Stanley v Ealing

The Court of Appeal held that premises at 5 Mount Avenue remained a "house" and therefore could be a "house in multiple occupation" within the meaning of Section 345 of the Housing Act 1985, so that the notices served under Sections 352 and 372 could properly be challenged only on grounds other than that the building was not a house. The court treated Okereke v Brent London Borough Council [1967] 1 QB 42 as binding authority that a building originally constructed as a single dwelling may still be a "house" despite internal subdivision into self-contained units. The 1989 amendment adding subsection (2) to Section 345 did not narrow the original meaning of Section 345(1) but instead extended the definition to parts of buildings; it did not make converted or purpose-built blocks immune from Part XI controls. The appellant's Convention arguments (Article 1, First Protocol) failed because Part XI serves the public interest and the extent of control lies within a wide margin of judgement of national authorities.

Background and facts:

• The appellant, a qualified architect, converted a mid-19th century semi‑detached dwelling at 5 Mount Avenue into 11 self-contained flats in 1990–91. Most flats are accessed via the original entrance and staircase; two lower-ground flats have separate entrances.
• The local authority served notices under Section 352 (works to render premises fit for occupation) and Section 372 (remedial works for neglectful management) of the Housing Act 1985, alleging defects in facilities, ventilation, fire precautions, management and other matters.

Nature of the application and procedural posture:

• The appellant challenged as a preliminary issue whether the building was a "house" and therefore a "house in multiple occupation" under Section 345 of the Housing Act 1985; if not, Part XI controls (including s.352) would not apply. The case came on appeal from Brentford County Court (His Honour Judge Marcus Edwards) to the Court of Appeal.

Issues framed:

1. Whether premises converted into separate self-contained flats can still be a "house" and thus a "house in multiple occupation" under Section 345(1) of the Housing Act 1985.
2. Whether the 1989 amendment adding Section 345(2) altered or limited the earlier meaning of "house" so as to exclude converted or purpose-built blocks from Part XI.
3. Whether the application of Part XI in convention rights terms (Article 1 of the First Protocol) would amount to disproportionate interference with property.

Court’s reasoning and decision:

• The court treated Okereke v Brent London Borough Council [1967] 1 QB 42 as authoritative: a building originally constructed as a single dwelling remains a "house" for the relevant statutory purposes despite internal subdivision into self-contained units. That precedent was binding and dispositive on the statutory construction issue.
• The 1989 amendment (addition of s.345(2) by Part III of Schedule 9 to the Local Government Act 1989) was interpreted as extending and rationalising the definition to include parts of buildings that were originally constructed or adapted for a single household, not as restricting the pre-existing meaning of s.345(1). There was no convincing indication that Parliament intended to change the meaning of s.345(1) by the amendment.
• The appellant’s Convention argument was rejected: the statutory scheme serves a clear public interest; national authorities and courts enjoy a wide margin of judgement in matters of public health and housing control, and the judge had properly considered proportionality. Any objection to the reasonableness or proportionality of particular works remained a matter for challenge on the merits rather than by denying that the premises were an HMO.

The appeal was dismissed and the county court decision holding the premises within Part XI was upheld.

Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal held that (1) a building originally constructed as a single dwelling may remain a "house" for the purposes of Section 345(1) of the Housing Act 1985 even if internally subdivided into self-contained flats; (2) the 1989 addition of Section 345(2) extended the definition to parts of buildings but did not narrow the core meaning of Section 345(1); and (3) the appellant’s human rights complaint under Article 1 of the First Protocol did not establish disproportionate interference. The judge below was therefore right to treat the premises as within Part XI and to consider the notices under Sections 352 and 372.

Appeal from Brentford County Court (His Honour Judge Marcus Edwards). The county court had determined the premises to be a house in multiple occupation for the purposes of Part XI of the Housing Act 1985; appeal to the Court of Appeal (Neutral Citation [2003] EWCA Civ 679) was dismissed and permission to appeal refused.