Matthews (Appellant) v. Ministry of Defence (Respondents)

An internal housing reviewer employed by the authority whose statutory duty is in dispute is not an independent tribunal for article 6(1) purposes. Nevertheless, an administrative welfare decision need not be subject to a full factual rehearing. The required judicial jurisdiction depends on the subject matter, the decision-making process and the content and grounds of the dispute.

For an ordinary homelessness decision under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996, fair internal procedures combined with a section 204 appeal exercising conventional judicial-review jurisdiction satisfy article 6(1), even where disputed facts arise. Article 6(1) does not itself require an independent fact-finder or enhanced scrutiny. Whether the statutory right to accommodation is a Convention civil right was assumed but not decided.

Runa Begum was accepted as unintentionally homeless and in priority need. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council consequently owed her the full housing duty under section 193 of the Housing Act 1996. After she refused an offer of accommodation, a senior council officer conducted an internal review and decided that the accommodation was suitable and that the refusal was unreasonable.

The county court, following the obiter reasoning in Adan v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1916, quashed the review because material factual disputes had not been referred to an independent fact-finder. The Court of Appeal allowed the council's appeal: [2002] EWCA Civ 239.

The House considered whether the statutory entitlement was a civil right under article 6(1), whether the reviewing officer was independent, and whether the section 204 appeal on a point of law supplied sufficient independent judicial control.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Hoffmann delivered the leading speech. Lord Bingham, Lord Hope and Lord Walker agreed with his reasons. Lord Millett gave concurring reasons reaching the same result.

2. Per Lord Hoffmann, the council's reviewing officer was not independent for article 6(1) purposes. Her personal impartiality, professionalism and lack of a private interest did not alter that conclusion. She was an officer of the authority whose continuing statutory duty she had to determine. Lord Bingham and Lord Millett likewise regarded the want of institutional independence as clear.

3. Per Lord Hoffmann, the House assumed without deciding that the section 193 entitlement under the Housing Act 1996 was a civil right. The right was a benefit in kind, involved competing claims to limited housing and required substantial administrative judgment. Applying article 6(1) to such welfare rights would go beyond the Strasbourg decisions then available. The separate argument based on the appellant's temporary tenancy failed because the council could terminate that tenancy independently of its Part VII duties.

4. Per Lord Hoffmann, “full jurisdiction” means jurisdiction adequate for the nature of the decision. Its sufficiency depends on the subject matter, the manner of decision-making and the content and grounds of the dispute. Regulatory and welfare decisions customarily entrusted to administrators do not require a full factual appeal merely because preliminary factual disputes arise.

5. The suggested division between cases with many or few factual disputes was rejected. Per Lord Hoffmann, the controlling question was whether the powers could, consistently with the rule of law and constitutional propriety, be entrusted to administrators. Requiring an external fact-finder under the contracting-out legislation would distort the statutory scheme, increase cost and delay, and generate collateral disputes. The contrary obiter approach in Adan v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1916 was disapproved.

6. Section 204 gave the county court conventional judicial-review jurisdiction. It could quash for legal error, procedural unfairness, bias, irrationality, absence of evidence, or misunderstanding of an established and relevant fact. It could not remake tenable findings of fact or credibility. The statutory review safeguards and this judicial control were sufficient for an ordinary Part VII decision engaging no Convention right other than article 6. Article 6 did not mandate anxious scrutiny or a more intensive factual review.

1. House of Lords: The appeal was dismissed unanimously: [2003] UKHL 5. The Court of Appeal's conclusion that the section 204 appeal satisfied article 6(1) was upheld.
2. Court of Appeal: The council's appeal was allowed: [2002] EWCA Civ 239. The court held that the statutory review and appeal process complied with article 6(1).
3. County court: The reviewing officer's decision was quashed on a preliminary point because the judge considered himself bound by the majority dicta in Adan v Newham London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1916.