Smith v Gatwick Airport Ltd.

In a criminal prosecution under section 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Etc Act 1974, the prosecution need not prove the precise mechanism of an accident by direct evidence. A court may draw compelling inferences from established primary facts. Evidence of a defective fire door, an improperly protruding screw and the door closing when it should have remained open was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that persons were exposed to a risk to health or safety. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in a criminal case, but ordinary reasoning and common sense may support inferences. A magistrates’ court errs in ruling that there is no case to answer where it fails to consider obvious inferences from the evidence.

Peter Graham Smith, a health and safety inspector, appealed by way of case stated against the dismissal by District Judge Arnold at Brighton Magistrates’ Court of an information against Gatwick Airport Ltd. The prosecution alleged a breach of section 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Etc Act 1974 arising from Mrs Patel’s serious finger injury while travelling through a fire door on an invalid luggage buggy.

The district judge ruled that there was no evidence of exposure to risk because the precise cause of the door closing, the mechanism of the injury and the timing of the screw’s protrusion had not been proved. The central issue was whether the prosecution evidence, viewed at the end of its case, disclosed a prima facie case requiring an answer.

1. Appeal allowed. The dismissal was set aside and the case was remitted to the district judge.
2. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no application to the criminal prosecution. That did not prevent the court from drawing inferences from primary facts using common sense.
3. There was an irresistible inference that the fire door had come away from its magnetic catch and begun to close improperly; that Mrs Patel had put out her hand to stop it; and that her finger, with its ring, had caught on the protruding screw. The evidence that the screw was found protruding and bent later that day supported the inference that it had been protruding when the injury occurred.
4. The precise reason why the door had come away from its catch was immaterial. The evidence showed that it should not have closed in ordinary circumstances and that the buggy had not caused it to do so.
5. The combination of an improperly protruding screw on a fire door which closed when it should not have done so constituted sufficient evidence of exposure to risk under section 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Etc Act 1974. The district judge had failed to draw the obvious inferences and therefore erred in ruling that there was no case to answer.
6. The question whether the prosecution had to establish a prima facie case on reasonable practicability before the burden under section 40 arose had not been argued before the district judge and did not arise on the case stated. The judge expressed doubt about the respondent’s submission, adding that the evidence would still have disclosed a prima facie case if the submission were correct.
7. Costs followed the event. The approach in Davies v Health and Safety Executive [2002] EWCA Crim 2949 was distinguished because that case concerned an important point of principle and materially different circumstances. The respondent was ordered to pay £12,325.83.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal by case stated allowed. The district judge’s ruling that there was no case to answer was held erroneous, and the case was remitted.
• Brighton Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Arnold dismissed the information at the close of the prosecution case.