Transco Plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council

The House of Lords reaffirmed that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher remains part of English law as a sub-species of private nuisance but emphasised its confined scope and the high threshold for strict liability. The rule requires (i) an escape from the defendant's land to the claimant's land, (ii) that the defendant brought or kept on his land something likely to cause mischief if it escaped, and (iii) a "non-natural" or "special" use of land; remoteness and foreseeability (as developed in Cambridge Water) limit liability. Statutory schemes (for example, section 209 of the Water Industry Act 1991) and defences such as acts of God or intervening third parties may exclude or limit liability. Applying these principles, the House dismissed Transco's claim because the council's provision of a water supply to a block of flats was an ordinary user of land (not non-natural), the leaking water accumulated and escaped on the council's own land, and the requisite exceptional risk for Rylands liability was not shown.

This was an appeal from the Court of Appeal ([2001] EWCA Civ 212) concerning a claim by Transco for the cost of emergency works after an embankment supporting its high-pressure gas main collapsed following prolonged leakage from a water supply pipe owned and maintained by Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council.

Nature of the claim:

• Transco sought to recover the agreed cost of remedial works on the basis of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher rather than negligence.

Procedural posture:

• At first instance the judge found for Transco on Rylands grounds; the Court of Appeal reversed ([2001] EWCA Civ 212); Transco appealed to the House of Lords.

Issues framed by the House:

• Whether the council had brought onto its land something likely to cause danger or mischief if it escaped; and
• Whether the council's use of its land was a "non-natural" (or extraordinary) user engaging strict liability under Rylands v Fletcher; further, whether the element of "escape" and the requirement of foreseeability/remoteness were satisfied.

Court's reasoning:

• The House held that Rylands remains good law but is narrow in scope and should be applied with careful attention to its constituent elements: escape, dangerous thing, non-natural use and limits of remoteness/foreseeability (following Cambridge Water).
• Several speeches emphasised that Rylands is a form of nuisance, protects property interests not personal injury, and may be displaced or limited by statutory regulation (for example Water Industry Act 1991 s209) or by defences (acts of God, acts of third parties).
• On the facts the court concluded that providing a water supply pipe to a 66-flat tower block was an ordinary and routine use of land, did not amount to the kind of non-natural accumulation of water that Rylands was designed to address, and that the leak and accumulation occurred and remained on the council's land such that the essential escape element was not established in the necessary way. The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal dismissed. The House affirmed that the rule in Rylands v Fletcher remains part of the law as a species of private nuisance but is narrow in scope: liability requires escape to the claimant's land, a thing likely to do mischief, and a non-natural or special use of land; statutory regimes and remoteness/foreseeability limit the rule. On the facts the council's water supply to a block of flats was an ordinary user and not a non-natural use giving rise to strict liability, and in any event the escape/accumulation remained on the council's land, so Transco's Rylands claim failed.

First instance: trial judge found for Transco on Rylands grounds (trial court and citation not specified in the judgment). Court of Appeal reversed: [2001] EWCA Civ 212. Appeal to the House of Lords: [2003] UKHL 61 (this judgment).