McDonnell v. Congregation of Christian Brothers Trustees & Ors

The House considered whether successive Limitation Acts (notably the Limitation Act 1963 and the Limitation Act 1975, consolidated in the Limitation Act 1980) had the effect of removing a pre-existing statutory time bar under the Limitation Act 1939 to personal injury claims whose causes of action accrued before 1954. The appellant, alleging abuse between 1941 and 1951, argued that the later Acts (through the "date of knowledge" test and related provisions) operated retrospectively to revive or remove the accrued six-year bar. The House held that the earlier unanimous decision in Arnold v Central Electricity Generating Board and the statutory and legislative history required the conclusion that the 1963 and 1975 enactments were not intended to deprive defendants of an accrued statutory bar to pre-1954 six-year claims. Accordingly the appellant's claims remained statute-barred.

The appellant alleged physical, emotional and sexual abuse suffered as a boarding pupil between 1941 and 1951 and sought damages. Born in 1936, he remained an infant until 6 January 1957 and, under the Limitation Act 1939, could have brought proceedings until 6 January 1963. Proceedings were issued in August 2000 after the appellant asserted a psychiatric injury and reliance on later Limitation Acts.

The proceedings were determined on applications to strike out, with the appellant's allegations assumed but not found. The central legal issue was whether the Limitation Act 1963, the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1971, the Limitation Act 1975 (and the consolidated Limitation Act 1980) had the effect of removing retrospectively a time bar which had already accrued under the 1939 Act in relation to pre-1954 six-year personal injury claims.

The court examined the statutory scheme and legislative history: the 1939 Act (six-year rule and disability extension in section 22), the 1954 reforms shortening the primary limitation to three years in many personal injury cases, the 1963 Act introducing the "date of knowledge" test with leave requirements and transitional provisions, the 1971 amendment extending the post-knowledge period, and the 1975 Act giving the courts wider procedural discretion and inserting section 2A into the 1939 Act. The court also reviewed authority including Cartledge, Knipe and Arnold, and considered arguments invoking Hansard.

The House, following the reasoning in Arnold and applying the presumption against retrospectivity beyond what is necessary, concluded that Parliament had not clearly intended to deprive defendants of accrued six-year time bars arising under the 1939 Act for causes of action accruing before 1954. The appellant's reliance on a broader retrospective reading of the 1963 and 1975 Acts was rejected. The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal dismissed. The House held that the Limitation Act 1963 and the Limitation Act 1975 did not operate so as to remove retrospectively an accrued statutory defence based on the six-year limitation under the Limitation Act 1939 for causes of action accruing before 1954; the legislative history and the earlier decision in Arnold v CEGB supported that conclusion and there was no clear indication that Parliament intended a wider retrospectivity that would revive or destroy such accrued time bars.

Decision below: Mackay J (strike-out application). Court of Appeal dismissed the claim: [2001] EWCA Civ 2095. Appeal to the House of Lords: [2003] UKHL 63.