Mohindra v Director Of Public Prosecutions

Section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 creates one offence: failure to comply with a requirement for driver-identification information. The information need not specify whether the accused was the keeper or another person. If the recipient remains silent, the prosecution need prove a valid requirement and failure to respond. The precise obligation only becomes material if the accused asserts that they were not the keeper or relies on the statutory defence. The prosecution must prove that the requirement was made by or on behalf of the chief officer of police. A bare statement that a section 172 notice was served is insufficient. Where the issue is raised after the prosecution case has closed, fairness may require the justices to permit the prosecution to reopen its case.

These were two appeals by way of Case Stated from decisions of the Greater Manchester justices. Meera Mohindra had been convicted following an alleged failure to respond to a section 172 requirement. Joanne Browne raised the same issue concerning proof of the requirement.

The appeals concerned whether section 172(3) created separate offences for keepers and other persons, whether the justices could infer that a registered keeper was not the keeper, and whether the prosecution had proved that the requirements were made by or on behalf of the chief officer of police.

1. Disposition. Both appeals were allowed. The court formally answered no to all four questions in Mohindra and to both questions in Browne.
2. Single offence. Section 172(3) creates only one offence. It is the failure to comply with a requirement under section 172(2). The differing obligations in section 172(2)(a) and (b) define the obligation which may be breached; they do not create separate offences or require alternative informations.
3. Where the recipient remains silent, the prosecution need prove only that the recipient was required to provide information and failed to respond. Whether the recipient was the keeper is immaterial unless the recipient asserts that they were not the keeper, or a keeper seeks to rely on the defence in section 172(4). A registered keeper’s status alone does not establish that the person was, or was not, the keeper.
4. Proof of authority. The prosecution must prove that the requirement was made by or on behalf of the chief officer of police. This is a matter of substance, not merely procedure. The postal clerk’s evidence that a section 172 requirement had been served did not prove the requirement’s authority, particularly where the notice and requirement were not before the justices.
5. The authorities show that production of the notice, together with evidence identifying its author and authority, may establish a lawful requirement. In these cases the issue should have been raised before the close of the prosecution case. Once raised, the justices should have allowed the prosecution to reopen its case because there was no prejudice to the defendants and fairness required a full hearing.
6. For future cases, the section 9 statement proving service should annex the notice of intended prosecution and the requirement, with the author’s signature and authority described. The court declined to remit these cases because of the time and expense involved.

• High Court (Administrative Court) — Appeals by Case Stated from decisions of the Greater Manchester justices dated 21 July 2003 and 8 August 2003. Both appeals were allowed.