McDonnell (FC) (Appellant) v. Congregation of Christian Brothers Trustees (Formerly Irish Christian Brothers) and others (Respondents)

The date-of-knowledge regime and judicial discretion introduced for personal injury claims by the Limitation Acts 1963 and 1975 did not revive a pre-1954 claim governed by the original six-year limitation period under the Limitation Act 1939. This remains so where disability postponed expiry until after 1954.

Legislation affecting an accrued limitation defence is presumed to operate retrospectively only so far as its clear language or manifest purpose requires. A longstanding, considered and unanimous decision of the House should not be departed from merely because its correctness is doubtful or its consequences appear anomalous.

The appellant sought damages from the respondents for alleged physical, emotional and sexual abuse between 1941 and 1951. His claims, governed by the six-year period in the Limitation Act 1939, became statute-barred on 6 January 1963 after the expiry of the disability extension available during infancy. Proceedings were issued in August 2000.

Mackay J struck out the claims. The Court of Appeal, comprising Ward, May and Kay LJJ, upheld that decision in [2001] EWCA Civ 2095. The allegations were assumed to be true solely for determining the strike-out applications.

The central issue was whether the Limitation Act 1963, or the later regimes enacted in 1975 and consolidated in 1980, removed the accrued statutory bar and permitted reliance on the date-of-knowledge provisions and the court's discretion to disapply limitation.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Bingham delivered the leading speech. Lord Nicholls, Lord Steyn, Lord Hobhouse and Lord Rodger agreed with his conclusion and reasons. The appellant's pre-1954 causes of action remained barred, so sections 14 and 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 were unavailable.

2. Per Lord Bingham, the claims were governed by the original six-year period under the Limitation Act 1939. Infancy postponed the running of time, but the claims nevertheless became barred on 6 January 1963. The Law Reform (Limitation of Actions, &c) Act 1954 did not convert them into claims governed by the new three-year regime.

3. The House applied Arnold v Central Electricity Generating Board [1988] AC 228. That unanimous decision established that the 1963 and 1975 legislation did not remove an accrued limitation defence relating to a pre-1954 claim governed by the original six-year period. Its reasoning was intended to cover both former public-authority claims and ordinary six-year claims. The appellant's deferred six-year claim therefore fell within it, although the limitation period had not expired when the 1954 Act commenced.

4. Per Lord Bingham, a statute interfering with substantive rights is presumed not to operate retrospectively unless that intention clearly appears. Where some retrospection is intended, it extends only as far as the statutory language or manifest purpose requires. Neither the language nor legislative history of the 1963 and 1975 Acts showed an intention to revive pre-1954 six-year claims.

5. Although Arnold could arguably have been decided differently and produced an apparent anomaly between six-year and three-year claims, it was neither plainly wrong nor properly open to departure merely because of doubts about its correctness. It had stood unanimously for 16 years and might have been relied upon in other cases.

6. Lord Steyn added that Hansard may identify the mischief at which legislation is aimed. The narrower reading of Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 should, however, be preferred: a categorical governmental assurance may prevent the government from advancing a contrary interpretation, but ministerial intentions should not generally be treated as the will of Parliament. The appellant's proposed use of Hansard was impermissible.

7. The possible effect of Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498 was left undecided because the primary limitation argument failed.

1. House of Lords: The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The Court of Appeal's conclusion that the claims remained statute-barred was affirmed: [2003] UKHL 63.
2. Court of Appeal: Ward, May and Kay LJJ upheld the determination adverse to the appellant: [2001] EWCA Civ 2095.
3. High Court: Mackay J determined the limitation issue against the appellant on the respondents' strike-out applications. No citation is stated in the judgment.