Regina v. Connor and another (Appellants) (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) Regina v. Mirza (Appellant) (On Appeal from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) (Conjoined Appeals)

After a jury has returned its verdict, evidence about matters intrinsic to its deliberations is generally inadmissible. The rule protects frank collective discussion, jurors’ security and privacy, the authority of verdicts and public confidence in jury trial. It is compatible with the right to an impartial tribunal under article 6(1).

The rule does not exclude evidence of extraneous influences upon a jury. Alleged misconduct arising before verdict must also be investigated and addressed by the trial judge. A possible further exception for a jury’s complete abandonment of deliberation, such as deciding by lot or coin toss, was left unresolved.

Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 does not prevent a trial court or appellate court from investigating matters otherwise admissible at common law.

These conjoined appeals arose from separate majority convictions. Mirza was convicted of indecent assaults. After trial, a juror alleged that other jurors had treated his use of an interpreter as a dishonest device and had been influenced by racial or cultural prejudice. Connor and Rollock were convicted of wounding with intent. A juror subsequently alleged that the majority had convicted both defendants without properly deciding which had used the knife and partly to avoid prolonged deliberations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals in [2002] EWCA Crim 1235 and [2002] EWCA Crim 1236. It considered itself bound by R v Qureshi [2001] EWCA Crim 1807, which excluded evidence concerning private jury deliberations.

The House considered whether the common-law rule remained applicable where a juror’s statement provided prima facie evidence of partiality contrary to article 6(1), and whether section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 prevented a court from receiving or investigating such material.

1. Disposition. By a majority of four to one, the House dismissed both appeals. Lord Slynn, Lord Hope, Lord Hobhouse and Lord Rodger upheld the exclusion of the jurors’ allegations. Lord Steyn dissented as to Mirza but agreed that Connor and Rollock’s appeal should be dismissed.

2. Confidentiality of deliberations. Per Lord Hope, Lord Hobhouse and Lord Rodger, with Lord Slynn reaching the same conclusion, evidence about statements, opinions, arguments and votes intrinsic to a jury’s private deliberations is inadmissible after verdict. Confidentiality permits frank collective discussion, protects jurors from harassment and reprisals, supports finality and preserves the authority and impartiality of the jury. The rule applies regardless of how compelling an untested allegation may appear. Testing such an allegation would ordinarily require questioning the complainant and other jurors, thereby dismantling the protection.

3. Article 6(1). The majority held that the rule was compatible with the right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. Jurors are presumed impartial. The system contains safeguards before and during trial, including random selection, the juror’s oath, judicial directions and the trial judge’s power to investigate irregularities and discharge a juror or jury. The Strasbourg authorities recognised secrecy as a crucial and legitimate feature of English jury trial.

4. Limits of the rule. Evidence of an extraneous influence, such as bribery, intimidation, external information or an irregular event outside the deliberative process, may be admitted. Lord Hope considered that a jury’s complete repudiation of deliberation by deciding through lots, a coin toss or an ouija board might fall into a distinct category. Lord Slynn also regarded unanimous evidence of such an abdication as potentially different. Lord Rodger reserved the point. It was unnecessary to decide it.

5. Statutory prohibition. The House agreed that section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 is directed to jurors and third parties, not to a court acting to ensure a fair trial. It does not make a court contemptuous of itself or restrict an otherwise lawful judicial inquiry. The contrary observations in R v Young (Stephen) [1995] QB 324 were disapproved. The admissible scope of an inquiry remains controlled by the common law.

6. Practice. The majority emphasised that jurors should be told to report irregularities immediately and before verdict. Communications concerning a jury should be preserved. Where appropriate, the Court of Appeal may obtain a report from the trial judge about observable events at trial.

1. House of Lords: Both appeals dismissed by a majority of four to one. Lord Steyn would have allowed Mirza’s appeal but dismissed the appeal of Connor and Rollock.

2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The conviction appeals were dismissed in R v Mirza [2002] EWCA Crim 1235 and R v Connor and Rollock [2002] EWCA Crim 1236. The court considered itself bound by R v Qureshi [2001] EWCA Crim 1807. Mirza’s sentence was reduced.

3. Crown Court: Mirza was convicted at Snaresbrook Crown Court of six counts of indecent assault. Connor and Rollock were convicted at Southwark Crown Court of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.