Moyna (Respondent) v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (formerly against the Social Security Commissioner) (Appellant)

The cooking condition for the lowest care component of disability living allowance is a notional measure of disability, rather than a test of actual dietary need or quality of life. It assumes that the claimant has the ingredients and asks whether the claimant could prepare a cooked main meal.

The requirement in section 72 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 must be assessed broadly over the prescribed period. It does not require daily inability or an arithmetical calculation of frequency. The tribunal must decide whether the claimant can fairly be described as unable to cook, considering both the frequency and reasons for needing assistance. Application of that evaluative standard is reviewable on a point of law only when the tribunal's conclusion falls outside the bounds of reasonable judgment.

Mrs Moyna claimed the lowest-rate care component of disability living allowance because a heart condition limited her ability to handle heavy pans, cut some vegetables and remain standing. The disability appeal tribunal found that, with planning, lighter utensils and suitable arrangements, she could prepare a cooked main meal on most days. It therefore dismissed her appeal.

The Social Security Commissioner held that the tribunal had made no error of law. The Court of Appeal, in Moyna v Secretary of State for Social Security [2002] EWCA Civ 408, reversed that decision. It considered that her recurring need for assistance disclosed a sufficiently clear pattern of inability.

The Secretary of State appealed. The central questions were whether the cooking condition required regular or daily ability, how frequency should be assessed under section 72 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992, and whether the tribunal's evaluative conclusion disclosed an error of law.

Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Hoffmann delivered the leading speech. Lord Nicholls, Lord Steyn, Lord Rodger and Lord Walker adopted his reasons.

1. Nature of the cooking condition. Per Lord Hoffmann, section 72(1)(a)(ii) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 creates a notional test for calibrating the severity of disability. It does not determine whether a claimant can survive, obtain a reasonable diet or enjoy a reasonable quality of life without assistance. Actual cooking arrangements are immaterial because the test assumes that the ingredients are available and asks what assistance would be required if the claimant attempted to prepare the meal.
2. Frequency and duration. Per Lord Hoffmann, neither section 72(1)(a)(ii) nor section 72(2) requires an ability to cook daily or regularly. Section 72(2) requires a broad assessment over the three-month qualifying period and the following six months. A single occasion on which the claimant could cook does not defeat entitlement. The tribunal must instead decide whether, viewed over the whole period, the claimant can fairly be described as unable to prepare a cooked main meal.
3. Evaluative judgment. Per Lord Hoffmann, the assessment is not an arithmetical calculation. Relevant evidence includes the number of occasions on which help would be required, the reasons for requiring it, the tasks that could be performed with reasonable arrangements, medical evidence and the claimant's own description of her abilities. The Court of Appeal had attached excessive weight to the entries recording a need for help on one to three days each week.
4. Appellate review. Per Lord Hoffmann, applying George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803, an imprecise standard involving several factors may permit more than one reasonable conclusion. A court hearing an appeal confined to points of law cannot substitute its preferred assessment where the tribunal's conclusion remains within the bounds of reasonable judgment. The tribunal was entitled to rely on the claimant's ability to use lighter pans and smaller vegetables, the medical opinion and her own statement that she could cook.
5. Ordinary statutory language. In addressing the alternative submission founded on Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854, Lord Hoffmann explained that the conventional meaning of an ordinary word is not itself a question of law, but the construction of statutory language remains one. Whether found facts fall within a legal category is ordinarily an evaluative question for the tribunal, subject to review where the conclusion is unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal's decision was set aside and the decision of the disability appeal tribunal was restored.

1. House of Lords: In Moyna (Respondent) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] UKHL 44, the Secretary of State's appeal was allowed unanimously and the tribunal's decision was restored.
2. Court of Appeal: In [2002] EWCA Civ 408, the court reversed the Social Security Commissioner's decision. It held that the recurring occasions on which Mrs Moyna required help constituted a sufficiently clear pattern of inability.
3. Social Security Commissioner: The Commissioner dismissed Mrs Moyna's appeal, holding that the tribunal's assessment disclosed no error of law.
4. Disability appeal tribunal: The tribunal dismissed Mrs Moyna's appeal because, with planning and suitable arrangements, she could prepare a cooked main meal on most days.