Regina v. Police Complaints Authority (Respondents) ex parte Green (FC) (Appellant)

Section 80(1)(a) of the Police Act 1996 permits disclosure of information received by the Police Complaints Authority only so far as disclosure is necessary for the proper discharge of its functions. Necessity is a matter of judgment, rather than discretion. Where disclosure is necessary, the Authority must disclose; otherwise disclosure is prohibited and constitutes an offence.

The Convention requirement for an effective investigation into serious misconduct by state agents does not confer an automatic right to police reports or witness statements. A complainant’s legitimate interests may be safeguarded through meaningful participation, a detailed provisional decision, an opportunity to comment and a fully reasoned final decision. The risks of contaminating evidence and compromising possible proceedings ordinarily weigh against disclosing witness statements.

The appellant complained that a police officer had deliberately driven a car into him, causing serious injury. An officer from another force investigated under the supervision of the Police Complaints Authority. The Authority certified that the investigation had been conducted satisfactorily. After the officer pleaded guilty to careless driving, the Authority undertook to reconsider whether disciplinary proceedings should be recommended.

The appellant sought the witness statements and other underlying material so that he could respond to the Authority’s provisional view. Moses J ordered partial disclosure in [2001] EWHC Admin 1160, but the Court of Appeal allowed the Authority’s appeal in [2002] EWCA Civ 389. The central issue before the House was whether section 80(1)(a) of the Police Act 1996, read consistently with articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, permitted and required the requested disclosure.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Rodger delivered the leading speech. Lord Bingham, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Scott agreed with his reasons, while Lord Carswell reached the same conclusion in substantially similar terms.

2. Per Lord Rodger, section 80 of the Police Act 1996 establishes a general prohibition against disclosure of information received by the Authority. Section 80(1)(a) permits disclosure to another person only so far as it is necessary for the proper discharge of the Authority’s functions. Determining necessity involves judgment, not discretion. If disclosure is necessary, the Authority must make it; if it is unnecessary, disclosure is unlawful and exposes the person responsible to criminal liability.

3. The Authority’s role is to ensure that complaints against police officers are investigated independently and thoroughly and that appropriate disciplinary proceedings are taken. Its role does not extend to securing proper police behaviour or prosecuting wrongdoers. Transparency may require disclosure of information through reasoned or provisional decisions, but it does not establish a general entitlement to the underlying evidential material.

4. Proceeding on the assumption that article 3 was engaged, Lord Rodger held that the appellant had been involved in the process sufficiently to safeguard his legitimate interests. The Convention required an effective and independent investigation with appropriate public scrutiny. It did not create an automatic right to police reports or investigative materials. A detailed provisional decision, an opportunity to identify errors and supply further evidence, and a reasoned final decision enabled effective participation without disclosure of the witness statements.

5. The Authority member was therefore entitled to conclude that the requested disclosure was unnecessary for the performance of the Authority’s function under section 76. The reasoning of Moses J requiring disclosure of eyewitness statements was rejected. The House left open whether an exceptional case might require disclosure after a complainant had received a fully reasoned final decision.

6. Lord Rodger further held that the risks of contaminating witness evidence and prejudicing possible criminal or disciplinary proceedings reinforced the ordinary position against disclosure. Witness confidentiality was also a legitimate consideration, although it could not defeat disclosure that was truly necessary. Lord Carswell agreed that disclosure was unnecessary while criminal or disciplinary proceedings remained possible. Lord Scott considered that articles 2 and 3 had no continuing relevance to the disciplinary decision once the certified investigation had concluded, but agreed that section 80 barred disclosure.

1. House of Lords: The appellant’s appeal was dismissed unanimously: [2004] UKHL 6 .
2. Court of Appeal: The Police Complaints Authority’s appeal was allowed, reversing the disclosure order: [2002] EWCA Civ 389 .
3. Administrative Court: Moses J ordered disclosure of specified witness statements and documents: [2001] EWHC Admin 1160.