Stanley v Ealing

For the purposes of Part XI of the Housing Act 1985, a building originally constructed as a single-family house remains capable of being a house and a house in multiple occupation after substantial division into self-contained flats. Section 345(2) extends the definition to certain parts of buildings that are not houses; it does not restrict the existing meaning of section 345(1). In a codifying statute, common language used throughout the same Part should ordinarily have the same meaning unless there are very strong indications to the contrary. The statutory regime is compatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol, and public-health controls allow national authorities a wide area of judgment.

The appellant owned 5 Mount Avenue, an 1840s or 1850s semi-detached house converted into 11 self-contained flats. Ealing served notices under sections 352 and 372 of the Housing Act 1985, requiring works concerning fitness, amenities, fire precautions and management. The appellant argued that the property was no longer a house, but 11 houses, and therefore was neither a house nor a house in multiple occupation for Part XI purposes. The Brentford County Court rejected that preliminary argument. The appeal concerned the construction of section 345, the effect of the 1989 amendments, and compatibility with Article 1 of the First Protocol.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court held that 5 Mount Avenue remained a house for Part XI of the Housing Act 1985, notwithstanding its conversion into 11 self-contained flats. The statutory language did not justify treating each flat as a separate house.
2. Okereke v Brent London Borough Council [1967] 1 QB 42 was binding and directly addressed the contention that a building divided into self-contained dwellings could not be a house. The majority held that a building could remain a house under the predecessor provision. The provision extending the regime to buildings which were not houses did not deem a qualifying house to cease to be one.
3. Because the Housing Act 1985 is a codifying statute, “house in multiple occupation” should ordinarily bear the same meaning throughout Part XI. Section 345(2), inserted by Part III of Schedule 9 to the Local Government Act 1989, rationalised and extended the definition to qualifying parts of buildings that were not houses. It did not narrow section 345(1), and the repeal of section 374 and section 352(6) did not effect a significant change of policy.
4. The repair-notice provisions in Part VI of the 1989 Act did not assist because they addressed unfitness for human habitation, a distinct issue from the Part XI controls in question.
5. The application of Part XI was compatible with Article 1 of the First Protocol. There was a clear public interest in regulating premises of this kind. Particular requirements could still be challenged as disproportionate or unreasonable. In public-health and control matters, national authorities enjoy a wide area of judgment, as illustrated by Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326.
6. The appeal was dismissed with costs and permission to appeal was refused.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the Brentford County Court dismissed; costs awarded against the appellant and permission to appeal refused.
2. Brentford County Court: His Honour Judge Marcus Edwards held that the converted premises remained a house for the statutory purposes.