Law Society v Master of the Rolls & Anor

The court decided that paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 14 to the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, which provides that "Any registration may be made subject to such conditions as the Society sees fit to impose," is to be read as referring to the making of the initial entry in the register rather than as a general power to impose conditions at any time after registration. The Divisional Court agreed with the Master of the Rolls that the statutory language, the express provisions elsewhere in Schedule 14 (notably paragraphs 12(2), 13 and 14) and the statutory context indicate that Parliament intended only specific occasions for the imposition of conditions.

The court relied on a purposive construction coupled with ordinary canons of interpretation: (i) the presence of express powers to impose conditions on revival or termination of suspension made a general, unlimited power improbable, (ii) the wording of paragraph 14 (appeals) and the one‑month time limit supported a view that paragraph 2(3) looked to the initial registration event, and (iii) comparison with the Solicitors Act 1974 showed Parliament chose to circumscribe powers to impose conditions for solicitors and there was no clear basis to treat foreign lawyers differently.

On that basis the Law Society's application for judicial review of the Master of the Rolls' decision was refused.

Background and parties: The interested party, Mr Michael A Shuman, a Texas attorney registered as a foreign lawyer by the Law Society under the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, had conditions imposed on his registration by a Law Society adjudication panel on 25 July 2003. Mr Shuman had been the subject of an investigation by the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors and the Law Society referred matters to the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal. The adjudication panel imposed a set of conditions stated to protect the public pending disciplinary resolution.

Procedural posture: Mr Shuman appealed the panel's decision to the Master of the Rolls under paragraph 14 of Schedule 14 CLSA. The narrow point determined on that appeal was the construction of paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 14 (whether "registration" there referred to the initial making of an entry or to the entry as it exists at any time). The Master of the Rolls held that the provision referred only to the making of the initial entry. The Law Society sought judicial review of that decision in this Divisional Court. The Master of the Rolls took no part in these proceedings.

Nature of the claim / relief sought: The Law Society sought judicial review of the Master of the Rolls' construction of paragraph 2(3) Schedule 14 CLSA, contending that the Law Society had a continuing power to impose conditions on a registered foreign lawyer's entry in the register, not merely a power exercised at the moment of initial registration.

Issues framed:

• Does "registration" in paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 14 CLSA mean the making of the initial entry in the register or the register entry at any time?
• If paragraph 2(3) were limited to initial registration, would that produce an unacceptable lacuna in the regulatory scheme?

Court's reasoning: The court treated the phrase as ambiguous but resolved it by reference to the statutory context and purpose. It noted that paragraphs 12(2) and 13 expressly empower the Society to impose conditions on revival or termination of suspension and that paragraph 14 (appeal provisions) refers specifically to conditions imposed under paragraphs 2(3), 12(2) and 13 and prescribes a one‑month appeal period tied to notification of an application. Those features indicated the draftsman contemplated conditions being imposed on particular events rather than at any time. The court rejected reliance on the Interpretation Act 1978 s.12(1) to read a general recurring power into paragraph 2(3). It emphasised that Parliament had expressly circumscribed powers to impose conditions in the Solicitors Act 1974 for solicitors and saw no reason to conclude a broader, unrestricted power was intended for registered foreign lawyers. The court acknowledged the possibility of a regulatory "lacuna" but considered it not decisive, noting alternative steps (including reporting to the regulator in the lawyer's home jurisdiction and the s.89(5) power to extend 1974 Act provisions) and that the question of legislative or executive remedy was for others.

Conclusion / remedy: The Divisional Court refused the application for judicial review, upholding the Master of the Rolls' construction that paragraph 2(3) refers to the making of the initial registration entry and that the Law Society did not have a general power to impose conditions at any time post-registration.

The application for judicial review was refused. The court held that "registration" in paragraph 2(3) of Schedule 14 to the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 refers to the making of the initial entry in the register. The Law Society therefore does not possess a general, unfettered power to impose conditions on a registered foreign lawyer after initial registration; the power to impose conditions arises only on the specific occasions set out elsewhere in the Schedule (for example on revival or termination of suspension) and the statutory language and context support that construction.

Adjudication Panel of the Law Society imposed conditions on Mr Shuman's registration (25 July 2003); Mr Shuman appealed to the Master of the Rolls under paragraph 14, Schedule 14, CLSA (Master of the Rolls held paragraph 2(3) limited to initial registration). The Law Society sought judicial review of the Master of the Rolls' decision in the Divisional Court, which is reported as [2005] EWHC 146 (Admin).