Regina v. London Borough of Barnet (Respondents) ex parte G (FC) (Appellant) Regina v. London Borough of Lambeth (Respondents) ex parte W (FC) (Appellant) Regina v. London Borough of Lambeth (Respondents) ex parte A (FC) (Appellant)

The general duty under section 17(1) of the Children Act 1989 is owed to children in need within a local authority’s area collectively. It does not become an individually enforceable duty to provide every service identified by an assessment. An authority must assess apparent need and exercise its powers lawfully, but may consider resources when selecting and prioritising services.

Section 20(1) requires accommodation for a child whose carer is prevented, for any reason, from providing suitable accommodation or care. Section 23(6) regulates the child’s placement with a parent or other connected person who has accommodation. It does not require the authority to house that person.

These conjoined appeals concerned three single mothers who sought accommodation-related assistance from local social services authorities under Part III of the Children Act 1989.

• In R (G) v London Borough of Barnet, Hooper J quashed the authority’s decision in [2000] EWHC Admin 5. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision in [2001] EWCA Civ 540.
• In R (A) v London Borough of Lambeth, two autistic children lived in unsuitable accommodation. Scott Baker J and the Court of Appeal, in [2001] EWCA Civ 1624, rejected the claim for a mandatory order requiring suitable rehousing.
• In R (W) v London Borough of Lambeth, the mother had been found intentionally homeless. Maurice Kay J and the Court of Appeal, in [2002] EWCA Civ 613, upheld the authority’s refusal to accommodate the family together.

The central questions were whether section 17(1) created an enforceable duty towards each individual child and whether section 23(6) required an authority accommodating a child to provide accommodation for the child’s parent.

1. All three appeals were dismissed. The appeals of G and W were dismissed unanimously. A’s appeal was dismissed by a majority of three to two, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Millett and Lord Scott of Foscote forming the majority.

2. Per Lord Hope, whose conclusion and reasoning on section 17 were supported by Lord Millett and Lord Scott, section 17(1) of the Children Act 1989 imposes a general and overriding duty for the benefit of children in need within the authority’s area as a class. It states the principles governing the performance of the other duties and powers in Part III and Schedule 2. It does not confer an absolute right upon each child to every assessed service, and assessment does not crystallise the general duty into a specific duty to provide that service.

3. An authority must nevertheless take reasonable steps to identify children in need and assess individual needs where necessary. Its decisions remain reviewable on ordinary public law grounds. A mandatory order requiring a particular service must be founded on a specific statutory duty, or on the invalidity of the authority’s refusal under ordinary reasonableness and proportionality principles. A’s pleaded case depended upon an individual duty under section 17(1), which the majority rejected.

4. The words “prevented, for whatever reason” in section 20(1)(c) receive a wide construction. A carer may be prevented from providing suitable accommodation even where her own conduct caused the problem, including intentional homelessness. The authority must safeguard the child and, where the statutory conditions are met, provide accommodation for the child.

5. Section 23(6) does not require an authority to provide accommodation for a parent or other connected person. Per Lord Nicholls, in reasoning accepted across the House, it concerns placement, not housing. It assumes that the person with whom the child may live already has accommodation. The section therefore did not give G or W a right to accommodation for themselves.

6. Lord Hope and Lord Millett considered that placing a child away from a parent engages family life under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, but compatibility depends on the circumstances. No article 8 ground altered the orders.

7. Lord Nicholls, with Lord Steyn agreeing, dissented on section 17. They would have held that it imposed a qualified individual duty, allowing latitude as to appropriate services and cost. They would also have required adjustment of a policy offering to accommodate children alone where a young child, or a child likely to be significantly distressed, could be accommodated with the parent without significant extra cost. Lord Scott expressly disagreed with that policy analysis. It did not command a majority.

1. House of Lords: Dismissed all three appeals. The decisions of the Court of Appeal were left standing.
2. Court of Appeal—G: In R (G) v London Borough of Barnet [2001] EWCA Civ 540, allowed Barnet’s appeal and dismissed the application for judicial review.
3. Court of Appeal—W: In R (W) v London Borough of Lambeth [2002] EWCA Civ 613, dismissed W’s appeal.
4. Court of Appeal—A: In R (A) v London Borough of Lambeth [2001] EWCA Civ 1624, upheld the rejection of A’s claim.
5. High Court—G: Hooper J quashed Barnet’s decision in [2000] EWHC Admin 5.
6. High Court—W and A: Maurice Kay J dismissed W’s application. Scott Baker J rejected A’s claim for a mandatory order. Neutral citations were not stated.