Mirvahedy v Henley & Anor

The central legal issue was the correct construction of section 2(2)(b) of the Animals Act 1971: whether the subsection requires the dangerous characteristic to be abnormal for the species even in the particular circumstances in which the animal acted, or whether behaviour that is characteristic of the species in particular circumstances can satisfy the subsection. The majority of the House adopted the interpretation that the second limb of section 2(2)(b) covers characteristics which are not normally found in the species except at particular times or in particular circumstances (the Cummings interpretation), so that conduct which is unusual in the species generally but characteristic in the particular circumstances can give rise to strict liability. The court held that requirements (a) and (c) of section 2(2) were satisfied on the facts and that causation was attributable to the horses' panicked behaviour; accordingly the owners were strictly liable under section 2(2). The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The claimant, Mr Mirvahedy, suffered serious injuries when a horse owned by Dr and Mrs Henley escaped its field at night and ran onto the A380, colliding with his car. At first instance (Exeter County Court, Judge O'Malley) the claimant's negligence claim failed because the fence was found to be adequate; an Animals Act 1971 claim under section 2 also failed at first instance on grounds that causation was not established. The Court of Appeal ([2001] EWCA Civ 1749; reported [2002] 2 WLR 566) reversed on causation and held that the owners were liable under section 2(2). The owners appealed to the House of Lords.

The appeal raised one question: how is section 2(2)(b) to be read — does the subsection require that the dangerous characteristic be abnormal for the species even in the circumstances in which the animal acted, or will behaviour that is characteristic of the species in the particular circumstances nevertheless satisfy the statutory test?

The Lords examined prior authorities (including Cummings v Granger and Breeden v Lampard), the Law Commission report that preceded the Act and parliamentary material. The majority concluded that the natural reading of section 2(2)(b) is that its second limb was intended to catch cases where an animal manifests dangerous characteristics that are not normally found in the species except at particular times or in particular circumstances — in other words the statute covers animals that behave dangerously in particular circumstances even where that behaviour would be normal in those limited circumstances. On the facts the horses had panicked, behaved unusually for horses in general, and the panicked behaviour caused the collision. Requirements (a) and (c) were satisfied and causation was properly found to lie in the horses' terrified flight. The majority therefore dismissed the appeal. The minority favoured a narrower construction (the Breeden interpretation) that would exclude liability where the animal was behaving in a way normal for the species in the circumstances.

Relief sought: damages for personal injury under the Animals Act 1971 (section 2) and in negligence; issues framed: interpretation of section 2(2)(b), and causation/applicability of section 2(2)(a) and (c); reasoning: statutory construction informed by the Act's purpose, prior authorities, the Law Commission report and the facts (panic-induced bolting by horses); result: majority holds the statutory test satisfied and dismisses the owners' appeal.

Appeal dismissed. The majority construed section 2(2)(b) of the Animals Act 1971 in accordance with the Cummings approach: an animal's likelihood to cause damage which is due to characteristics not normally found in the species except at particular times or in particular circumstances can give rise to strict liability. On the facts the horses panicked and behaved in that unusual way, requirements (a) and (c) were satisfied and the panicked behaviour caused the accident, so the owners were strictly liable under section 2(2). The dissenting speech preferred a narrower construction that would exclude conduct normal in the species in the circumstances.

County Court (Exeter, Judge O'Malley) — initial trial; Court of Appeal [2001] EWCA Civ 1749 (reported [2002] 2 WLR 566) — allowed the claimant's Animals Act claim; House of Lords [2003] UKHL 16 — appeal dismissed by majority.