrest and detain for breach of the peace while excluding that situation from the statutory arrest/detention code. The court considered the Strasbourg decision in Steel but concluded that it did not require a different construction of PACE, and that the common law safeguards governing arrest and detention for breach of the peace are compatible with Article 5 ECHR. Although the appeal on the point of statutory construction failed, the judge's unchallenged factual finding that, on the facts, detention should have ended by 18:00 was left intact.

Background and parties. The claimant (Williamson) sued the Chief Constable for wrongful arrest and unlawful detention after being arrested at his home for an alleged breach of the peace and detained overnight before being brought before magistrates. The defendant was the Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police. The appeal was from Birmingham County Court (His Honour Judge McKenna) to the Court of Appeal.

Nature of the claim and relief sought. The claimant sought damages for wrongful arrest and unlawful detention. The judge at first instance found the arrest lawful but concluded that the custody officer ought to have released the claimant by 18:00 on the day of arrest; the judge also interpreted PACE in light of the European Court of Human Rights to treat "offence" as including breach of the peace.

Procedural posture. The defendant was given limited permission to appeal on the narrow point whether PACE applies to arrests and detention for breach of the peace. The Court of Appeal heard argument on that statutory interpretation issue and on the subsidiary questions arising from the judge's factual findings.

Issues framed by the court. (i) Whether a breach of the peace is an "offence" within the meaning of PACE so that PACE's detention and bail provisions apply; (ii) whether, applying domestic common law principles, the custody officer should have released the claimant earlier (the latter factual point was not reopened on appeal).

Court's reasoning and holdings. The court reviewed domestic authorities and PACE's text. It emphasised that breach of the peace is not a criminal offence under English law and that PACE expressly preserved common law powers to deal with breach of the peace (see section 17(6)). The court concluded that statutory language and context (including section 25(6), section 39 and the Bail Act 1976) indicated Parliament did not intend PACE's arrest/detention code to extend to breach of the peace. The Court considered the Strasbourg judgment in Steel and held that Steel did not require the court to construe "offence" in PACE to include breach of the peace because English common law safeguards already satisfy Article 5. The court therefore refused to read PACE as covering breach of the peace, but affirmed the trial judge's unchallenged factual conclusion that, on the evidence, detention should have ended by 18:00 under common law principles and that continued detention beyond that time was unlawful. The court dismissed the appeal but made a declaration about the proper construction of PACE.

Context and implications. The court observed that though some PACE provisions are good police practice to follow in breach of the peace cases, certain statutory powers (notably grant of bail under the bail code) do not exist at common law and therefore do not apply to such detentions.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that "offence" in PACE does not include a breach of the peace and therefore PACE's statutory arrest/detention and bail code does not apply to arrests/detention for breach of the peace; the court reasoned from PACE's text, structure (including sections 17(6) and 25(6)), the Bail Act 1976, and relevant authorities, and concluded that the common law rules governing breach of the peace provide the necessary safeguards and that Steel v United Kingdom did not require a contrary construction. The judge's unchallenged factual finding that continued detention should have ended by 18:00 remained effective and the appeal was dismissed; the court granted a declaration reflecting the statutory construction it set out.

On appeal from Birmingham County Court (His Honour Judge McKenna) to the Court of Appeal; the Court of Appeal delivered judgment on 21 February 2003 ([2003] EWCA Civ 337). The defendant had limited permission to appeal on the point whether PACE applies to breach of the peace.