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Moyna v Secretary of State for Works and Pensions

[2003] UKHL 44

Case details

Neutral citation
[2003] UKHL 44
Court
House of Lords
Judgment date
31 July 2003
Subjects
Social SecurityDisability benefitsStatutory interpretationAdministrative law
Keywords
Disability Living Allowancesection 72care componentstatutory constructiontribunal discretionappellate reviewnotional test
Outcome
allowed

Case summary

The House of Lords considered whether a disability appeal tribunal had erred in law in finding that the claimant did not satisfy section 72(1)(a)(ii) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, namely that she could not prepare a cooked main meal for herself if she had the ingredients. The court held that the statutory test is a notional one intended to calibrate the severity of disability, that the statute does not prescribe a specific frequency (for example daily) and that section 72(2) requires a broad assessment over the relevant qualifying periods rather than an arithmetical day-by-day calculation. The tribunal's judgment involved the exercise of evaluative discretion within permissible bounds and did not disclose an error of law; accordingly the appeal was allowed and the tribunal's decision restored.

Case abstract

This was an appeal from the Court of Appeal which had reversed a disability appeal tribunal's decision dismissing the claimant's appeal against refusal of the care component of disability living allowance under section 72(1)(a)(ii) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992.

  • Background and parties: The claimant, Mrs Munira Moyna, a former civil servant with multiple health problems including angina, applied for disability living allowance on 20 December 1996. She stated on the application form that she sometimes needed help (1–3 days a week) with aspects of cooking, and an examining doctor recorded that she could prepare a cooked meal. An adjudication officer and a disability appeal tribunal rejected her claim on the basis that she could, with adaptations, prepare a main meal on most days.
  • Procedural posture: The claimant appealed by way of the Social Security Commissioner (who found no error of law), then to the Court of Appeal which allowed the claimant's appeal ([2002] EWCA Civ 408). The Secretary of State appealed to the House of Lords.
  • Relief sought: The appellant (Secretary of State) sought to reinstate the tribunal's decision denying the care component for inability to prepare a cooked main meal.
  • Issues framed: (i) Whether the tribunal had misconstrued the statutory test in section 72(1)(a)(ii); (ii) whether the assessment requires a specified frequency (for example a daily or near-daily inability) or a broader evaluative judgment over the qualifying periods in section 72(2); (iii) the extent to which appellate review on points of law permits substitution of judgment where the tribunal applies an imprecise standard.
  • Court's reasoning: The House of Lords emphasised that the cooking test is a notional, calibrating test and does not focus on how the applicant in practice addresses the problem of feeding. The statutory language does not specify frequency; instead section 72(2) contemplates a broad evaluation over the relevant periods (three months preceding and six months prospective). Where a standard admits inevitable imprecision and multiple relevant factors, an appellate court charged only with determining points of law should be cautious about substituting its own view for that of the tribunal unless the tribunal's conclusion falls outside the bounds of reasonable judgment. Applying those principles, the tribunal's careful consideration of the evidence, including the claimant's own statements and the medical report, did not disclose an error of law.
  • Subsidiary observations: The court discussed the distinction between ordinary-language meaning and statutory construction and reiterated established principles about deference to tribunals applying imprecise statutory standards.

Held

Appeal allowed. The House of Lords held that section 72(1)(a)(ii) should be read as a notional test to be applied by broad evaluative judgment over the qualifying periods in section 72(2), not by an arithmetical calculation of days on which the claimant can or cannot cook. The disability appeal tribunal's decision fell within the bounds of reasonable judgment and did not disclose an error of law, so the tribunal's decision was restored.

Appellate history

Disability Appeal Tribunal decision (27 January 1999) dismissed claimant's appeal; Social Security Commissioner found no error of law; Court of Appeal allowed claimant's appeal ([2002] EWCA Civ 408); House of Lords allowed the Secretary of State's appeal ([2003] UKHL 44).

Cited cases

  • Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v Bairstow, [1956] AC 14 positive
  • Brutus v Cozens, [1973] AC 854 mixed
  • George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd, [1983] 2 AC 803 positive
  • In re Woodling, [1984] 1 WLR 348 neutral
  • O'Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc, [1984] QB 90 positive
  • Mallinson v Secretary of State for Social Security, [1994] 1 WLR 630 neutral
  • In re Grayan Building Services Ltd (in liquidation), [1995] Ch 241 positive
  • R v Radio Authority, Ex p Bull, [1998] QB 294 unclear

Legislation cited

  • Social Security Act 1998: section 14(1)
  • Social Security Act 1998: section 15(1)
  • Social Security Act 1998: section 4(1)
  • Social Security Administration Act 1992: section 34(1)
  • Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992: Section 72