R v Mirza

The House of Lords reaffirmed the long‑standing common law rule that statements about what occurs during jury deliberations are, as a general rule, inadmissible. The court held that evidence impinging on jury deliberations may exceptionally be admissible only where the matter complained of is extraneous to the jury's deliberative process (for example bribery, outside influence or the jury having consulted an ouija board or otherwise deciding the case by lot). Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 does not prevent the court from investigating allegations of juror misconduct, but it does not itself authorise departure from the common law rule. Article 6 ECHR considerations require careful scrutiny of jury impartiality, but the majority concluded that the confidentiality rule remains proportionate and necessary to protect frank jury deliberation, finality and public confidence, and that any broader reform should be for Parliament.

Background and issues:

• The appeals arose from two criminal trials in which jurors later wrote letters alleging serious improprieties in jury deliberations: (i) in Mirza, a juror alleged racial prejudice and that the jury took the appellant's use of an interpreter into account improperly; (ii) in Connor and Rollock, a juror alleged the jury sought a quick verdict and some jurors proposed convicting both defendants to "teach them a lesson". Both convictions were by majority verdicts (10:2).
• The Court of Appeal declined to admit the jurors' accounts, following R v Qureshi, and certified two questions for the House of Lords: (1) whether the common law prohibition on admission of evidence of jury deliberations prevails even where a juror's statement would provide prima facie evidence of partiality in breach of Article 6 ECHR; and (2) whether section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, when read with s.3 HRA 1998 and Article 6, prohibits admission of such statements.

Relief sought: Appeals against conviction; the appellants sought to admit juror statements to impugn the safety of the convictions and obtain quashing.

Court's reasoning and disposition:

• The majority (Lords Hope, Slynn, Hobhouse and Rodger) held that the established common law rule of secrecy for jury deliberations should be maintained, save for recognised exceptions concerning extraneous influence; that rule is justified by the need for candid deliberation, finality and protection of jurors from harassment; and that Article 6 and Strasbourg case‑law do not require opening the jury room in the manner sought. They concluded that section 8 of the 1981 Act is directed at third‑party disclosure and does not prevent the court itself from acting, but that the common law exclusion remains the primary constraint.
• Lord Steyn dissented on Mirza: he considered that in exceptional circumstances cogent post‑verdict evidence demonstrating a real risk of jury partiality should be admissible and that, on the facts of Mirza, the juror's account established such a risk and warranted quashing the conviction. He also considered that, properly construed, s.8 is not a bar to such inquiries and that article 6 supports remedial intervention in extreme cases.
• Practical observations: several Law Lords urged improvements in jury practice (better pre‑empanelment guidance, informing jurors of their duty to report irregularities, scope for trial judge or appeal court reports) and noted Lord Justice Auld's recommendation for legislative reform; but they left wider reform to Parliament.

The appeals were dismissed by the majority. The House of Lords upheld the common law secrecy rule that excludes evidence of what jurors said or did in the course of their deliberations, subject only to established exceptions for extraneous influences; section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 does not prevent the court from investigating but does not displace the common law rule; although Article 6 requires impartial tribunals, the majority concluded the secrecy rule remains proportionate and necessary and any broader change should be by legislation. Lord Steyn dissented in Mirza and would have allowed that appeal on the facts.

On appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): [2002] EWCA Crim 1235 and [2002] EWCA Crim 1236 (separate judgments of the Court of Appeal, which followed R v Qureshi [2001] EWCA Crim 1807; [2002] 1 WLR 518). The Court of Appeal certified questions of law to the House of Lords.