Aineto, R (on the application of) v HM Coroner for Brighton and Hove

Under section 8(3)(c) of the Coroners Act 1988, a coroner must summon a jury where there is reason to suspect that the death resulted from a reportable accident. The requirement is triggered by information giving reason to suspect; positive proof or formulated evidence is unnecessary.

For the purposes of regulation 10(2)(b) of the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995, work connected with loading or unloading is wider than the physical act of loading or unloading. Driving a refuse vehicle closely connected in time, place and purpose with collecting refuse may fall within the provision.

A failure to summon a jury is a serious procedural irregularity. A fresh inquest should ordinarily follow unless cogent reasons justify withholding that remedy.

Stephane Aineto died after being crushed beneath a refuse-collection vehicle in a pedestrianised street. The defendant coroner concluded that he had died as a result of an accident.

The claimant, his sister, brought judicial review proceedings and an application under section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988. She alleged, among other matters, that the coroner had failed to summon a jury under section 8(3)(c). By agreement, the court determined that issue as a preliminary point.

The central question was whether the coroner had reason to suspect that the death was caused by the activities of a person engaged in work connected with loading or unloading an article or substance onto or off the vehicle.

1. The court held that the coroner was required by section 8(3)(c) of the Coroners Act 1988 to summon a jury. Regulation 10(2)(b) of the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 applies not only where loading or unloading is actually taking place, but also where the relevant person is engaged in work connected with that activity.

2. The words “connected with” require a relationship between the work and the loading or unloading. Whether that relationship exists is a question of fact and degree. In this case, the driver’s movement of the vehicle was closely connected in time, space and purpose with loading refuse from the bins.

3. The statutory threshold is reason to suspect. Positive proof and formulated evidence are unnecessary. Any information capable of giving reason to suspect may suffice, as explained in R v Inner London Coroner ex parte Linnane [1989] 1 WLR 395.

4. The coroner had erred in failing to summon a jury. Her evidence did not show that she had considered the section 8(3)(c) question. The verdict was therefore quashed.

5. The failure to summon a jury was a serious procedural irregularity. Although the court had discretion not to order a fresh inquest, cogent reasons would be required. The unexplained aspects of the death and the continuing, unsatisfactory HSE investigation meant that the court could not exclude the possibility that a fresh inquest would cast material light on the circumstances.

6. A fresh inquest was directed before a different coroner and a jury. The parties were given liberty to apply concerning the lawful mechanics of transferring the matter to a different administrative district. The claimant was awarded her judicial review costs; there was no order for costs in the section 13 proceedings.

The judgment itself records that the inquest was held by the defendant coroner and that permission for judicial review was granted by Hooper J on 27 August 2002. The court determined the section 8(3)(c) issue as a preliminary point and quashed the verdict.